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13Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation umfasst drei Kapitel, die sich mit drei verschie-
denen Themengebieten aus der Finanz￿konomie und Volkswirtschaft befas-
sen. Im ersten Kapitel wird eine neue Methode entwickelt, mit Hilfe derer sich
￿￿entliche Aussagen einer Zentralbank in quantitative Einsch￿tzungsindika-
toren umwandeln lassen, die zur Analyse der Geldpolitik dieser Zentralbank
herangezogen werden k￿nnen. Im zweiten Kapitel 1 wird der Ein￿uss von an
die Umsetzung von Reformen gekn￿pften Kreditprogrammen des Interna-
tionalen W￿hrungsfonds (IWF) auf das Wirtschaftswachstum der an den
Programmen teilnehmenden L￿nder untersucht. Im dritten Kapitel 2 werden
die Entstehung systemischen Risikos in einem Netzwerkmodell von Banken,
die ￿ber ihre Bilanzen miteinander verbunden sind, sowie die M￿glichkeit,
systemisches Risiko ￿ber einen Systemrisikowert-Ansatz und eine systemi-
sche Risikogeb￿hr zu senken, analysiert. Alle drei Kapitel er￿￿nen wichtige
Einblicke in die Politikgestaltung bedeutender volkswirtschaftlicher Institu-
tionen wie Zentralbanken, IWF und makroprudenzieller Aufsicht.
Die im ersten Kapitel der Dissertation entwickelten Einsch￿tzungsindika-
toren bilden Erwartungen und Einsch￿tzungen einer Zentralbank ￿ber die f￿r
ihre Geldpolitik relevanten Variablen, wie zum Beispiel die reale Wirtschafts-
aktivit￿t oder In￿ation ab und k￿nnen zur Analyse der geldpolitischen Stra-
tegie von Zentralbanken, beispielsweise durch Sch￿tzung einer Taylor-Regel
verwendet werden.
Der Informationsgehalt von Einsch￿tzungen einer Zentralbank ￿ber die
f￿r ihre Geldpolitik relevanten Variablen kann sich vom Informationsgehalt
dieser Variablen selbst unterscheiden. Zum Beispiel kann eine Zentralbank
davon ausgehen, dass ein auftretender In￿ationsschock nur tempor￿rer Na-
tur ist. In diesem Fall wird sie dem Schock wahrscheinlich nicht viel Gewicht
1Das zweite Kapitel wurde zusammen mit Professor Michael Binder, Goethe-
Universit￿t Frankfurt am Main, verfasst.
2Das dritte Kapitel wurde zusammen mit Professor Jan Pieter Krahnen, Goethe-
Universit￿t Frankfurt am Main, verfasst.
14f￿r ihre geldpolitischen Entscheidungen beimessen. Falls sie aber davon aus-
geht, dass der In￿ationsschock von Dauer ist, dann ist es wahrscheinlich,
dass ihre geldpolitischen Entscheidungen davon st￿rker beein￿usst werden.
Die Einsch￿tzung der Zentralbank ￿ber den In￿ationsschock und dessen Aus-
wirkungen sind jedoch nicht in der In￿ationsrate selbst enthalten. Da die
geldpolitischen Entscheidungen in der Zentralbank stark von ihren Einsch￿t-
zungen abh￿ngen, bietet es sich an, diese f￿r eine Analyse der Geldpolitik
dieser Zentralbank heranzuziehen.
Zentralbanken erreichen in der ￿￿entlichkeit durch Transparenz und Kom-
munikation ￿ber ihre geldpolitischen Entscheidungen ein Verst￿ndnis ihres
geldpolitischen Entscheidungsprozesses und erh￿hen damit nicht zuletzt die
Wirksamkeit ihrer Geldpolitik. Da die meisten Zentralbanken aus diesem
Grunde ihre geldpolitischen Entscheidungen in regelm￿￿ig erscheinenden Be-
richten erkl￿ren und kommunizieren, bietet es sich an, diese Informationsquel-
le zur Analyse ihrer Geldpolitik heranzuziehen. Um die von den Zentralban-
ken kommunizierten Einsch￿tzungen f￿r eine statistische Analyse verwertbar
zu machen, wird im ersten Kapitel gezeigt, wie sich Erwartungsindikatoren
erstellen lassen. Die vorgeschlagene Herangehensweise besteht darin, in ei-
nem ersten Schritt Aussagen der Zentralbank in ihrem Monatsberichtsheft
mit ordinalen Kennzahlen zu bewerten, die anzeigen, ob die Aussage darauf
hindeutet, dass die bewertete Gr￿￿e (i) positiv, (ii) negativ oder (iii) nicht
von ihrem Trend abweicht. In einem zweiten Schritt werden diese ordinalen
Kennzahlen dann mit Hilfe des Gleichgewichtsstatistik-Ansatzes in quanti-
tative Einsch￿tzungsindikatoren der Zentralbank ￿ber f￿r ihre Geldpolitik
relevante Richtgr￿￿en, wie zum Beispiel In￿ation oder die reale Wirtschafts-
aktivit￿t umgewandelt. Diese k￿nnen dann f￿r die statistische Analyse der
Geldpolitik im Rahmen einer Taylor-Regel verwendet werden.
Nachdem diese neue Analysemethode erl￿utert wurde, wird sie verwendet,
um einen neuen Datensatz zu erstellen, der die Einsch￿tzungen der Deutschen
Bundesbank ￿ber die f￿r sie politikrelevanten Variablen aus ihren Aussagen
in den Monatsberichtsheften ￿ber den Zeitraum Januar 1970 bis Dezember
1998 heraus￿ltert. Dieser Datensatz wird dann zur Sch￿tzung einer Taylor-
Regel f￿r die Deutsche Bundesbank ￿ber den betrachteten Zeitraum heran-
15gezogen.
Der geldpolitische Erfolg der Deutschen Bundesbank wird nach wie vor
als eine Referenz f￿r das Erreichen von Geldwertstabilit￿t betrachtet. Ein
herausragendes Merkmal der geldpolitischen Strategie der Deutschen Bun-
desbank war der Ansatz ￿exibler Geldmengensteuerung. Diesem Ansatz fol-
gend versuchte die Deutsche Bundesbank, Geldwertstabilit￿t zu erreichen,
indem sie geldpolitische Entscheidungen auf das Erreichen von Wachstums-
zielen f￿r Geldmengenaggregate ausrichtete. Die Deutsche Bundesbank ist
hierbei jedoch ￿exibel und pragmatisch vorgegangen und hat ihre Geldpolitik
nicht mechanisch vom Erreichen dieser Wachstumsziele beein￿ussen lassen,
sondern auch andere Richtgr￿￿en ber￿cksichtigt, wie zum Beispiel die reale
Wirtschaftsaktivit￿t oder In￿ation. Sowohl Clarida, Gali und Gertler (1998)
als auch Bernanke und Mihov (1997) haben jedoch in Frage gestellt, dass die
Deutsche Bundesbank tats￿chlich Wachstumsziele f￿r Geldmengenaggregate
in ihren geldpolitischen Entscheidungen ber￿cksichtigt hat. Bei einer Ana-
lyse der Geldpolitik der Deutschen Bundesbank mittels einer Taylor-Regel
￿nden die Autoren keine statistische Signi￿kanz von Geldmengenaggregaten
als erkl￿rende Variablen.
Im Gegensatz dazu f￿hrt die im ersten Kapitel vorgestellte Analysemetho-
de zu einem anderen Ergebnis. Verwendet man die Einsch￿tzungsindikatoren
als erkl￿rende Variablen in einer Taylor-Regel, dann zeigt die Analyse, dass
die realwirtschaftliche Aktivit￿t, In￿ation und die Entwicklung von Geld-
mengenaggregaten die geldpolitischen Entscheidungen der Deutschen Bun-
desbank signi￿kant erkl￿ren k￿nnen. Strukturbruchtests nach Bai and Perron
(1998) zeigen an, dass die Deutsche Bundesbank dieser Geldpolitik ￿exibler
Geldmengensteuerung von April 1975 bis Dezember 1998 gefolgt ist. Dieses
Ergebnis deutet darauf hin, dass die Verwendung von Geldmengenaggrega-
ten, wie beispielsweise auch von der Europ￿ischen Zentralbank praktiziert,
Teil einer erfolgreichen geldpolitischen Strategie sein kann.
Im zweiten Kapitel der Dissertation wird der Ein￿uss von an Reformen
gekn￿pften Kreditprogrammen des IWF auf das Wirtschaftswachstum von
teilnehmenden L￿ndern untersucht.
16Als der IWF im Jahre 1945 seine T￿tigkeit aufnahm, sollte er als unabh￿n-
gige internationale Organisation sowohl zu makro￿konomischer und ￿nanzi-
eller Stabilit￿t beitragen als auch das Wachstum der Weltwirtschaft bef￿r-
dern. Nach dem Scheitern des Bretton-Woods Systems in den 1970er Jahren
erweiterte der IWF seine Aktivit￿ten in den Bereich von an Bedingungen
gekn￿pfter Entwicklungshilfe. Um sich f￿r derartige Kreditprogramme des
IWF zu quali￿zieren, muss sich ein Land im Gegenzug zur Durchf￿hrung
wirtschaftlicher und struktureller Reformen verp￿ichten. Diese Konditiona-
lit￿t soll sicherstellen, dass die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in dem entspre-
chenden Land eine sp￿tere R￿ckzahlung der Hilfszahlungen erm￿glicht.
Bisherige Analysen der Auswirkungen von IWF-Kreditprogrammen auf
das Wirtschaftswachstum von teilnehmenden L￿ndern f￿hren zu unterschied-
lichen Ergebnissen. So kommen Barro und Lee (2005), die polit￿konomische
Variablen benutzen, um m￿gliche Endogenit￿t der IWF-Programmteilnahme
zu ber￿cksichtigen, zu dem Schluss, dass die Teilnahme an Kreditprogram-
men des IWF einen negativen E￿ekt auf das Wirtschaftswachstum hat. In
einer kontrafaktischen Analyse ￿ndet auch Vreeland (2003) Hinweise darauf,
dass die Teilnahme an IWF-Kreditprogrammen zu einer Verringerung des
Wirtschaftswachstums f￿hrt. Im Gegensatz dazu zeigen Dicks-Mireaux, Me-
cagni und Schadler (2000) ebenfalls anhand einer kontrafaktischen Analyse,
dass sich IWF-Kreditprogramme positiv auf das Wirtschaftswachstum von
teilnehmenden L￿ndern auswirken. Diese unterschiedlichen Ergebnisse deu-
ten darauf hin, dass bei der Untersuchung von IWF-Kreditprogrammen auf
das Wirtschaftswachstum Zustandsabh￿ngigkeit der Teilnahmee￿ekte eine
wichtige Rolle spielt.
F￿r die Analyse der Wachstumse￿ekte von an Reformen gekn￿pften Kre-
ditprogrammen verwenden wir ein zustandsabh￿ngiges Paneldatenmodell mit
festen E￿ekten. Um Selektionsverzerrung und Endogenit￿t zu ber￿cksichti-
gen, benutzen wir ein Gleichungssystem, das aus zwei Gleichungen besteht.
Die erste Gleichung modelliert die E￿ekte der Programmteilnahme auf das
Wirtschaftswachstum (￿Wachstumsgleichung￿) und die zweite Gleichung mo-
delliert die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Teilnahme an IWF Kreditprogrammen
(￿Teilnahmegleichung￿). Die Sch￿tzung der Gleichungskoe￿zienten ￿ndet in
17zwei Schritten statt. In einem ersten Schritt wird die Teilnehmegleichung mit
dem Kredit-Quote-Verh￿ltnis als abh￿ngiger Variable gesch￿tzt. 3 Aus dem
Fehlerterm dieser Sch￿tzung lassen sich Korrekturterme erstellen, die als zu-
s￿tzliche erkl￿rende Variablen in die Wachstumsgleichung mit aufgenommen
werden. Durch die Ber￿cksichtigung dieser Korrekturterme kann der E￿ekt
des Kredit-Quote-Verh￿ltnis auf das reale pro Kopf Wirtschaftswachstum
von an IWF-Kreditprogrammen teilnehmenden L￿ndern unverzerrt gesch￿tzt
werden.
Die Heterogenit￿t der E￿ekte von IWF-Kreditprogrammen auf das Wirt-
schaftswachstum wird mit Hilfe eines semiparametrischen zustandsabh￿n-
gigen Pooling Ansatzes ber￿cksichtigt, bei dem die E￿ekte der IWF-Kre-
ditprogrammteilnahme auf das Wirtschaftswachstum selbst Funktion einer
bedingenden Variable sind. Um m￿glicher Zustandsabh￿ngigkeit der Teil-
nahmee￿ekte Rechnung zu tragen, werden in der Analyse zwei bedingen-
de Variablen verwendet, einerseits der Grad, zu dem vereinbarte Reformen
tats￿chlich umgesetzt werden, und andererseits institutionelle Faktoren, die
die E￿ektivit￿t der Hilfsprogramme beein￿ussen k￿nnen. Da die von einem
am IWF-Kreditprogramm teilnehmenden Land zugesagten Reformen meist
nur schrittweise umgesetzt werden, zahlt der IWF vereinbarte Kreditbetr￿ge
auch nur schrittweise aus, und zwar zu jeweils vorher festgelegten Terminen,
wenn das Land die vereinbarten Reformen tats￿chlich umgesetzt hat. Aus
diesem Grunde kann das Verh￿ltnis von tats￿chlich ausgezahlten Geldern
zu in dem Hilfsprogramm insgesamt vereinbarten Geldern als Proxyvariable
f￿r den Grad, zu dem ein Land die vereinbarten Reformschritte tats￿chlich
umgesetzt hat, verwendet werden. Als zweite Proxyvariable f￿r die Zustands-
abh￿ngigkeit der E￿ekte von IWF-Kreditprogrammteilnahme auf das Wirt-
schaftswachstum wird die institutionelle Qualit￿t des teilnehmenden Landes
verwendet, da (i) diese einen direkten Ein￿uss auf die E￿ektivit￿t von verwen-
deten Hilfsgeldern hat und (ii) der IWF seit den 1980er Jahren strukturelle
Reformbedingungen, die vor allem auf Fortschritte im politischen, legislati-
3Das Kredit-Quote-Verh￿ltnis ist das Verh￿ltnis der Summe aller an Bedingungen
gekn￿pften Kredite des IWF, die f￿r ein Land bewilligt wurden, zu dessen Quote beim
IWF.
18ven und institutionellen Umfeld abzielen, in seinen Kreditprogrammen ver-
wendet. Um ein m￿glichst breites Spektrum von Merkmalen institutioneller
Qualit￿t abzubilden, verwenden wir einen Index, in den l￿nderspezi￿sche In-
formationen ￿ber die Qualit￿t des Beamtenapparates, Korruption, Recht und
Ordnung, Stabilit￿t der Regierung, ethnische Spannungen, interne Kon￿ikte,
Lebenserwartung und Schulbildung ein￿ie￿en.
Die Analyse, in der j￿hrliche Daten f￿r 86 L￿nder ￿ber den Zeitraum
von 1975 bis 2005 verwendet werden, zeigt, dass die Teilnahmee￿ekte von
IWF-Kreditprogrammen auf das Wirtschaftswachstum systematisch mit dem
Grad der Umsetzung vereinbarter Reformschritte sowie dem Index insti-
tutioneller Faktoren variieren. IWF-Kreditprogramme f￿hren zu positiven
Teilnahmee￿ekten, wenn die vereinbarten Reformen zu einem ausreichen-
den Grad umgesetzt werden oder wenn die Teilnahme am Kreditprogramm
mit ausreichenden Fortschritten bei der institutionellen Qualit￿t verbun-
den ist. Im Hinblick auf die St￿rke der E￿ekte zeigt sich in einer Analy-
se der Wachstumsbeitr￿ge, dass die Teilnahme an IWF-Kreditprogrammen
im Durchschnitt ￿ber alle L￿nder und Zeitpunkte betr￿chtlich zum Wirt-
schaftswachstum eines Landes beitr￿gt. Der durchschnittliche Beitrag von be-
dingten IWF-Kreditprogrammen zum Wirtschaftswachstum ist durchschnitt-
lich gr￿￿er als der von In￿ation, aber weitaus kleiner als der von Investi-
tionen. Ferner deutet eine intertemporale Analyse darauf hin, dass IWF-
Kreditprogramme bis zu einem Zeitraum von drei Jahren nach Programm-
teilnahme einen signi￿kant positiven Ein￿uss auf das Wirtschaftswachstum
haben, wenn ein teilnehmendes Land die vereinbarten Reformen zu einem
ausreichenden Grad umsetzt oder wenn die Programmteilnahme mit ausrei-
chenden Fortschritten bei der institutionellen Qualit￿t verbunden ist. Insge-
samt zeigen die Analyseergebnisse des zweiten Kapitels, dass L￿nder, die an
bedingten IWF-Kreditprogrammen teilnehmen, versuchen sollten, die damit
verbundene Konditionalit￿t weitestgehend zu erf￿llen sowie gr￿￿tm￿gliche
Fortschritte in ihrer institutionellen Qualit￿t zu erreichen.
Im dritten Kapitel der Dissertation werden die Entstehung systemischen
Risikos in einem Netzwerkmodell von Finanzinstituten sowie die M￿glichkeit,
19systemisches Risiko ￿ber einen Systemrisikowert-Ansatz und eine systemische
Risikogeb￿hr zu senken, analysiert.
Die globale Finanzkrise, die im Jahre 2007 ihren Anfang nahm, hat deut-
lich gemacht, dass ein System vernetzter Finanzinstitute systemischem Risi-
ko ausgesetzt ist und durch Insolvenzen die Realwirtschaft in Mitleidenschaft
ziehen kann. Systemisches Risiko ist die Gefahr, dass durch Ausf￿lle im Fi-
nanzsystem eine ausreichende Bereitstellung von Krediten und Finanzdienst-
leistungen nicht mehr gew￿hrleistet ist, so dass sich negative realwirtschaft-
liche E￿ekte ergeben. Finanzinstitute k￿nnen ein Interesse daran haben, zu
gro￿ oder zu vernetzt um zu fallieren zu werden, damit sie von den daraus
resultierenden g￿nstigen Re￿nanzierungsbedingungen pro￿tieren k￿nnen. Im
Falle eines drohenden Systemzusammenbruchs gehen dieselben Finanzinsti-
tute jedoch davon aus, dass sie von der Regierung ￿gerettet￿ werden, um
Schaden von der Realwirtschaft abzuwenden. Systemisches Risiko ist dem-
nach eine negative Externalit￿t, die von Finanzinstituten ausgel￿st wird und
das gesamte Finanzsystem betri￿t. Eines der zentralen Anliegen gegenw￿rti-
ger Reformbem￿hungen ist, Finanzinstitute angemessen an den durch syste-
misches Risiko entstehenden Kosten zu beteiligen.
Systemisches Risiko wird vor allem durch die Vernetzung der Finanzin-
stitute untereinander sowie durch Korrelationen zwischen den Bilanzen der
Finanzinstitute hervorgerufen. Zum einen besteht zwischen Banken ￿ber ge-
genseitig eingegangene Verp￿ichtungen (z.B. Interbankenkredite) ein Kon-
trahentenrisiko. Ger￿t eine Bank in Schie￿age und kann den eingegangenen
Verp￿ichtungen nicht mehr nachkommen, ￿bertr￿gt sie einen Schock auf ihre
Gegenparteien. Zum anderen sind die Bilanzen von Banken, die dieselben Fi-
nanzinvestitionen get￿tigt haben, indirekt ￿ber Marktpreisbewertung dieser
Investitionen miteinander verbunden. Ausf￿lle im Portfolio einiger Finanzin-
stitute k￿nnen diese in Schie￿age bringen. Um regulatorische Kapitalanfor-
derungen zu erf￿llen, k￿nnen sich diese Banken dann zu Notverk￿ufen ihrer
Verm￿genswerte gezwungen sehen. Dies kann jedoch zu einem Absinken der
Preise dieser Verm￿genswerte f￿hren und durch Marktpreisbewertung die
Bilanzen anderer Banken, die ebenfalls in diese Verm￿genswerte investiert
haben, unter Druck setzen. Schocks k￿nnen dementsprechend direkt (Kredi-
20trisiko) oder indirekt (Marktrisiko) ￿ber das Finanzsystem ￿bertragen wer-
den.
Das im dritten Kapitel entwickelte Modell soll diese Zusamenh￿nge erfas-
sen. Es besteht aus drei Banken, die ￿ber ihre Bilanzen direkt und indirekt
miteinander verbunden sind und ihr Portfolio automatisch anpassen, um re-
gulatorische Eigenkapitalanforderungen zu erf￿llen. Die Banken sind unter-
einander direkt ￿ber gegenseitig eingegangene Verbindlichkeiten und indi-
rekt ￿ber einen modellendogenen Verm￿gensmarkt miteinander verbunden.
Erf￿llt eine Bank nicht die regulatorisch vorgeschriebene Eigenkapitalquo-
te, hat sie die M￿glichkeit, ihre Eigenkapitalposition zu verbessern, indem
sie mit anderen Banken eingegangene Verbindlichkeiten au￿￿st oder Verm￿-
genswerte verkauft. Letzteres hat jedoch einen negativen E￿ekt auf die Preise
dieser Verm￿genswerte. Da Banken in dem Modell ihre Verm￿genswerte zu
Marktpreisen bewerten, hat der Verkauf von Verm￿genswerten einer Bank
Auswirkungen auf die Bilanzen aller Banken, die diese Verm￿genswerte auch
halten und sich vielleicht gezwungen sehen, auch entsprechende Portfolioan-
passungen vorzunehmen. Im Modell ist systemisches Risiko als der anteili-
ge Ausfall der Verm￿genswerte von insolventen Finanzinstituten relativ zur
Summe aller systemweit gehaltenen Verm￿genswerte de￿niert. Der Beitrag
einzelner Institute zum systemischen Risiko wird mit Hilfe des Shapleywertes
ermittelt, eines Konzeptes aus der Spieltheorie. 4
Um das Risiko tiefgehender Systemkrisen zuk￿nftig zu verringern, besteht
mittlerweile Einigkeit, dass die Finanzaufsicht die ￿traditionelle￿ mikropru-
dentielle ￿berwachung um eine makroprudentielle, das hei￿t systemumfas-
sende Dimension erweitern muss. Diese erweiterte Aufsicht soll es erm￿gli-
chen, die Ausl￿ser systemischen Risikos zu identi￿zieren, sie zu ￿berwachen
und angemessen darauf zu reagieren. Das entwickelte Modell repliziert em-
pirisch beobachtbare Ph￿nom￿ne, die durch systemisches Risiko im Finanz-
system w￿hrend der Finanzkrise aufgetreten sind, und wird dazu verwendet,
die Eigenschaften eines systemischen Risikowerts (￿Systemic Value at Risk￿)
zu analysieren.
Bei dem systemischen Risikowertansatz soll eine Systemrisikogeb￿hr Fi-
4Siehe Shapley (1953).
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und damit das gesamte systemische Risiko - zu senken. Diese Geb￿hr kann
gleichzeitig zur Kapitalisierung eines systemischen Risikofonds herangezogen
werden. Im Modell h￿ngt der Umfang des Systemrisikofonds vom Zustand
des Finanzsystems, einer Anzahl m￿glicher Stressszenarien in Bezug auf die
Bilanzen der Finanzinstitute und dem systemischen Risikowert ab. Der sys-
temische Risikowert wird hierbei als der erwartete prozentuale Ausfall des
Finanzsystems in einem festgelegten Quantil der Verteilung von Stressszena-
rien de￿niert. Die Geb￿hr einzelner Finanzinstitute zum Systemrisikofonds
bemisst sich nach dem Beitrag der einzelnen Institute zum erwarteten syste-
mischen Risiko. Um das Finanzsystem robuster gegen￿ber systemischem Ri-
siko zu machen, werden die Gelder des Systemrisikofonds als zus￿tzliche Ka-
pitalpu￿er in die Finanzinstitute injiziert und zwar so, dass der gew￿nschte
systemische Risikowert erf￿llt wird. Die optimale L￿sung, in der das notwen-
dige Gesamtaufkommen, das zur Erf￿llung des vorgegebenen systemischen
Risikowertes ben￿tigt wird, minimiert wird, kann mit Hilfe eines f￿r das Mo-
dell angepassten parallelisierten simulierten Abk￿hlungsverfahrens gefunden
werden.
Die Analyse des dritten Kapitels zeigt, dass der Beitrag eines Finanz-
instituts zum systemischen Risiko nicht unbedingt mit dem Wert der opti-
malen Kapitalinjektion zur Erf￿llung des systemischen Risikowertes ￿berein-
stimmen muss. Unserem Ansatz folgend ist es deshalb wichtig, zwischen der
Beitragszahlung, die sich aus dem Beitrag zum systemischen Risiko und dem
notwendigen Gesamtaufkommen des systemischen Risikofonds ergibt und von
einer Vielzahl verschiedener Risikofaktoren ausgel￿st wird, und der den Sys-
temrisikowert erf￿llenden optimalen Kapitalinjektion zu unterscheiden, wenn
letztere die Risikofaktoren unterschiedlich beein￿usst. Die Untersuchungser-
gebnisse deuten auch darauf hin, dass ein Systemrisikofonds, dessen Gelder
in den Banken als zus￿tzliche Kapitalpu￿er angelegt werden, geringere Ge-
b￿hren verursacht als ein Fonds, dessen Aufkommen zentral aufbewahrt wird
und nach Auftreten eines Schocks zur Rettung von Banken aufgewendet wird.
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This thesis consist of three chapters of which each investigates a topic from
￿nancial and monetary economics. In the ￿rst chapter a novel method to
analyze the monetary policy of central banks is presented. In the second
chapter the e￿ects of conditional loan programs of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) on participating countries’ output growth are investigated.
In the third chapter a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets
which gives rise to systemic risk is developed and used to analyze the im-
plications of a bank levy related to banks’ contribution to systemic risk.
All three chapters give important insights to the policy design of macroeco-
nomic institutions such as central banks, the IMF, and agencies charged with
macroprudential supervision.
The ￿rst chapter outlines a method for using qualitative information to
analyze the monetary policy strategy of central banks. Quantitative assess-
ment indicators that are extracted from a central bank’s public statements
via the balance statistic approach are employed to estimate a Taylor-type
rule. This procedure allows to directly capture a policymaker’s assessments
of macroeconomic variables that are relevant for its decision making pro-
cess. As an application of the proposed method the monetary policy of the
Deutsche Bundesbank is re-investigated with a new dataset. One distinctive
feature of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s strategy consisted of targeting growth
in monetary aggregates. The analysis using the proposed method provides
evidence that the Deutsche Bundesbank indeed took into consideration mon-
etary aggregates but also real economic activity and in￿ation developments
in its monetary policy strategy since 1975.
In the second chapter5 the e￿ect of conditional loan programs of the IMF
on participating countries’ output growth is re-investigated with a state-
dependent panel data model. The model accounts in particular for program
participation selection and the potential conditionality of the output growth
5The second chapter is joint work with Professor Michael Binder, Goethe-Universit￿t
Frankfurt am Main.
23e￿ects of program participation on a country’s degree of program imple-
mentation and institutional factors such as quality of governance, internal
stability, health, and educational attainment. It is shown that the e￿ects of
IMF program participation on output growth vary systematically with the
degree of program implementation as well as an index of institutional factors,
and that these e￿ects are positive only if the IMF program is implemented
to a su￿cient degree or if program participation is coupled with su￿cient
progress in improving institutional quality.
In the third chapter6 the emergence of systemic risk in a network model
of interconnected bank balance sheets is analyzed. Given a shock to assets
of one or several banks, systemic risk in the form of multiple bank defaults
depends on the strength of balance sheets and asset market liquidity. The
price of assets on the secondary market is endogenous in the model, thereby
relating funding liquidity to bank solvency ￿ an important stylized fact of
banking crises. A systemic risk charge which relies on the Shapley Value in a
system value at risk model is then introduced. Using a parallelized simulated
annealing algorithm the properties of an optimal charge are derived. Among
other things we ￿nd that there is not necessarily a correspondence between
a bank’s contribution to systemic risk ￿ which determines its risk charge ￿
and the capital that is optimally injected into it to make the ￿nancial system
more resilient to systemic risk. The analysis has policy implications for the
design of optimal bank levies.
6The third chapter is joint work with Professor Jan Pieter Krahnen, Goethe-
Universit￿t Frankfurt am Main.
24Chapter 1
Investigating the Monetary Policy
of Central Banks with Assessment
Indicators
Empirical analyses of monetary policy are usually characterized by estimating
interest rate rules which express the central bank’s policy rate as a function of
data on macroeconomic variables. 1 One strand of literature in this ￿eld uses
qualitative information to capture a policymaker’s assessments of macroe-
conomic variables that are important for its decision making process. The
analysis in this chapter extends that literature and outlines how quantitative
assessment indicators that are generated from a central bank’s statements
about economic and monetary developments can be used to estimate a mon-
etary policy rule. As an application of the proposed method the monetary
policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank is re-investigated.
The information content of a policymaker’s assessment of a variable which
is important for its decision making process can di￿er from the numerical
value of the same variable. For example, a policymaker might think that
a shock to a variable that plays an important role for its monetary policy,
such as the in￿ation rate, is of temporary nature only. In this case the shock
will not be attributed much weight in the central bank’s monetary policy
1For a general review of Taylor-type rules see Orphanides (1998).
25decisions. In contrast, if a policymaker judges the shock to be of permanent
nature its actions are likely to be shaped (partly) in response to the shock.
When the monetary policy stance of a central bank is to be investigated,
incorporating the decision maker’s assessment of key-variables can thus add
important information going beyond the numerical value of these variables.
Central banks achieve an understanding of their monetary policy deci-
sions in the public through transparency and communication. 2 On the one
hand, they are accountable to the public because of their relatively high de-
gree of independence and, on the other hand, it improves the e￿ciency of
their monetary policy. Since most central banks thus regularly explain and
communicate their monetary policy decisions to the public it o￿ers the pos-
sibility to use this information for an analysis of their monetary policy. The
information about variables that are important for a central bank’s decision
making process, such as, for example, real economic activity, can be captured
via collecting its public statements from its regular economic statistical bul-
letins. To render the information contained in the statements accessible for
statistical analysis this chapter proposes an approach which consists of two
steps. In a ￿rst step the statements are assigned ordinal index marks which
depend on whether the statement is indicative (i) of an upward, (ii) of a
downward or (iii) of no deviation of the variables of interest from trend. In
a second step these ordinally indexed statements are then transformed with
the balance statistic approach into quantitative assessment indicators which
can be used for statistical analysis.
As an application of the proposed method a new dataset that allows to
re-examine the monetary policy strategy of the Deutsche Bundesbank is set
up. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s monetary policy continues to be considered
as a benchmark for many central banks in light of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s
success in maintaining price stability. One distinctive feature of its strategy
was the targeting of growth in monetary aggregates. However, this notion
has been challenged by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) as well as Bernanke
2For an overview on the importance of transparency and accountability for central
banks see, for example, Eij￿nger and Hoeberichts (2002) or Hahn (2002). For a theoretical
and empirical analysis on transparency see, for example, Faust and Svensson (2001) and
Eij￿nger and Geraats (2006), respectively.
26and Mihov (1997) who ￿nd monetary aggregates to be statistically insignif-
icant when estimating Taylor-type rules for the Deutsche Bundesbank. By
contrast, using the proposed assessment indicator approach to analyze the
monetary policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank provides evidence that the
Deutsche Bundesbank indeed took into consideration monetary aggregates
but also real economic activity and in￿ation developments in its monetary
policy strategy from 1975 to 1998.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 reviews
the existing literature. Section 1.2 describes the construction of assessment
indicators, and Section 1.3 provides an analysis of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s
monetary policy using the proposed method. Section 1.4 concludes. Further
details regarding the dataset, results, and econometric modelling framework
are described in several appendices at the end of the chapter.
271.1 Review of Previous Literature
The usefulness of qualitative information to investigate central banks’ mon-
etary policy has become evident in numerous analyses. In a related arti-
cle Gerlach (2007) constructs quantitative indicators of the ECB Governing
Council’s assessments of economic conditions to analyze its interest rate deci-
sions. Among other things he ￿nds that the ECB did not react to temporary
in￿ation shocks but to economic activity because it in￿uences the outlook for
in￿ation. Furthermore, the Konjunkturforschungsstelle der Eidgen￿ssischen
Technischen Hochschule Z￿rich (2005) regularly publishes an indicator that
captures the ECB president’s statements concerning risks to price stability.
The index contains information about the future path of monetary policy of
the ECB. Using the index, Lamla and Rupprecht (2006) ￿nd that the ECB
communication a￿ects the term structure in the medium term. They provide
evidence that the ECB’s forecasts of price developments and its interpreta-
tions are important news for the markets. Sturm and de Haan (2009), also
using the index and four additional qualitative information indicators, 3 an-
alyze whether communication by the ECB o￿ers additional information as
compared to the information content in standard Taylor rules. They show
that the indicators indeed contain additional information that helps to pre-
dict future policy decisions of the ECB.
Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) analyze the information content of ECB
statements during monthly press conferences and show that the inclusion of
an indicator for signal words can improve a model’s ￿t when added to stan-
dard explanatory variables in a Taylor rule. Berger, de Haan, and Sturm
(2006) analyze the role of money in the ECB monetary policy using qual-
itative information from the introductory statements of the ECB monthly
press conferences. The authors ￿nd that the indicator of the monetary pol-
icy only plays a minor role in the ECB’s interest rate decisions. Rosa and
Verga (2005) analyze to what extent markets react to the information of the
ECB released during its press conferences. Translating the qualitative infor-
3The four additional communication indicators are (i) an updated version of the Rosa
and Verga (2007) index, (ii) the index of Heinemann and Ullrich (2007), (iii) the aggregate
index of Berger, de Haan, and Sturm (2006), and (iv) the indicator of Ullrich (2008).
28mation of the press conferences into an ordinal scale they ￿nd that the public
understands and believes in the signals sent by the ECB.
Hansen and De Haan (2009) examine whether ECB statements on the
main re￿nancing rate and future in￿ation are signi￿cantly related to interest
rate decisions. In an out-of-sample evaluation they show that communication
based models do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in
predicting policy rate decisions. Hayo, Kutan, and Neuenkirch (2008) study
the e￿ect of Federal Open Market Commitee (FOMC) communication on
U.S. ￿nancial markets. The authors ￿nd that more formal communication
channels such as monetary policy reports have higher impact on ￿nancial
markets’ return and volatility.
Hayo and Neuenkirch (2009) use a Taylor rule augmented with Federal
Reserve communication indicators and ￿nd that including the communication
indicators signi￿cantly improves explanatory power for interest rate decisions
in and out of sample. Pakko (2005) analyzes the predictive content of U.S.
FOMC statements which contain information about a subsequent tightening
or easing of monetary policy. Using a Taylor rule framework he provides evi-
dence that these statements are usefull for forecasting changes in the federal
funds target.
In a broader sense this chapter is also related to the so-called ‘narra-
tive approach’, that is, the identi￿cation of monetary shocks through non-
statistical procedures. This literature involves historical records that contain
information about the motives that led to decisions by monetary authori-
ties. For example, Romer and Romer (2004) use quantitative and narrative
records to infer the Federal Reserve’s intention for its target rate and ￿nd
that monetary policy decisions by the Federal Reserve had large and rapid
e￿ects on output and in￿ation.
In the next section the proposed method of constructing assessment in-
dicators to capture qualitative information from a central bank’s statements
is outlined.
291.2 Construction of Assessment Indicators
Transparency and accountability have become central elements in the statute
of most central banks.4 Not at least to counterbalance their independence,
they have to justify their policy decisions vis-￿-vis the public and outline
to which extent they achieve the assigned policy objectives. Central banks
communicate this information, inter alia, via giving press conferences, or-
ganizing research conferences, publicizing minutes of internal meetings, and
issuing economic statistical bulletins. At the same time these communica-
tion channels o￿er central banks the opportunity to in￿uence expectations
and thereby the opportunity of more e￿ciently implementing their monetary
policy.5 The information captured in a central bank’s communication hence
o￿ers an important point of departure for analyzing its monetary policy.
Among the outlined communication channels, economic statistical bul-
letins have an outstanding position. For example, the ECB’s monthly bulletin
is described to be its ￿communication ￿agship￿. 6 To enhance the public un-
derstanding of monetary policy, economic statistical bulletins contain ￿some
descriptive commentary and analysis that go beyond data dissemination￿. 7
Most central bank’s bulletins consist of a statistical section with economic
key ￿gures and a section in which these key ￿gures are interpreted with re-
spect to the overall economic situation, and in light of the monetary policy
decisions taken by the central bank. In addition they usually contain arti-
cles covering a broad range of topics related to economic questions that help
fostering a deeper understanding of the economy and contribute to the aca-
4See, for example, Eij￿nger and Hoeberichts (2002).
5Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan, and Jansen (2008) give a survey on the com-
munication channel and show that it has become increasingly important for the conduct
of monetary policy. In particular, they ￿nd that central bank communication can move
￿nancial markets and makes monetary policy decisions more predictable. Amato, Morris,
and Shin (2002) explore the economic e￿ects of public information in monetary policy and
￿nd that it is very e￿ective in in￿uencing agents, however, that there is also a danger if
agents only rely on that channel to coordinate actions away from fundamentals. On the
importance of expectation formation for the conduct of monetary policy, see, for example,
Demertzis (2006).
6Issing (2008), p. 74.
7Dyiobek and Jin (2002), p. 2.
30demic debate.8 The proposed method in this chapter uses the information
conveyed by a central bank’s assessment of macroeconomic variables based
on the statements given in its periodic economic statistical bulletins. 9
The following sub-section outlines how statements are selected from eco-
nomic statistical bulletins and assigned to prespeci￿ed categories that are
relevant for a central bank’s monetary policy decisions.
1.2.1 The Statement Data
Prior to capturing information from a central bank’s public statements, dif-
ferent categories that will serve to group the statements have to be speci￿ed.
One possibility to determine potential categories for grouping the statements
is to use the structure of the analyzed central bank’s economic statistical bul-
letin because it gives important indications as to which areas are important
for its monetary policy decisions. For example, the ECB structures its anal-
yses in the monthly bulletins into the categories ‘the external environment
of the euro area’, ‘monetary and ￿nancial developments’, ‘prices and costs’,
‘output demand and the labour market’, and ‘exchange rate and balance of
payments developments’.
After having de￿ned the categories used in the analysis of the central
bank’s monetary policy, the next step consists of identifying and collect-
ing statements in which the central bank assesses (part of) these categories.
Statements in economic statistical bulletins mostly do not refer directly to a
speci￿ed category but instead assess several key-variables from the de￿ned
category. For example, a category ‘real economic activity’ is assessed, inter
alia, with variables like ‘investment’, ‘industrial production’, and ‘employ-
ment’. Each collected statement gives a hint as to how the central bank
assesses at the time the assessment is given (part of) the information that is
available about the state of the according category.
Assessments might refer to variables’ past, current or expected future
8See Dyiobek and Jin (2002).
9It is straightforward to extend the coverage of assessment indicators outlined in this
chapter beyond capturing information from economic statistical bulletins only, for example,
via using statements given during press conferences, interviews etc.
31developments. Central banks often refer to past values of variables because
the data provided by the statistical o￿ces are mainly available with a certain
time lag. However, all statements evaluated in a de￿ned category re￿ect the
motives for the central bank’s monetary policy decisions at the time the
assessment is given, that is, in t, and will thus be used in the following to set
up the assessment indicator for each category in t.
At this stage of analysis one has available for each point in time, that
is for each issue of the economic statistical bulletin of the analyzed central
bank, numerous statements in each de￿ned category.
The next sub-section outlines how an ordinal index mark is assigned to
each of these collected statements.
1.2.2 The Ordinal Index
To reduce arbitrariness in the evaluation of statements, the procedure out-
lined in the following only uses three option ordinal index numbers and con-
￿nes evidence containing information about changes in the monetary policy
stance to the occurrence of key-words.10 When assigning ordinal index num-
bers to the collected statements it is important (i) to determine whether a
statement’s subject variable is out-of-trend (deviates from its normally ex-
pected state), and if so (ii) whether the variable is positively or negatively
correlated with the category it is assigned to. The following two paragraphs
outline when a variable is judged out-of-trend and how its correlation with
the according category can be determined.
Statements using key-words that put emphasis on the central bank’s as-
sessment of the variable under consideration, for example, ‘high’, ‘weak’,
‘markedly’, ‘extraordinarily’, or alike, indicate that this variable is out-of-
trend. For example, the statement ￿The growth of the monetary aggregate
M3 is weak￿ indicates that the variable ‘M3’ (in the category ‘monetary ac-
tivity’) is below trend.
The correlation of a variable with the according category depends on
whether the variable’s deviation from trend indicates that the category it
10The approach to generate the ordinal index draws partly upon Bluhm (2007).
32is assigned to deviates into the same direction (positive correlation) or into
the opposite direction (negative correlation). For example, the variable ‘un-
employment rate’ is likely to be negatively correlated with the category ‘real
economic activity’. Higher than normal unemployment usually indicates that
the economy underperforms. By contrast, the correlation of the variable ‘in-
dustrial production’ with the category ‘real economic activity’ is positive
because high industrial production indicates that the real economy is used to
capacity. Having outlined the relation between variables and their according
category, the following paragraph describes how each statement is assigned
an ordinal index mark, following the scheme depicted on Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Assignement of Index Marks
First of all, one infers following the approach described in the previous
paragraph whether a statement suggests that its subject variable is out-of-
trend. If a statement is not judged to be out-of-trend it is assigned a ‘ 0’
in the according category [case A on Figure 1.1]. If the statement suggests
33that the variable deviates from its normal state one has to ￿gure out the
variable’s correlation with the according category. The statement is assigned
a ‘1’ (‘ 1’) [case E(D) on Figure 1.1] if the variable positively deviates from
its normal state and is positively (negatively) correlated with the category.
The statement is assigned a ‘ 1’ (‘1’) [case C(B) on Figure 1.1] if the vari-
able negatively deviates from its normal state and its correlation with the
according category is positive (negative). In the following the evaluations
‘1’ and ‘ 1’ are denominated ‘out-of-trend marks’ and the categorized and
evaluated set of statements will be referred to as ‘ordinal index data’.
At this stage of setting up the assessment indicators, each category of
the ordinal index data contains for each point in time many index numbers,
taking on the values ‘-1’, ‘0’, or ‘1’.
The next sub-section describes the method that is used to transform the
ordinal index data into quantitative assessment indicators.
1.2.3 Transformation of the Ordinal Index Into Assess-
ment Indicators
The ordinal index data have arranged the central bank’s assessments of
macroeconomic variables like ‘real economic activity’ in an accessible way.
In the following, each individual index number is treated analogously to a
response of the analyzed central bank to a question about its assessment of
the state in the according category. This approach o￿ers the possibility to
transform the ordinal index data into quantitative assessment indicators with
techniques known from public survey analyses.
Surveys are an important source to measure expectations ￿ or, as in the
case of this analysis, assessments ￿ directly and o￿er up-to-date information
about the state of the economy. They can be broadly divided into two classes,
namely quantitative and qualitative surveys. 11 Quantitative surveys require
precise quantitative answers. An example is the ECB’s Quarterly Survey
of Professional Forecasters which, inter alia, asks the participants for point
11Pesaran (1987).
34estimates of Euro Area in￿ation expectations. 12 In contrast, qualitative sur-
veys do not directly ask the respondents for a precise ￿gure concerning the
variable under consideration. Instead, respondents are asked to give a qual-
itative indication. The latter is widely used in surveys because responses to
qualitative questions are more reliable than more precise questions, there is
believed to be some sort of trade-o￿ between the loss of information conse-
quent on qualitative questions and the cost in terms of response rate and
therefore possible bias from asking more precise questions. 13
A special form of qualitative survey is the business tendency survey which
asks respondents about recent developments and the current situation of
their business as well as their plans and expectations for the near future.
One example for this kind of survey is the Industrial Con￿dence Indicator
published by the European Commission.14 For example, repondents are asked
whether they consider their current stock of ￿nished products to be ‘too large
(above normal)’, ‘adequate (normal)’, or ‘too small (below normal)’. Another
question asks respondents whether they expect their production to ‘increase’,
‘remain unchanged’, or ‘decrease’ over the next 3 months. The ordinal index
data described in the previous sub-section are set up in the spirit of such a
tendency survey as they also consist of three-option replies. Note that the
ordinal index numbers assigned can be based on statements related to levels
as well as changes of relevant variables.
There exist mainly three approaches to convert qualitative survey data
into quantitative data: The balance statistic approach, the regression ap-
proach, and the Carlson-Parkin method. 15 While the latter two are rather
complex and based on distributional assumptions, the balance statistic ap-
proach is not outperformed as there is a very high correlation between all
three approaches when three-option replies are used. 16 The European Com-
12Garcia (2003).
13Pesaran and Weale (2005).
14An overview on the methodology of the Con￿dence Indicators used by the European
Commission is given in European Commission, DG for Economic and Financial A￿airs
(2006).
15An overview about these transformation methods can be found in Pesaran and Weale
(2005).
16OECD (2003).
35mission, for example, makes use of the balance statistic to set up the Indus-
trial Con￿dence Indicator. The balance statistic is also the method which is
used in this chapter to transform the ordinal index data into time series of
quantitative assessment indicators. It is calculated following Equation (1.1):
bsjt = ujt   djt (1.1)
where bsjt denotes the balance statistic, ujt denotes the proportion of
statements that indicate a positive deviation from trend, and djt denotes the
proportion of statements that indicate a negative deviation from trend, all
with respect to category j at time t.
Equation (1.1) thus shows how the ordinal index data are transformed
into quantitative assessment indicators restricted to the interval (-1,1) for
each de￿ned category and point in time. If no statements are available in a
category at a given point in time it is assumed that the assessment indicator
is in line with trend, that is, the assessment indicator is assigned a value of
‘0’.
Note that the assessment indicators contain information about the cen-
tral bank’s assessment of past and currently available data as well as on its
expectations about data in the future. The indicators obtained from this
information set hence contain real time information available to the central
bank at the time the assessment was given and are thus not subject to the
informational problems when using revised data vintages as outlined in Or-
phanides (2001).
The information content in the assessment indicators is limited, not at
least because the indicators are based on three-option replies and are re-
stricted to the interval (-1,1). However, the more statements are available
for a category and point in time, the preciser will be the balance statistic.
For example, if for a category and point in time there is only one statement,
the assessment indicator can take three values, -1, 0, and 1. If instead there
are two statements, the assessment indicator can additionally take the values
-0.5 and 0.5, etc.17 E￿ectively, the information content in the assessment in-
17Hence the analysis of Gerlach (2007) with ordinal index values that can take on 5
36dicators gets less coarse if the number of statements in a category and point
in time increases. However, no matter how many discrete values the indica-
tors can take on, in tendency, they reveal the central bank’s assessment of
categories underlying its monetary policy decisions. 18
Figure 1.2 gives an overview of the method outlined throughout this chap-
ter.
Monthly bulletin at time t
#
Statements containing assessments of category j at time t
#
Ordinal index for assessments of category j at time t
#
Transformation method: balance statistic
#
Quantitative assessment indicator of category j at time t
Where t covers the time dimension, and j denotes di￿erent speci￿ed categories.
Figure 1.2: Method to Generate Assessment Indicators
In the next section the proposed method will be applied to re-investigate
the monetary policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
distinct values can be seen as an example for the case where one collects exactly two
statements for each category in each monthly bulletin analyzed.
18It is possible that the number of variables evaluated in a de￿ned category varies
between di￿erent issues of economic statistical bulletins if the central bank does not always
receive data in time or if variables are only analyzed from a certain point in time onward.
For example, when growth in money funds became very large in the 1990s, the Deutsche
Bundesbank created a new monetary aggregate for analysis, ‘M3 extended’, that contained
these funds.
371.3 Analysis of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Mon-
etary Policy Using Assessment Indicators
The Deutsche Bundesbank continues to be considered as a benchmark for
many central banks in light of its success in maintaining price stability. One
distinctive feature of its monetary policy was the strategy of monetary target-
ing which the Deutsche Bundesbank o￿cially followed since 1975. However,
whether monetary aggregates indeed played a role in its monetary policy
strategy is subject to debate because analyses show mixed evidence. While
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997) ￿nd that
monetary aggregates did not play a signi￿cant role for the Deutsche Bundes-
bank’s monetary policy from 1979 to 1993, Gerberding, Worms, and Seitz
(2005) ￿nd that the Deutsche Bundesbank indeed took its monetary targets
seriously from 1979 to 1998 and Clausen and Meier (2005) ￿nd that monetary
aggregates played a small but signi￿cant role for the Deutsche Bundesbank’s
interest rate decisions between 1973 and 1998.
As an application of the method proposed in this chapter the mone-
tary policy strategy of the Deutsche Bundesbank is re-investigated using a
new data set. The dataset consists of assessment indicators that capture
the Deutsche Bundesbank’s assessment of monetary and real economic de-
velopments following the approach outlined in the previous section. The
assessment indicators are then used to estimate a monetary policy rule.
This analysis might also be relevant for the debate about the two pil-
lar strategy of the ECB. The ECB was established much in the spirit of
the Deutsche Bundesbank, also as regards the monetary policy strategy. In
particular prior to the ￿nancial crisis that began in 2007, it has been sub-
ject to criticism for using monetary aggregates in its second pillar to assess
the trends in medium- to long-term in￿ation. If the Deutsche Bundesbank
actually was a monetary targeter its eminent track record concerning price
stability might suggests that incorporating monetary aggregates in a central
bank’s policy strategy cannot be labelled as improper right away.
The following sub-section outlines the monetary policy strategy of the
Deutsche Bundesbank.
381.3.1 The Deutsche Bundesbank’s Monetary Policy
The Deutsche Bundesbank Act from 1957 mandated the Deutsche Bundes-
bank to ‘safeguard the currency’ which was ultimately interpreted as main-
taining price stability.19 To achieve this goal, the Deutsche Bundesbank’s
policy consisted of pre-announcing annual targets for growth in broad money
since 1975. From 1975 to 1987 the target was de￿ned as the central bank mon-
etary stock, that is, currency in circulation and required reserves and from
1988 to 1998 the Deutsche Bundesbank targeted growth in the monetary
aggregate M3. To cross-check and verify the information content provided
by the targeted aggregate, the Deutsche Bundesbank always included other
monetary and real indicators in its monetary policy analyses. The monetary
targeting strategy was implemented via controlling the quantity of money
indirectly by in￿uencing the day-to-day money market rate in the interbank
market through rediscount and lombard policies, minimum reserve policy,
and open market operations.20
The Deutsche Bundesbank determined the money growth target for the
following year via adding growth of potential output, the ‘unavoidable’ in-
￿ation over the medium term, and the trend rate of change in the velocity
of money. The reasoning behind this approach was that if the money stock
could be kept on this target path, the monetary conditions should be met for
corresponding real growth to be compatible with monetary stability. 21 Al-
though the Deutsche Bundesbank announced the growth target on a yearly
basis it frequently stressed the medium-term nature of the approach ￿ the
Deutsche Bundesbank did not apply its monetary policy mechanically but
accepted short-run deviations from target growth if neccessary. With a few
technical modi￿cations this approach has been followed since the start of
this policy in 1975 although the Deutsche Bundesbank regarded monetary
targeting as an experiment in the ￿rst few years. 22
19On several occasions the Deutsche Bundesbank stated that price stability is its statu-
tory ￿nal goal, for example, in Bundesbank (1995).
20Bundesbank (1995).
21Issing (1997).
22Schmid (1999).
39Despite the fact that the Deutsche Bundesbank attained only 13 of 24
money stock targets, it impressively achieved its ultimate goal of safeguarding
price stability with an annual in￿ation rate of 3% on average between 1975
and 1998.23
The following sub-section outlines how the assessment indicators for the
Deutsche Bundesbank are are set up.
1.3.2 Assessment Indicators for the Deutsche Bundes-
bank
As outlined in Section 1.2, policy relevant statements can be extracted from
the analyzed central bank’s economic statistical bulletin. The monthly bul-
letin was the Deutsche Bundesbank’s main instrument of communication
with the public. Prior to the emergence of European Monetary Union (EMU)
the monthly bulletins of the Deutsche Bundesbank had an outstanding posi-
tion in Germany in the ￿eld of regular economic publications. Since 1970 the
Deutsche Bundesbank regularly incorporated economic reports in its monthly
bulletins. Every quarter, two monthly bulletins contained abridged economic
reports and one monthly bulletin gave a detailed report on the economic sit-
uation in Germany.24 These parts of the monthly bulletin touched upon the
di￿erent ￿elds the Deutsche Bundesbank judged to be of importance for its
monetary policy. They were organized into sub-sections analyzing ‘monetary
development’, ‘public ￿nances’, ‘economic situation’, ‘balance of payments’,
and ‘stock and bond markets’. All monthly bulletins contained a statisti-
cal appendix with economic key data and infrequently essays on economic
questions of interest.
To construct the assessment indicators for the Bundebank, only the a-
bridged reports and editorials of the economic outlook in the monthly bul-
letins are taken into account because in these parts the Deutsche Bundesbank
23Own calculation: Mean year-on-year percentage change of the consumer price index;
from 1975 to 1991 only for West Germany, from 1992 to 1998 for re-united Germany.
24The Deutsche Bundesbank issued economic reports prior to 1970 but not on a regular
monthly basis: within a year there were several issues of monthly bulletins containing only
economic key-data.
40explained its policy decisions in the context of its analyses of economic and
monetary aspects in a condensed form. As the structure of the monthly
bulletins had undergone only minor changes since January 1970 this date is
chosen as the starting point of the sample analyzed. The endpoint of the
sample is December 1998 because it marks the last month of an independent
monetary policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
All statements from the abridged reports and the editorials of the monthly
bulletins from 1970 to 1998 that express the Deutsche Bundesbank’s assess-
ment for one or several of the categories, ‘monetary activity’, ‘real economic
activity’, ‘￿scal activity’, ‘foreign trade activity’, and ‘price activity’ have
been collected.25 Table 1.1 summarises the assumed correlation of the vari-
ables appearing most frequently in statements about one or several of the
de￿ned categories. In the sample analyzed, the average number of assessed
statements per month amounts to 8.68 for the category ‘real economic ac-
tivity’, 8.63 for the category ‘monetary activity’, 5.89 for the category ‘￿scal
activity’, 4.49 for the category ‘foreign trade activity’, and 2.41 for the cate-
gory ‘price activity’.
Following the proposed method outlined in the previous section, assess-
ment indicators for the ￿ve de￿ned categories are set up. Several examples
for the evaluation of statements are given in Appendix 1.A at the end of
this chapter.26 As a showcase Figure 1.3 displays the assessment indicator
for monetary activity (left scale), its mean value (left scale), and the num-
ber of statements in each month (right scale). The time series shows little
persistence and the number of statements assessed re￿ects that the editori-
als and short reports in the monthly bulletins became more extensive over
the years. While the analyzed parts covered only three to ￿ve pages in a
bulletin in the 1970s, the amount of pages to be analyzed from a bulletin of
the end of the 1990s increased up to seven pages. This development took
place gradually in the course of time. As previously outlined, this makes the
assessment indicators’ information content less coarse for later issues of the
monthly bulletins and provides a more di￿erenciated picture of the Deutsche
25In the following these ￿ve ￿elds will be referred to as categories.
26Part of the statements has been taken from Bluhm (2007).
41Category Variables Posi-
tively Correlated
With the category
Variables Nega-
tively Correlated
With the category
Monetary activity Monetary expansion Long-term deposits
Monetary in￿ows from
abroad
Monetary out￿ows to
abroad
Volume of money in cir-
culation
Monetary aggregates
Credits
Real economic activity Industrial production Unemployment
Investments
Business cycle
Labour market
Economic activity
Volume of orders
Domestic orders
Fiscal activity Public debt Inland tax revenues
Public spending / in-
vestment
Public borrowing
Public de￿cit
Foreign trade activity Orders from abroad Inland orders for abroad
Exports Imports
Active trade balance Passive trade balance
Sales abroad
Price activity Producer prices
Year-on-year per-
centage change of
the Consumer Price
Index (CPI)
Import prices
Table 1.1: Variables and Their Relation to the Assessed Category
Bundesbank’s assessment about the economy. According ￿gures for the as-
sessment indicators of the other categories are provided in Appendix 1.B at
the end of this chapter.
42Theoretically, deviations from trend captured by the assessment indica-
tors should be zero on average. However, the mean values of all assessment
indicators are positive, ranging from 0.06 (assessment indicator for foreign
trade activity) to 0.17 (assessment indicator for monetary activity). This
might re￿ect higher vigilance of the Deutsche Bundesbank towards upward
risks to price stability as compared to downward risks if the Deutsche Bun-
desbank did not assess upward or downward deviations from trend sym-
metrically. In other words, the Deutsche Bundesbank might have perceived
an upward deviation from trend in a category as sizeable because this puts
upward pressure on prices while the Deutsche Bundesbank might not have
perceived a downward deviation of similar magnitude as sizeable if it was not
as sensible as regards downward risks to price stability.
Figure 1.3: Assessment Indicator for Monetary Activity
Except for the real economic activity indicator and the ￿scal activity in-
dicator the assessment indicators are not correlated with each other. This
provides evidence that the indicators capture distinct information sets. The
correlation coe￿cient between the real economic activity indicator and the
￿scal activity indicator amounts to -0.30 which might be due to countercycli-
43cal policies of German governments. It is very likely that in addition to the
normal economic stabilizers, such as unemployment compensations, de￿cit
spending strategies were implemented when the economy was in a recession.
In the following sub-section a monetary policy rule based on the outlined
assessment indicators is estimated for the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1.3.3 A Monetary Policy Rule for the Deutsche Bun-
desbank
Investigating the properties of monetary policy rules, Levin, Wieland, and
Williams (1998) show that ￿rst di￿erence rules perform reasonably well in
comparison to several alternatives and are robust to model uncertainty. In
their analysis they employ the ￿rst di￿erenced U.S. federal funds rate as de-
pendent variable and a measure for the deviation of in￿ation from target and
the output gap as independent variables. Other authors also use ￿rst di￿er-
ence rules to investigate the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve System
of the U.S. or the ECB. For example, Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimate
a policy rule for the Fed with the U.S. federal funds rate in ￿rst-di￿erences
as dependent variable and measures for the output gap and deviation of
in￿ation from target as independent variables. Gerlach (2007) estimates a
policy rule for the ECB using ￿rst di￿erences of the repo rate as dependent
variable and di￿erent measures capturing real economic activity, in￿ation,
money growth, and the exchange rate as independent variables.
To investigate the monetary policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank, a Taylor-
type rule will be estimated that explains the ￿rst-di￿erenced German day-to-
day money market rate27 with the generated assessment indicators following
27Clarida and Gertler (1996) use a vector autoregressive analysis to identify the Ger-
man day-to-day money market rate as the relevant policy instrument of the Deutsche
Bundesbank as well as measures for in￿ation and output gaps as explanatory variables.
Similarly, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) employ the German day-to-day money market
rate as dependent variable in an estimation of a monetary policy rule for the Deutsche
Bundesbank, with, inter alia, measures for the output gap and deviation of in￿ation from
target as explanatory variables.
44Equation (1.2).28
it = c+1moneyt+2realt+3fiscalt+4tradet+5pricet+t (1.2)
where ‘i’ is the ￿rst-di￿erenced German day-to-day money market rate
(monthly averages), ‘c’ is a constant, ‘money’ denotes the deviation of mon-
etary activity from trend and is captured by the assessment indicator for
monetary activity, ‘real’ denotes the deviation of real economic activity from
trend and is captured by the assessment indicator for real economic activity,
‘￿scal’ denotes the deviation of ￿scal activity from trend and is captured by
the assessment indicator for ￿scal activity, ‘trade’ denotes the deviation of
foreign trade activity from trend and is captured by the assessment indica-
tor for foreign trade activity, ‘price’ denotes the deviation of price activity
from trend and is captured by the assessment indicator for price activity,
and ‘’ is an error term. Intuitively one would expect the coe￿cients of the
explanatory variables in equation (1.2) to be positive since high values of the
assessment indicators are indicative of upward risks to price stability.
To avoid a spurious regression it is important to determine the order of
integration of the time series under consideration. All time series used are
stationary at a 5% signi￿cance level when applying the Dickey-Fuller test. 29
The time span covered in the analysis, January 1970 to 1998, might con-
tain structural breaks, for example, the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods
system in March 1973, the beginning of the monetary targeting strategy of
28The assessment indicators can also be used to augment Taylor-type rules which al-
ready contain standard statistical data for the output gap and deviation of in￿ation from
target, thus turning them into ‘hybrid rules’. In the case of the Deutsche Bundesbank
such hybrid rules feature a better model ￿t with respect to standard Taylor-type rules
as measured by the adjusted R-squared. A systematic comparison of such hybrid versus
non-hybrid rules would be interesting to pursue but is beyond the scope of this paper. See
also Sturm and de Haan (2009) and Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) for an analysis using
mixed data.
29Note that all following results as regards signi￿cance and breakpoint tests also hold
qualitatively when estimating the Taylor-type rule not as a ￿rst-di￿erence rule but with the
level of the day-to-day money market rate as dependent variable and the lagged dependent
variable as well as the assessment indicators as explanatory variables. However, since the
level of the dependent variable features high persistence at a monthly frequency, it follows
a unit root process.
45the Deutsche Bundesbank in January 1975, and German re-uni￿cation in
October 1990. Bai and Perron (1998) propose a procedure that allows to
estimate the number and the position of breakpoints and tests linear models
with multiple structural changes for a given data set. In the following this
method will be applied to the estimation of a monetary policy rule for the
Deutsche Bundesbank to detect potential breakpoints in the sample. An out-
line of the procedure is provided in Appendix 1.C at the end of this chapter.
The procedure selects March 1975 as the only breakpoint. 30 Table 1.2
displays the estimation results for the two samples ranging from January
1970 to March 1975, and April 1975 to December 1998. Regarding the ￿rst
sample, only the indicator for real economic activity is signi￿cant. 31 Given
its coe￿cient, the target rate’s ￿rst di￿erence rose by 2.84 percentage points
if, ceteris paribus, all variables from the category real economic activity were
assessed to be above trend (that is, the according indicator has a value of
1). The relatively high coe￿cient estimates are likely due to the volatility
of the dependent variable during the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods sys-
tem. Figure 1.4 displays the day-to-day money market rate for the period of
analysis. Several large changes took place only during and shortly after the
period of Bretton-Woods.
Regarding the second sample, all assessment indicators except those for
foreign trade activity and ￿scal activity are signi￿cant and have the expected
sign. If all assessments in one of the categories, monetary activity, real eco-
nomic activity, or price activity, ceteris paribus, were assessed to be above
trend, the day-to-day money market rate rose by 0.16, 0.22, or 0.19 percent-
age points, respectively.
A central result is the signi￿cance of the assessment indicator for mon-
etary activity in the sample that starts in April 1975. It provides evidence
that the Deutsche Bundesbank indeed took into account the development of
30As a robustness check here and in the following the procedure has been implemented
with several values of the parameter that determines the minimal length of a sub-sample
(see Appendix 1.C). For reasonable values of this parameter the selected breakpoint is
always March 1975.
31Signi￿cance is indicated by an absolute t-value of 1.96 or larger. All t-statistics are
computed with robust standard errors.
46Sample: Jan 1970 - Mar 1975 Apr 1975 - Dec 1998
Constant -0:61
[1:53]
-0:09
[3:22]
***
Monetary activity -1:75
[1:41]
0:16
[2:09]
**
Real economic activity 2:84
[2:17]
** 0:22
[3:78]
***
Fiscal activity 1:65
[1:47]
0:05
[0:79]
Foreign trade activity -0:46
[0:59]
0:09
[1:76]
Price activity -0:25
[0:36]
0:19
[2:60]
***
No. of obs. 63 285
Adjusted R-squared 0:078 0:067
t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the coe￿cient estimates. A ‘**’ indicates signi￿cance at the
5% level and a ‘***’ indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The dependent variable is the ￿rst di￿erence of the day-to-
day money market rate. Estimated equation: it = c+1 moneyt +2 realt +3 fiscalt +4 tradet +5 pricet +t.
Table 1.2: Regression Results of the Taylor Rule for the Deutsche Bundes-
bank
monetary aggregates for the conduct of its monetary policy. The analysis
does not allow to disentangle to which extent this outcome is directly driven
by the Deutsche Bundesbank’s policy rate setting or indirectly via in￿uenc-
ing market expectations through its communication within the framework of
its monetary policy strategy. 32 However, monetary aggregates played a sig-
ni￿cant role in the practical implementation of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s
monetary policy strategy. Similar to Gerberding, Worms, and Seitz (2005)
and Clausen and Meier (2005) the results also give evidence that the Deutsche
Bundesbank was not a pure monetary targeter but took into consideration
real economic activity and in￿ation developments as well.
Besides the Deutsche Bundesbank, several other central banks incorpo-
rated monetary targeting elements in their policy strategies ￿ with di￿erent
degrees of success. Switzerland successfully followed a strategy of monetary
targeting from 1975 to 2000. The Federal Reserve System of the United
32For an analysis of the money growth targeting approach of the Deutsche Bundesbank
in light of a communication strategy see von Hagen (1999).
47States adhered to a policy strategy with monetary targeting elements at the
beginning of the 1980’s, and the Bank of England pursued a strategy that
focused on monetary targeting at the end of the 1970’s and in the 1980’s.
However, the latter two central banks more or less abandoned monetary tar-
geting elements in their strategies after several years. In the United States a
large literature has criticised the practice of monetary targeting because of
the macroeconomic turbulence of that period and of the severity of the reces-
sion that followed.33 The authors claim that accurate control of the money
stock is not feasible or that control induces extreme volatility to money mar-
ket rates. The practical implementation of the monetary targeting strategy
followed by the Deutsche Bundesbank might be a reason why criticism di-
rected against monetary targeting does not convincingly apply in the case of
the German experience. The Deutsche Bundesbank never claimed to be able
to completely control money growth and even frequently missed its target
growth rate. In large part this should be due to the medium-term orien-
tation of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s strategy but also to a certain degree
of pragmatism which is revealed by also taking real economic and in￿ation
developments into consideration.
In the words of Issing (1997), ￿ [s]ome occasions when targets were missed
may well be interpreted as showing that at these points in time the Deutsche
Bundesbank allowed itself additional room for discretion in the light of the
then prevailing situation. Only rarely have money stock overshoots been of a
completely involuntary nature; mostly rather they constituted deliberate mon-
etary policy decisions. [...] Crucially though, monetary policy was always
analyzed with a view to achieve the ultimate aim of safeguarding the cur-
rency. Such an approach may be termed ‘pragmatic monetarism’... ￿34
This also gives evidence why the pragmatic, ￿exible monetary targeting
approach of the Deutsche Bundesbank did not induce extreme volatility to
money market rates. The Deutsche Bundesbank did not mechanically try to
achieve its medium target but claimed a certain discretionary margin when
33McCallum (1985).
34From 1990 to 1998 Otmar Issing was a member of the Board of the Deutsche Deutsche
Bundesbank with a seat in the Central Bank Council.
48judged neccessary. Figure 1.4 displays that the Deutsche Bundesbank did
not bring extreme hikes or slumps about its target rate since the start of
monetary targeting in 1975.
Figure 1.4: First Di￿erences of the German Day-to-Day Money Market Rate
(Monthly Averages)
Critics of monetary targeting also stress that practical di￿culties coming
up through technological changes and deregulations in the payment industry
render monetary targeting practices unfeasible. These arguments do not ap-
ply in the German case as well. It is possible that money demand functions
become unstable and that targeted monetary aggregates lose explanatory
power and utility for forecasting. However, this was not the case for Ger-
many as the liberalization of ￿nancial markets and cross-border money and
capital movements was largely completed in Germany at the beginning of
the 1970s. In addition, new ￿nancial products generally turned out to be of
little relevance in Germany.35
The results of the analysis in this chapter give evidence that the Deutsche
35Issing (1997).
49Bundesbank actually was a ￿exible monetary targeter. Its policy strategy
was in large part operational due to a combination of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank’s pragmatic approach and to a relatively stable ￿nancial environment
in Germany after the period of Bretton-Woods.
The following section concludes.
501.4 Conclusion
This chapter outlined a novel method which allows to extract a central bank’s
assessment of macroeconomic key-variables from its public statements using
the balance statistic approach. Since a central bank’s assessment of macroe-
conomic key-variables is not contained in the information set when using
readily available statistical data such as, for example, the percentage change
of the CPI, the generated assessment indicators capture unique information
and can be used to analyze a central bank’s monetary policy.
The method is applied to re-investigate the Deutsche Bundesbank’s mone-
tary policy strategy with a new data set and gives evidence that the Deutsche
Bundesbank actually was a ￿exible monetary targeter. When estimating a
monetary policy rule with a sample ranging from April 1975 to December
1998 the assessment indicators for monetary activity, real economic activity,
and price activity are signi￿cant and have the expected sign. Particularly for
the monetary indicator this is an interesting result as it was claimed in sev-
eral studies that the Deutsche Bundesbank actually did not involve monetary
aggregates in the conduct of its policy.
These results indicate that the inclusion of monetary aggregates in a cen-
tral bank’s monetary policy strategy, as done by the ECB, might not be re-
futed as unreasonable right away. The example of the Deutsche Bundesbank
gives evidence that successfully incorporating monetary targeting elements
in a policy strategy is possible.
51Appendix 1.A: Examples for the Evaluation of State-
ments
First of all, consider three examples for the category ‘monetary activity’.
￿Das l￿ngerfristige Mittelaufkommen bei den Banken war [...] weit h￿her
als gew￿hnlich [...].￿36
The statement su￿ces to assign an out-of-trend mark as it describes the
variable ‘long-term deposits’ to be much higher than usual. The correlation
of long-term deposits with monetary activity is negative. Accordingly the
statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case D in Figure 1.1).
￿Deutlicher noch als in den vorangegangenen Monaten beruht das starke
Wachstum der Geldmenge im Juni des Jahres auf der kr￿ftigen Expansion
der Kreditgew￿hrung der Banken an inl￿ndische Kunden. ￿37
This statement assesses two variables: ‘monetary quantity’ and ‘credits’.
Both variables change sizeably into a positive direction. As the variables are
positively correlated with the category both are evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case E
in Figure 1.1).
￿Insgesamt waren die Kredite [...] an inl￿ndischen Nichtbanken Ende Juli
1970 um 12.8 Prozent h￿her als vor einem Jahr.￿ 38
Nothing suggests that the variable ‘loans’ which are positively correlated
with the category ’monetary activity’ is out-of-trend. Hence the statement
is evaluated with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1.1).
Next consider three examples for the category ‘real economic activity’.
￿Die Investitionst￿tigkeit der Unternehmen hielt sich in den vergangenen
36￿Long-term deposits were much higher than usual.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche
Bundesbank (May 1975), p. 6.
37￿The strong growth of the monetary quantity in June results more noticeably from a
robust domestic credit expansion than in the previous months.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the
Deutsche Bundesbank (August 1976), p. 7.
38￿Overall, at the end of July 1970 loans to domestic non-banks were 12:8% higher than
in the previous year.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (August 1970), p. 7.
52Monaten auf hohem Niveau.￿39
The variable ‘￿rm investments’ is described to be on a high level which is
su￿cient to assign an out-of-trend mark. As the correlation of ￿rm invest-
ments with the category ‘real economic activity’ is positive the statement is
evaluated with ‘1’ (Case E in Figure 1.1).
￿Das verarbeitende Gewerbe hat seine Produktion in den ersten beiden Monaten
sp￿rbar ausgeweitet.￿40
The positive change of the variable ‘production in the manufacturing indus-
tries’ is sizeable which turns the balance towards an out-of-trend mark. As
the corellation of the variable with the category is positive the statement is
evaluated with ‘1’ (Case E in Figure 1.1).
￿Die Produktion des produzierenden Gewerbes ist im September tendenziell
leicht gesunken.￿41
A ‘slight decrease’ is not su￿cient to assign an out-of-trend mark for the
variable ‘industrial production’. The statement is evaluated with ‘ 0’ (Case
A in Figure 1.1).
The following three statements are examples for the evaluation in the
category ‘foreign trade activity’.
￿In den hohen Auslandsbestellungen spiegelt sich die fortschreitende Kon-
junkturbelebung in wichtigen Industriel￿ndern wider. ￿42
‘Foreign export orders’ are described to be high which is su￿cient to assign
an out-of-trend mark. As the correlation of the variable with the category
‘foreign trade activity’ is positive the statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case
E in Figure 1.1).
39￿The investment activity of enterprises stayed on a high level during the past months.￿
Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (December 1980), p. 6.
40￿The manufacturing industries have noticeably expanded their production during the
summer months.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (October 1996), p. 6.
41￿Industrial production tended to decline slightly in September.￿ Monthly Bulletin of
the Deutsche Bundesbank (November 1997), p. 10.
42￿The high level of foreign export orders re￿ects the advancing economic recovery
in important industrial countries.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (June
1976), p. 5.
53￿Saisonbereinigt waren die Exporte (...) im Mai nach dem recht umsatzstar-
ken Vormonat ausgesprochen schwach. ￿43
‘Exports’ are described to be markedly weak which points in the direction
of being below trend. As exports and foreign trade indicator are positively
correlated the statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case C in Figure 1.1).
￿Schaltet man die Saisonschwankungen aus, so waren Aus- und Einfuhren
gleicherma￿en dem Wert nach um 1% h￿her als im Februar 1983. ￿44
The change of the variables ‘exports’ and ‘imports’ is not sizeable. Hence
they are assumed to be in line with their trend. Both variables assessed are
evaluated with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1.1).
The next three examples are about the interpretation of assessments from
the category ‘￿scal activity’.
￿Demzufolge muss f￿r 1980 auch mit einem weit h￿heren Gesamtde￿zit
der ￿￿entlichen Haushalte gerechnet werden, als noch im Fr￿hjahr erwartet
worden war [...].￿45
‘Public debt’ is expected to be considerably above previous expectations
which hints that the variable will be higher than normal in the future. Its
correlation with the category is positive and consequently the statement is
evaluated with ‘1’ (Case E in Figure 1.1).
￿Der vorangegangene Monat November war f￿r den Bund [steuerlich] ein
au￿erordentlich einnahmeschwacher Monat gewesen [...]. ￿46
‘Inland revenues’ are assessed to be ‘extraordinarily weak’ which hints that
they are below trend. The correlation of inland revenues with the category is
43￿After the quite top-selling previous month seasonally adjusted exports (...) were
markedly weak in May.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (July 1978), p. 12.
44￿After correcting for seasonal variations the values of imports and exports were 1%
higher than in February 1983.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (May 1983),
p. 15.
45￿As a result one should expect a much higher overall public de￿cit than the de￿cit
which was expected in spring.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (December
1980), p. 6.
46￿Inland revenues in the previous month, November, were extraordinarily weak.￿
Monthly Bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank (January 1975), p. 9.
54negative. Consequently the statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case B in Figure
1.1).
￿Auch im kommenden Jahr werden die staatlichen De￿zite weiter steigen,
aber sie werden voraussichtlich nicht die im Sommer des Jahres erwartete
Gr￿￿enordnung erreichen.￿47
Nothing suggests that the variable ‘public de￿cit’ which is positively corre-
lated with the category ‘￿scal activity’ is out-of-trend. Hence the statement
is evaluated with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1.1).
The next three examples show the evaluation of statements from the cat-
egory ‘price activity’.
￿Die Zunahme der Au￿enhandels- und Leistungsbilanz￿bersch￿sse [...]
geht [...] ausschlie￿lich auf die drastischen R￿ckg￿nge der Einfuhrpreise
zur￿ck.￿48
‘Import prices’ are positively correlated with the category ‘prices’. They
have declined drastically which indicates that (part of) the category is below
trend. The statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case C in Figure 1.1).
￿[...] das Problem der In￿ationsbek￿mpfung [stellt sich] mehr denn je. ￿49
One can infer from this statement that in￿ation is considerably too high.
This justi￿es an out-of-trend mark. As the variable is positively correlated
with the category the statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case E in Figure 1.1).
￿Die Einfuhrpreise sind im Mai saisonbereinigt wieder leicht gesunken. ￿50
One cannot infer that the variable ‘import prices’ is out-of-trend. The state-
47￿Public de￿cits will also rise in the forthcoming year but presumably they will not
reach the magnitude that was expected in the summer of this year.￿ Monthly Bulletin of
the Deutsche Bundesbank (December 1978), p. 6.
48￿The growth of the surpluses in the foreign trade balance and the current account
balance [...] can be attributed to a drastic decline in import prices.￿ Monthly Bulletin of
the Deutsche Bundesbank (September 1986), p. 8. Note that this statement would also
be evaluated in the category foreign trade activity because it assesses the variable ￿trade
balance￿.
49￿The problem of ￿ghting in￿ation is bigger than ever.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the
Deutsche Bundesbank (February 1974), p. 6.
50￿Seasonally adjusted import prices again slightly decreased in May.￿ Monthly Bulletin
of the Deutsche Bundesbank (July 1996), p. 14.
55ment is evaluated with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1.1).
56Appendix 1.B: Assessment Indicators, Mean Values, and
Number of Assessed Statements
Figure 1.5: Assessment Indicator for Real Economic Activity
Figure 1.6: Assessment Indicator for Fiscal Activity
57Figure 1.7: Assessment Indicator for Foreign Trade Activity
Figure 1.8: Assessment Indicator for Price Activity
58Appendix 1.C: Testing for Structural Breaks
The following description is based on Bai and Perron (1998). In this appli-
cation estimation is done within a pure structural change model, that is, all
coe￿cients can be subject to shifts.
Consider the linear regression with m breakpoints, that is m+1 regimes:
yt = z z z
0
t  j + ut (1.3)
where j = 1;:::;m + 1, t = Tj 1 + 1;:::;Tj, min(t) = h, T0 = 0, Tm+1 = T,
h denotes the minimal length of a regime, yt is the dependent variable, z z zt
are the independent variables,   j is a vector of coe￿cients, and ut is an error
term.
The following procedure estimates the unknown regression coe￿cients
^  ^  ^ j as well as the optimal position of the breakpoints ^ Tj. For each possi-
ble segment (Tj 1 + 1;:::;Tj), denoted fTjg, the corresponding least squares
estimates of j j j are obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals
Pm+1
i=1
PTi
t=Ti 1+1[yt z z z0
t  i]2. Let ^  ^  ^ (fTjg) denote the resulting estimates. Using
the corresponding sum of squared residuals, denoted by ST(T1;:::;Tm), for the
^  ^  ^ (fTjg), the estimated breakpoints ( ^ T1;:::; ^ Tm) are such that ( ^ T1;:::; ^ Tm) =
argminT1;:::;TmST(T1;:::;Tm).
In a nutshell, given the number of breakpoints m and the minimal length
of a segment h, the procedure calculates the global sum of squared resid-
uals for all possible positions of the breakpoints. The selected breakpoints
are such that the sum of squared residuals over all segments is minimized.
The ^   (Tj) chosen are the corresponding coe￿cient estimates at the selected
breakdates ^   (^ Tj).
The maximum number of breakpoints m is determined by h: m =    1
where  is rounded to the nearest integer less or equal to T
h. To determine
the optimal number of breakpoints one applies the above procedure for m=0,
...,    1. The optimal number of breakpoints chosen is the one that yields
the smallest value of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) de￿ned as
BIC(m) = ln ^ 
2(m) + [(m + 1)q + m]
ln T
T
; (1.4)
59where q is the number of independent variables. According to Bai and Perron
(1998) the BIC performs reasonably well when no serial correlation is present
in the errors. In all estimations, Durbin’s test provided no evidence of serial
correlation.51
Bai and Perron (1998) do not give clear guidance as to how the parameter
h which in￿uences the position of selected breakpoints should be chosen.
When choosing h too small, one ends up estimating for some segments with
very few observations. However, in their application they always choose it
to be in a range between 10% and 25% of all observations. The value of
h chosen in this application is 48 observations, that is, a minimum sample
size of four years, which is 14% of T. Note that the chosen value of h does
not allow the inclusion of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system as
a breakpoint in the analysis covering data from January 1970 to December
1998.52
51See Durbin’s test for serial correlation in Stata (2005).
52In the range of h=30 to 38 the beginning of 1973 is always a chosen breakpoint,
however, this number of observations is considered too small to estimate six coe￿cients
and several potential breakpoints. In the range h=39 to h=63, which allows for the
inclusion of March 1975, that date is always the selected breakpoint.
60Chapter 2
On the Conditional E￿ects of
IMF Program Participation on
Output Growth1
The IMF began its operations in 1945 and was conceived as an independent
international organization helping to promote macroeconomic and ￿nancial
stability as well as growth of the world economy. In the 1970s the IMF
expanded its role towards providing on a conditional basis development as-
sistance to countries that as a prerequisite for loan approval had to initiate
economic and structural reforms as outlined by the IMF. 2 While the IMF
has often been criticized for failures in carrying out such development policy,
in the wake of the recent ￿nancial crisis a number of calls have been made
for an expanded role of the IMF. This chapter re-considers the e￿ects of a
country’s participation in IMF loan programs on its output growth, taking
account of conditionality of these growth e￿ects on the degree of program
implementation as well as institutional factors such as quality of governance,
internal stability, health, and educational attainment.
The IMF has been o￿ering four types of loan arrangements involving pol-
icy conditions, the Stand-by Arrangement (SBA), the Extended Fund Facility
1This chapter is joint work with Michael Binder, Goethe-Universit￿t Frankfurt am
Main.
2For a more detailed exposition, see Fritz-Krockow and Ramlogan (2007).
61(EFF), the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and the Enhanced Struc-
tural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), subsequently replaced by the Poverty Re-
duction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 3 Most of the IMF’s assistance is pro-
vided through SBAs. Designed in 1952 to help countries with addressing
short-term balance of payments problems, SBAs typically cover periods of
one to two years. The EFF was set up in 1974 to help countries encountering
long-term balance of payments problems requiring fundamental economic re-
forms. EFF loan arrangements usually cover three to ￿ve years. The SAF
has been used since 1986 and is designed to provide assistance for low-income
countries. The ESAF only di￿ers slightly from the SAF, but involves stricter
conditionality criteria and larger loan amounts. The ESAF was used since
1986. After the East-Asian crisis this facility was relabeled PRGF, as it
was broadened to include poverty reduction and to grant governments larger
scope in negotiating the policy conditions. Typically PRGF programs are
pursued for up to four years. When conditionality is involved, the IMF as-
sesses whether a country complies with the conditionality requirements. If
so, the country can draw on the loan funds in pre-speci￿ed intervals. 4
The previous empirical evidence regarding the e￿ects of a country’s par-
ticipation in IMF loan programs on its output growth is rather mixed. Us-
ing political economy variables as instruments to address endogeneity issues,
Barro and Lee (2005) ￿nd that the IMF loan program participation rate has
a negative e￿ect on output growth. 5 Vreeland (2003), using counterfactual
analysis, also ￿nds evidence that program participation leads to a reduc-
tion of output growth. In contrast, Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler
(2000), also using counterfactual analysis, ￿nd positive output growth e￿ects
of IMF program participation.
3An overview on these programs involving conditionality is provided in Fritz-Krockow
and Ramlogan (2007).
4For the empirical work in this chapter we will not discriminate between these di￿erent
loan arrangement schemes. While SBAs in contrast to the other schemes cover elements
of structural reforms only to a limited extent, for example in the form of exchange rate
and pricing policies, SBAs often precede one of the other schemes simply because ￿there
has not [...] been enough time to assemble all the necessary elements of a comprehensive
structural package￿ (Polak, 1991).
5Barro and Lee (2005) de￿ne the loan participation rate as the fraction of months
during a ￿ve-years interval that a country operated under IMF loan programs.
62In this chapter we provide new insights regarding the e￿ects of a coun-
try’s IMF program participation on its output growth by constructing and
estimating a state-dependent panel data model accounting in particular for
sample selection, for the endogeneity of program participation, and for the
potential conditionality of the output growth e￿ects of IMF program partic-
ipation on a country’s degree of program implementation and institutional
factors such as quality of governance, internal stability, health, and edu-
cational attainment. We argue that capturing sample selection, program
participation endogeneity, and state dependence of the e￿ects is critical for
properly measuring the e￿ects of a country’s IMF program participation
on output growth. To cope with sample selection issues, we work with an
equation system composed both of a program participation selection and an
output growth (participation e￿ects) equation. Within this equation system,
we account for the endogeneity of the program participation measure in the
output growth equation using a two-step maximum likelihood estimator. We
capture country-speci￿c e￿ects under the two alternatives of a random and
a ￿xed e￿ects model. To account for the state dependence of the output
growth e￿ects of IMF program participation, we use semi-parametric con-
ditional pooling techniques to condition the e￿ects of participation in IMF
programs on a country’s degree of program implementation and its institu-
tional features as measured by our index comprising measures of quality of
governance, internal stability, health, and educational attainment.
Using this novel econometric framework and a sample of annual data for
86 countries over the time period from 1975 to 2004, we provide evidence that
the e￿ects of IMF program participation on output growth vary systemat-
ically with the degree of program implementation as well as our index of
institutional factors, and that these e￿ects are positive only if IMF program
participation is at a su￿ciently advanced stage, or if the program participa-
tion is coupled with su￿cient progress in improving institutional quality.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 pro-
vides a review of the previous literature. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 describe our
panel econometric framework, with Section 2.2 focussing on sample selection
and endogeneity issues, and Section 2.3 describing our approach to mod-
63elling state dependence of the e￿ects of IMF program participation. Section
2.4 describes the construction of our variables for modelling the state de-
pendence of the e￿ects of IMF program participation on a country’s output
growth. Section 2.5 presents our empirical results. Finally, Section 2.6 con-
cludes. Further details regarding our econometric modelling framework and
inference approach, further results checking on the robustness of our main
￿ndings and some details concerning the data set we collected for this chapter
are described in several appendices at the end of the chapter.
642.1 Review of Previous Literature
There are a number of notable contributions to the literature concerned with
measuring the e￿ects of a country’s IMF loan program participation on out-
put growth. Most of the contributions can be characterized as following one
of three approaches: (i) the ‘before-after’-approach, (ii) the ‘with-without’-
approach, and (iii) regression-based approaches. 6
The ‘before-after’-approach is based on the idea that, ceteris paribus, out-
put growth that a country has experienced before/after entering an IMF loan
program may be compared with output growth that the country experiences
during participation in an IMF loan program. For example, Evrensel (2002)
investigates the e￿ects of IMF loan programs for a sample of 109 countries
over the time period from 1971 to 1997 using lags of up to three years before
and after program participation to conduct a ‘before-after’ analysis. With
respect to the output growth e￿ects of program participation, she argues
that the evidence is inconclusive. The main problem with the ‘before-after’
approach, in any case, is that in practice it does not allow to fully account
for country-speci￿c factors that have bearing on the output growth e￿ects of
program participation.
The ‘with-without’ approach rests on the assumption that the core fea-
tures of countries that participate in IMF loan programs are the same as
those of countries not participating in IMF loan programs. For example, us-
ing matching methods, Hutchison (2004) analyzes the di￿erences in output
growth between countries participating and those not participating in IMF
loan programs, for a panel of 25 countries over the time period 1975 to 1997.
Hutchison’s (2004) results suggest that, once sample selection is controlled
for using observed variables only, 7 participation in IMF loan programs has
no adverse e￿ects on output growth. However, Hutchison’s (2004) match-
ing methods do not take into account any selection based on unobserved
variables, and so his results may still be subject to sample selection bias.
6See also Vreeland (2003) and Dreher (2006) for a similar categorization of the litera-
ture.
7See, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) for a distinction between
selection based on observed variables versus selection based on unobserved variables.
65Bordo and Schwartz (2000) compare the performance of 24 Asian and Latin-
American countries over the time period 1973 to 1999 and ￿nd that before
the onset of currency or banking crises, output growth declines more strongly
in countries not participating in IMF loan programs, though not to levels as
low as of those countries participating in IMF loan programs. They ￿nd
furthermore that countries not participating in IMF loan programs recover
faster after currency and banking crises.
The majority of contributions to the empirical literature on the e￿ects of
IMF loan program participation on output growth employ regression-based
approaches. Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000) perform a coun-
terfactual analysis using a panel data set for 74 countries over the time period
from 1986 to 1991. Taking into account sample selection issues, they ￿nd sig-
ni￿cant, positive e￿ects of IMF loan program participation on output growth.
In contrast, Vreeland (2003) using a similar methodology for a panel of 79
countries over the time period from 1970 to 1990, 8 ￿nds a negative impact of
IMF program participation on output growth. Bordo and Schwartz (2000),
also using counterfactual analysis, ￿nd negative but insigni￿cant e￿ects on
output growth during the onset of a currency or banking crisis, but posi-
tive and signi￿cant e￿ects a year later. Their data set comprises 24 Asian
and Latin-American countries and covers the time period from 1973 to 1998.
Hutchison and Noy (2003), distinguishing between IMF program approval
and successful completion of IMF programs, analyze the e￿ects of IMF pro-
gram participation on output growth in a sample of 65 developing countries
over the time period from 1975 to 1997. Using counterfactual analysis, they
￿nd that participation in IMF loan programs results in short-run output
growth losses, though noting that these results appear entirely driven by the
Latin-American countries in their sample. Finally, Barro and Lee (2005), us-
ing a set of political economy variables as instruments to correct for regressor
endogeneity problems in a panel comprising 86 countries over the time pe-
riod from 1975 to 2000 ￿nd that participation in IMF loan programs has a
signi￿cantly negative e￿ect on output growth.
The following section outlines the econometric framework to investigate
8Vreeland (2003) also uses a larger data set, ranging from 1950 to 1990.
66the conditional e￿ects of IMF program participation on output growth.
672.2 Panel Data Models with Sample Selection
and Censored Endogenous Variables
When using a regression framework to estimate the e￿ects of IMF program
participation on a country’s output growth, two issues that need to be ad-
dressed are (i) endogeneity of the program participation measure in the out-
put growth equation and (ii) sample selection. The ￿rst issue arises when
explaining output growth with, inter alia, a country’s participation in IMF
loan programs, as one will need to distinguish whether a country’s economic
performance is causal for IMF program participation, or vice versa. The
second issue arises when using non-randomly selected samples for model es-
timation, as then the fact that the output growth performance of countries
that participate in IMF programs may systematically di￿er from that of
those countries that do not participate needs to be addressed. 9 Countries
tend to participate in IMF loan programs when they encounter economic
problems, which implies that they are likely to experience an output growth
process that is di￿erent from that of countries that do not turn to the IMF
for assistance. It is thus sensible to analyze the output growth process of
participating countries ￿ that are likely to be in a situation of economic
crisis ￿ separately from the output growth process of non-participating coun-
tries, which in turn necessitates to correct for sample selection. As noted
by Vella (1998), while sample selection has in the literature been commonly
confronted in purely cross-sectional analyses, it is less frequently considered
to be of concern in the estimation of panel models. This may in part be due
to the perception that a panel model incorporating random or ￿xed e￿ects
will eliminate most forms of unobserved heterogeneity. However, consistency
of the ￿xed e￿ects estimator of a default ￿xed e￿ects model not explicitly
capturing the selection mechanism requires that the selection operates purely
through the time-invariant country-speci￿c terms, which appears to be rather
unlikely. Consistency of the random e￿ects estimator of the default random
e￿ects panel model requires the additional condition that the time-invariant
9As is well known, the investigation of such sample selection e￿ects was pioneered in
empirical microeconomics by Heckman (1979).
68country-speci￿c e￿ect and the model’s disturbance term are uncorrelated.
The next two sub-sections describe the random and ￿xed e￿ects panel
models which will be used for our analysis and take account of sample selec-
tion and endogeneity.
2.2.1 Random E￿ects Panel Model with Sample Selec-
tion and Endogeneity
In the following we will ￿rst outline a random e￿ects model to correct for
sample selection as well as endogeneity of the IMF program participation
measure in the output growth equation. Our exposition of this random e￿ects
model draws strongly upon Vella (1998) and Vella and Verbeek (1999). 10
Consider the following random e￿ects panel data model with sample selection
and endogeneity:
y

it = i + dit +x x x
0
it   + eit (2.1)
(‘participation e￿ects equation’),
d

it = i +z z z
0
it
 
 
 + vit (2.2)
(‘participation selection equation’), with
dit =
(
d

it if d

it > 0;
0 otherwise,
(2.3)
yit =
(
y

it if dit > 0;
‘unspeci￿ed’ otherwise,
(2.4)
10Vella and Verbeek (1999) discuss a model that inter alia allows for a broader range
of functional forms than we wish to consider in this chapter. Our model speci￿cation also
di￿ers from theirs in that unlike Vella and Verbeek (1999) we wish to allow for a larger
number of regressors in the participation selection equation than in the participation e￿ects
equation.
69i = 1;2;:::;N; and t = 1;2;:::;Ti, where y
it and d
it are latent endogenous
variables for country i and time period t with observed counterparts yit (out-
put growth ￿ participation e￿ects measure) and dit (IMF loan-quota ratio ￿
measure of participation intensity). 11 Also note that x x xit is a subset of z z zit,
and throughout our exposition in this section z z zit will be taken to be strictly
exogenous.
Let us write the unobserved component of each equation as the sum of
the country-speci￿c random e￿ect (i in Equation (2.1) and i in Equation
(2.2)) and the time-speci￿c idiosyncratic error term ( eit in Equation (2.1)
and vit in Equation (2.2)):
it = i + eit; (2.5)
and
uit = i + it: (2.6)
De￿ning u u ui as the stacked (Ti  1) vector of uit’s for country i, X X Xi =
(x x xi1;x x xi2;:::;x x xiTi)0, and Z Z Zi = (z z zi1;z z zi2;:::;z z ziTi)0, we assume that
u u uijZ Z Zi
iid  N(0;
2
    
0 + 
2
vI I I); (2.7)
with    being a Ti 1 vector of ones. Equation (2.7) restricts i and vit to be
independent across i, and vit is restricted to be intertemporally uncorrelated
and homoskedastic. We also assume that
E(itjZ Z Zi;u u ui) = 1uit + 2 ui; (2.8)
where  ui = T
 1
i
PTi
t=1 uit and 1 as well as 2 are parameters. Note that Equa-
tion (2.8) allows for dit and it to be correlated, capturing endogeneity of the
IMF loan-quota ratio in the output growth equation as arising through the
program participation selection mechanism speci￿ed in Equation (2.2). Also,
11While the availability of data on output growth is per se not tied to a country partici-
pating in an IMF loan program (that is, dit  0), yit under non-participation is unobserved
from the perspective of the sample selection model equations in (2.1) and (2.2), in that it
is then driven by a di￿erent model of output growth.
70through 2 6= 0 Equation (2.8) allows eit to be intertemporally correlated and
heteroskedastic.
Conditioning Equation (2.1) on the selection outcomes, d d di, as well as the
regressors in X X Xi, and observing Equation (2.8) yields
E(y

itjZ Z Zi;d d di) = dit +x x x
0
it   + E(itjZ Z Zi;d d di)
= dit +x x x
0
it   + 1uit + 2 ui: (2.9)
To obtain the sample selection correction terms in uit and  ui on the right-
hand side of Equation (2.9), Vella and Verbeek (1999) propose to compute
E[uitjZ Z Zi;d d di] =
Z
[i + E(vitjZ Z Zi;d d di;i)]f(ijZ Z Zi;d d di)di; (2.10)
where f(ijZ Z Zi;d d di) denotes the conditional density of i and vit in terms of
its expectation conditional on Z Z Zi;d d di and i is the generalized residual from
estimation of the panel Tobit model in Equation (2.2). 12 The conditional
density of i can be obtained from
f(ijZ Z Zi;d d di) =
f(d d dijZ Z Zi;i)f(i)
f(d d dijZ Z Zi)
; (2.11)
with f generically denoting density functions, and where
f(d d dijZ Z Zi) =
Z Ti Y
t=1
f(ditjZ Z Zi;i)f(i)di: (2.12)
After obtaining the conditional expectation of uit in Equation (2.10), the
output growth equation in (2.1) can be estimated, including uit and  ui as
additional variables to correct for sample selection while also allowing for
endogeneity of dit. The functional form of Equation (2.10) as well as details
concerning the computation of the standard errors for the estimates of ;  ;1,
and 2 can be found in Appendix 2.A at the end of the chapter.
If eit is restricted to be intertemporally uncorrelated, then Equation (2.8)
12See Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault, and Trognon (1987) for a de￿nition of the gener-
alized residuals we work with here.
71reduces to
E(itjZ Z Zi;u u ui) = 1uit; (2.13)
implying that Equation (2.10) simpli￿es to
E[uitjZ Z Zi;dit] =
Z
[i + E(vitjZ Z Zi;dit;i)]f(ijZ Z Zi;dit)di: (2.14)
The following sub-section describes the ￿xed e￿ects panel model.
2.2.2 Fixed E￿ects Panel Model with Sample Selection
and Endogeneity
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) propose a ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation of a
panel data model closely related to Equations (2.1) to (2.4). In what follows
we will invoke Semykina and Wooldridge’s (2005) modelling of the ￿xed ef-
fects, decomposing the ￿xed e￿ects into a systematic component driven by
observables (in the following the variables in g g gi) as well as a random unob-
served component, and then embed the resultant model within the estimation
and inference procedure discussed in Sub-Section 2.2.1. 13
Following Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), let us thus invoke a Mundlak
(1978) type decomposition of the country-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ect in Equation
(2.2):
i =  +g g g
0
i   + ri; (2.15)
where ri is a random e￿ect. De￿ning
~ uit = ri + vit; (2.16)
13Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) provide a di￿erent two-step estimation and inference
procedure for a panel model with a Probit speci￿cation of the selection mechanism than
we propose in this sub-section for a panel model with a Tobit speci￿cation of the selection
mechanism. For our data set, the procedure we outline here appears to be more robust
to the selection of variables in g g gi than the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) procedure.
A systematic comparison of our procedure with that of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010)
would be interesting to pursue but is beyond the scope of this chapter.
72we assume in analogy to Equation (2.7) that
~ u u uijZ Z Zi;g g gi
iid  N(0;
2
r    
0 + 
2
vI I I): (2.17)
Note that the systematic component in i, g g gi, consists of cross-sectional
means over time, that is, country-speci￿c constants.
Clearly, the Mundlak (1978) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) ￿xed
e￿ects speci￿cation restricts the systematic variation of the country-speci￿c
e￿ect to only arise through the vector of observables g g gi. This is a more
restrictive speci￿cation of the ￿xed e￿ect than often adopted in other panel
data models, for example in the linear dynamic panel data literature. 14
Let us use a similar decomposition as speci￿ed in Equation (2.15) for
the country-speci￿c e￿ect in the participation selection equation also for the
country-speci￿c e￿ect in the output growth (participation e￿ects) equation
(that is, Equation (2.1)):
i =   +q q q
0
i   + i; (2.18)
where i is a random e￿ect and q q qi is a subset of g g gi. De￿ning
~ it = i + eit; (2.19)
we now also assume in analogy to Equation (2.8) that
E(~ itjZ Z Zi; ~ u u ui;g g gi) = ~ 1~ uit + ~ 2 ~ ui: (2.20)
Under Equations (2.15) to (2.20), we therefore allow for a less restrictive
speci￿cation of the country-speci￿c e￿ects than in Vella and Verbeek (1999)
and capture a ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation in the spirit of Mundlak (1978) and
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), augmenting both the program selection
equation, Equation (2.2), and the output growth equation, Equation (2.1),
with the regressors in q q qi and g g gi, but otherwise pursuing the estimation and in-
14See, for example, Binder, Hsiao, and Pesaran (2005) for an unrestricted formulation
of ￿xed e￿ects within a linear dynamic panel data model.
73ference procedure of Sub-Section 2.2.1. We will discuss the choice of elements
in g g gi in Section 2.5.
Finally, the null of the random e￿ects speci￿cation of Sub-Section 2.2.1
can be tested against the ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation of this section by investi-
gating whether    = 0 0 0 and    = 0 0 0.
The next section outlines the methodological approach which allows for
conditioning the e￿ect of IMF loan program participation in our panel econo-
metric framework.
742.3 Conditioning the E￿ect of IMF Loan Pro-
gram Participation
The ￿xed e￿ects model of Sub-Section 2.2.2 still involves the restriction that
the systematic di￿erences in the output growth processes across participating
countries can be captured through the country-speci￿c e￿ects and di￿erent
realizations of the regressors in dit and x x xit. This is a rather strong assump-
tion. To analyze the e￿ects of IMF program participation, it clearly seems
desirable to allow for systematic di￿erences in these e￿ects themselves across
countries. To do so in a parsimonious form that also allows us to learn about
the sources of the variations of the e￿ects across countries, we consider here
the conditional pooling (state dependence) approach of Binder and O￿er-
manns (2007). This approach allows us to model the conditionality of the
growth e￿ects of IMF loan programs on a country’s degree of program imple-
mentation or on its institutional quality with a minimal set of assumptions
regarding the functional form of this conditionality. The approach consists of
modelling the state dependence with ￿exible functional form polynomials, as
a (cross-sectionally) homogeneous function of the relevant conditioning vari-
able. Denoting the conditioning variable by wit and the ￿exible functional
form polynomial by (wit), Binder and O￿ermanns (2007) propose to specify
(wit) using a parametric function of ￿exible form, and in particular choose
Chebyshev polynomials as one speci￿cation of orthogonal polynomials:
(wit) =
 X
s=0

()
s cs(wit); (2.21)
with the Chebyshev polynomials cs(wit) recursively de￿ned as cs+1(wit) =
2witcs(wit)   cs 1(wit), s = 1;2;:::;, c0(wit) = 1, c1(wit) = wit, and where

()
s , s = 0;1;:::;, are coe￿cients that are homogeneous across countries. 15
To condition an independent variable’s e￿ect, the variable may be mul-
tiplied with the Chebyshev polynomial (wit), and estimation can then be
15Chebyshev polynomials belong to the class of orthogonal polynomials and thus can
address collinearity problems that could arise under  > 1.
75carried out as usual with the resultant augmented set of variables.
The following section describes the variables which are used to condi-
tion the e￿ects of IMF loan program participation in our panel econometric
framework.
762.4 Conditioning Variables
Under the conditional pooling approach (some of) the model coe￿cients are
a function of a conditioning variable. According to the IMF, ￿[c]onditionality
refers to policies and actions that a borrowing member agrees to carry out as
a condition for the use of IMF resources. The purpose of conditionality is to
ensure assistance to members [...] in a manner that [...] establishes adequate
safeguards for the temporary use of the IMF’s resources.￿ 16 In practice, the
IMF only disburses installments of funds agreed to in the loan program if
the country initiates speci￿c reforms, that is, complies with conditionality of
the loan program. Hence, one way to model compliance with conditionality
is to consider the ratio of loans actually drawn relative to loans originally
agreed upon.17 Provided that the IMF consistently disburses funds only to
countries that are su￿ciently successful in advancing economic reforms, the
loans-drawn-to-agreed ratio should be a useful proxy as to whether a country
is successful in implementing the economic reforms advocated by the IMF.
We also consider a more direct measure of structural conditionality. Struc-
tural conditionality according to the IMF since the 1980s has involved changes
in policy processes, legislation, and institutional reforms. 18 In line with this,
the IMF is arguing that ￿the implementation of IMF-supported programs
depends to a signi￿cant extent on the domestic political and institutional
environment￿.19 By fostering institutional development, the IMF in e￿ect
acknowledges that e￿cient outcomes in market-oriented economies are most
likely to occur when the non-market institutions are functioning well. Rodrik
(2009) distinguishes between ￿ve types of institutions that allow markets to
perform well: (i) private property rights give entrepreneurs the security of
claiming the gains from investment and innovations; (ii) regulatory institu-
tions prevent market failures that can arise from fraudulent behavior and
incomplete information; (iii) institutions for macroeconomic stabilization are
16See Fritz-Krockow and Ramlogan (2007), p. 25.
17This measure was initially suggested as a proxy for compliance with conditionality
by Killick (1995)
18See Nsouli, Atoyan, and Mourmouras (2006).
19See A. Moody and A. Rebucci (2006).
77neccessary to alleviate shocks that hit the economy; (iv) institutions for so-
cial security render a market economy compatible with social coherence and
stability; and (v) institutions of con￿ict management are neccessary to pre-
vent social con￿icts from creating uncertainty and diversion of ressources
from economically productive activities. To capture a broad range of aspects
of institutional quality, we construct for this chapter an index incorporating
measures of bureaucracy quality, absence of corruption, law and order, gov-
ernment stability, absence of ethnic tensions and internal con￿icts, and add
two further dimensions by also taking account of health (life expectancy)
and educational attainment. The set up of the index is described in what
follows.20 The index is constructed on the basis of the mean of the i-th coun-
try’s index elements relative to the mean of the same index elements for a
base-country year (the United States in 2000):
indexit =
Pm
s=1 s-th variableit Pm
s=1 s-th variablebase-country, base-year
; (2.22)
where m denotes the number of variables that enter into the construction of
the index. To be able to calculate this index, we replace missing observa-
tions using interpolated values. If for, say, country i a time series is missing
entirely, we proxy it via a ‘rank-matching’ procedure: For each time period
for country i, ￿rst a preliminary index is calculated on the basis of Equation
(2.22) involving only those variables that are actually available for country i.
We then also calculate the same preliminary index for all other countries for
time period t, excluding those variables that are completely missing for coun-
try i. Using these preliminary indices, we then calculate the period t relative
rank (that is,
rankit
number of countriest) of the preliminary index value of country
i among the set of all countries that can be considered for the preliminary
index values in period t. We then proxy for time period t the variable in
country i that is entirely missing with the value of that variable for which
the period t relative rank is closest to the relative rank calculated for country
i’s preliminary index for period t.
20A listing including a description of all variables used for construction of our index is
given in Appendix 2.B at the end of the chapter.
78Finally, we impute those variables for which there are no observations
either at the beginning or at the end of the series backward or forward,
respectively, using the percentage changes of, again, a preliminary index that
contains only the variables that are available for the country in the missing
time period. At this point we then have for each country a balanced set of
variables that can be used to calculate the index as outlined in Equation
(2.22).
Our approach to index calculation ensures that there are no mean-shifts
in the index if for a country the time series for some variable begins later or
ends earlier than the time series for some other variables for that country.
Our approach furthermore preserves all the information about the variation
in the time series we exploit. It should be noted that due to the imputation
procedure it is possible that an index value may become larger than one.
The next section outlines our empirical results as regards the conditional
e￿ects of IMF program participation on output growth.
792.5 Empirical Results
We begin by discussing empirical results obtained when taking into account
sample selection and regressor endogeneity by means of considering the ￿xed
e￿ects panel model without state dependence of e￿ects, as outlined in Sub-
Section 2.2.2.21 The selection equation, Equation (2.2) is a ￿xed e￿ects Tobit
model, as the loan-quota ratio is left-censored at zero. 22 It contains country
years with and without participation in IMF loan programs. Note that when
later we turn to considering state dependence of e￿ects, the estimated models
involve di￿erent sets of observations than considered here, depending on the
conditioning variable chosen.23 Table 2.1 displays our estimation results when
estimating Equation (2.2), with the full set of observations available.
As can be seen from Table 2.1, the estimated coe￿cients on the invest-
ment share, measure of democracy, in￿ation, and mean economic proximity
to major Europe are signi￿cantly negative. If the investment share or the
measure for democracy decline by one percentage point or by one unit, then
the ratio of IMF lending to a country’s quota increases by 1.686 or 3 per-
21The set of regressors for all equations was chosen on the basis of the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC). Since the AIC turned out to always select the ￿xed e￿ects
speci￿cation, in what follows we focus our discussion on the ￿xed e￿ects model. Potential
candidates for the Mundlak variables, gi and qi, were a country’s fertility rate, freedom
of the press, freedom status of society, economic proximity to the U.S., and economic
proximity to major Europe. Results for the random e￿ects speci￿cation are provided as
robustness check in Appendix 2.D at the end of the chapter. Potential candidates for z z zit
and x x xit were a country’s cumulative number of years in IMF loan programs, quota share
at the IMF, sta￿ share at the IMF, political proximity to the U.S., political proximity
to major Europe, reserve position, current account position, trade openness, democracy
index rating, investment share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Government share of
GDP, and in￿ation.
22The IMF loan-quota ratio captures the average, on a monthly basis, of funds agreed
upon in all loan programs (SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF/PRGF) divided by the country’s quota
at the IMF. Note that Dreher (2006) only covers those arrangements that have been active
for at least ￿ve months in a given calendar year. Our results do not change if we adjust
the loan-quota ratio accordingly. Similar to Vreeland (2003), we consider consecutive
agreements with the IMF as part of the same spell, since governments most of the time
have several consecutive agreements with the IMF. A description of all variables used is
provided in Appendix 2.B at the end of the chapter.
23One of the conditioning variables, the (growth rate of the) index of institutional
quality, is available only for a sub-set of the observations in our sample. When using this
sub-set of observations the results of the selection equation do not change qualitatively,
however.
80Independent Variables Coe￿cients
Investment Share  1:686
[2:579]
**
Reserves  0:053
[0:374]
Government Share 0:432
[1:014]
Current Account  0:077
[0:207]
Openness  0:094
[0:859]
Democracy Index  0:030
[2:371]
**
Number of Years under IMF Programs 0:020
[4:358]
***
In￿ation  0:027
[2:771]
**
Mean Fertility Rate 0:556
[1:875]
*
Mean Economic Proximity to Major Europe  0:132
[2:032]
**
Number of Observations for the selection equation: 1640
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2.2), augmented with the Mundlak variables capturing
￿xed e￿ects. The dependent variable is the loan-quota ratio. The F-test of joint signi￿cance of the Mundlak variables
is signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level. The McFadden pseudo R-squared for the regression equals 0.017. t-statistics
are displayed in square brackets underneath the coe￿cient estimates. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level, a ‘**’
indicates signi￿cance at the 5% level, and a ‘***’ indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data,
the sample extends from 1975 to 2004 and the number of countries considered is 68. A description of all variables used is
provided in Appendix 2.B at the end of the chapter.
Table 2.1: Regression Results for the Participation Selection Equation, FE
Speci￿cation
centage points, respectively.24 If the in￿ation rate or the mean economic
proximity to Major Europe increase by one percentage point, then the loan-
quota ratio decreases by 0.027 or 0.132 percentage points, respectively. The
24Note that di￿erentiating the latent variable (denoted here generically as y) with
respect to the independent variable (denoted here generically as x, entering into the Tobit
model with a coe￿cient of ), we of course have
@E(yjx)
@x
= :
The marginal e￿ect for the observed dependent variable needs to be corrected for cen-
soring, multiplying  with the probability that the loan-quota ratio is strictly positive.
All reported e￿ects are average marginal e￿ects evaluated at the independent variables’
sample means.
81e￿ect of a country’s mean fertility rate and the number of years a country
has been under IMF loan programs are signi￿cantly positive. If the mean
fertility rate increases by one percentage point or the number of years under
IMF loan programs increases by one year, then the loan-quota ratio increases
by 0.556 and 2 percentage points, respectively.
Figure 2.1 displays the marginal e￿ects (red curve) of the signi￿cant vari-
ables from Table 2.1 as well as the corresponding one-standard deviation
(green) and two-standard deviation (blue) bands.
The residual obtained from estimating the participation selection equa-
tion can be used to generate correction terms that, as described in Sub-
Section 2.2.1, in addition to correcting for sample selection also correct for
endogeneity when estimating the e￿ects of the loan-quota ratio on the output
growth of countries participating in IMF loan programs. Table 2.2 displays
our estimation results for the ￿xed e￿ects participation e￿ects model (with-
out state dependence) of Sub-Section 2.2.2, using the growth rate of real GDP
per capita as the dependent variable and the IMF loan-quota ratio, as well
as a set of explanatory variables as independent variables. 25 The estimated
coe￿cient on the investment share is signi￿cantly positive. An increase of
the investment share by one percentage point increases a country’s growth
rate of real GDP per capita by 0:09 percentage points. The coe￿cients on
in￿ation and the mean of a country’s fertility rate are signi￿cantly negative.
An increase of in￿ation by one percentage point and an increase of the mean
fertility rate by one unit lead to a decrease of the real GDP per capita growth
rate by 0:003 and 0:035 percentage points, respectively.
Two further issues are worth noting: First, 1 (not displayed in the table)
is signi￿cant at the 10% level, providing evidence for a sample selection
mechanism. Second, the coe￿cient on the loan-quota ratio is positive but
not signi￿cant.26
25All standard errors reported in the following tables are corrected for ￿rst-step sam-
pling uncertainty a￿ecting second-step inference. See also Appendix 2.A at the end of the
chapter.
26When estimating the participation e￿ects equation without the sample selection cor-
rection terms (which we can do for a total of 938 observations), then the coe￿cient on the
loan-quota ratio has negative sign ( 0:003), with a t-statistic of  1:522.
82(a) Investment share (b) Democracy index
(c) Number of years under IMF programs (d) In￿ation
(e) Mean fertility rate (f) Mean economic proximity to Major Europe
Figure 2.1: Marginal E￿ects in the Participation Selection Equation, FE
Speci￿cation
To address the issue of heterogeneity bias in the loan program partici-
pation e￿ects estimates when state dependence of the e￿ects is ignored, in
our next step of analysis we condition the e￿ects of the loan-quota ratio
on output growth on the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio, which, as
discussed in Section 2.4, may serve as a useful proxy for measuring state de-
pendence of e￿ects. Taking into account such state dependence may also on
its own contribute to alleviating the endogeneity problem: One may expect
83Independent Variables Coe￿cients
Loan-Quota Ratio 0:004
[1:083]
Investment Share 0:090
[1:962]
**
In￿ation  0:003
[4:488]
***
Reserves 0:017
[1:300]
Mean Fertility Rate  0:035
[2:315]
**
Number of Observations: 849
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2.1), augmented with the Mundlak variables to capture
￿xed e￿ects. The F-test of joint signi￿cance of the correction terms, 1 and 2, is not signi￿cant, but 1 is individually
signi￿cant at the 10% signi￿cance level, indicating correlation between the idiosyncratic error terms. The dependent
variable is real GDP per capita growth. The adjusted R-squared for the regression equals 0.041. t-statistics are displayed
in square brackets underneath the coe￿cient estimates. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level, a ‘**’ indicates
signi￿cance at the 5% level, and a ‘***’ indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the
sample extends from 1975 to 2004, and the number of countries considered is 68. A description of all variables used is
provided in Appendix 2.B at the end of the chapter.
Table 2.2: Regression Results for the Participation E￿ects Equation, FE
Speci￿cation
that a higher degree of compliance with conditionality causes higher (lower)
output growth if the reforms implemented promote higher (lower) output
growth. However, output growth should have a negligable e￿ect on compli-
ance with conditionality. It appears sensible to conjecture that lower output
growth raises a country’s willingness to accept painful economic reforms. In
this case, lower output growth should be associated with a higher degree of
compliance. In any case, the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio and real
GDP per capita growth in our data set feature a correlation of -0.05 only.
Table 2.3 provides our estimation results when using Chebyshev polyno-
mials of order one and the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio as captur-
ing state dependence.
Conditioning the output growth e￿ects of the loan-quota ratio on the
proxy for compliance with conditionality has a considerable e￿ect on the
estimation results: If a participating country were not to comply with con-
ditionality at all, the e￿ect of loan program participation on output growth
is negative. An increase in the loan-quota ratio by 1 percentage point lowers
84Independent Variables Coe￿cients
Loan-Quota Ratio -0:005
[1:046]
Loan-Quota Ratio * Drawn Ratio 0:012
[2:333]
**
Investment Share 0:070
[1:642]
In￿ation  0:003
[4:241]
***
Reserves 0:021
[1:591]
Current Account  0:046
[1:272]
Mean of Fertility Rate  0:045
[3:144]
***
Number of Observations: 849
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2.1), augmented with the Mundlak variables to capture
￿xed e￿ects. The F-test of joint signi￿cance of the correction terms, 1 and 2, is not signi￿cant, but 1 is individually
signi￿cant at the 10% signi￿cance level, indicating correlation between the idiosyncratic error terms. The conditioning
variable, amount-drawn-to-agreed ratio, has been used as control variable (not displayed) and is not signi￿cant. The
dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. The adjusted R-squared for the regression equals 0.053. t-statistics
are displayed in square brackets underneath the coe￿cient estimates. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level, a ‘**’
indicates signi￿cance at the 5% level, and a ‘***’ indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data,
the sample extends from 1975 to 2004, and the number of countries considered is 68. A description of all variables used
is provided in Appendix 2.B at the end of the chapter.
Table 2.3: Regression Results for the Participation E￿ects Equation with
the Actual Degree of Program Implementation as Conditioning Variable, FE
Speci￿cation
the growth rate of real GDP per capita by 0.005 percentage points. (If such
a country does not receive any funds from the IMF, because it does not set
in e￿ect the required reforms, the output growth e￿ect obviously would be
zero.) However, the higher the compliance ratio, the smaller in absolute terms
the negative output growth e￿ect of the loan-quota ratio. If the compliance
ratio is larger than 42%, then the e￿ect of IMF program participation turns
positive.27 If all funds originally agreed upon are drawn, that is, there is full
compliance with IMF conditionality, then an increase of the loan-quota ratio
27Note that this ratio is sizeably smaller than in Killick (1995), who sets a threshold
value for successful IMF program implementation at 80 %, arguing that this cut-o￿ point
is closely associated with successful program implementation based on a survey between
1980 and 1992.
85Figure 2.2: E￿ect of Program Participation Conditional on Actual Degree of
Program Implementation, FE Speci￿cation
by 1 percentage point leads to an increase of real GDP per capita growth
by 0.007 percentage points. These results are in line with IMF arguments
stressing that compliance with conditionality is important for the success of
IMF loan programs. Figure 2.2 plots the coe￿cient on the loan-quota ratio
conditional on the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio (red curve) with
the one standard deviation (green) and two standard deviation (blue) bands.
To provide a di￿erent measure of quanti￿cation of the output growth
e￿ects of IMF loan programs, Table 2.4 displays the average contribution
of the various regressors to a country’s real GDP per capita growth net of
individual-speci￿c e￿ects, as implied by the state-dependent panel model in
Table 2.3:
The overall contribution of the loan-quota ratio to real GDP per capita
growth net of individual-speci￿c e￿ects is equal to 7:49%. The investment
share contributes most to a participating country’s real GDP per capita
growth, at almost 50%.
To investigate the state dependence of the output growth e￿ects of IMF
86Variables Mean E￿ect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio  0.005  30.39
Loan-Quota Ratio * Drawn Ratio 0.006 37.88
Investment Share 0.008 49.98
In￿ation  0.001   7.94
Reserves 0.006 36.70
Current Account 0.002 13.78
Sum 0.015 100.00
Table 2.4: Growth Accounting with the Actual Degree of Program Imple-
mentation as Conditioning Variable, FE Speci￿cation
program participation on a country’s institutional quality directly, we next
use our index of institutional quality as described in Section 2.4. Since struc-
tural conditionality is measured in changes by the IMF, we include the index
of institutional quality in percentage changes (‘institutional development’)
as our conditioning variable.
Table 2.5 displays results when using Chebyshev polynomials of order one
and institutional development as the conditioning variable.
Conditioning the e￿ect of the loan-quota ratio on institutional develop-
ment yields signi￿cant results: If a country cannot improve its institutional
quality, the e￿ect of program participation on output growth is negative: An
increase of the loan-quota ratio by 1 percentage point lowers the growth rate
of real GDP per capita by 0.004 percentage points. At the same time, the
estimated coe￿cient increases systematically with the magnitude of institu-
tional development. Figure 2.3 displays the coe￿cient on the loan-quota ra-
tio conditional on the progress in institutional development. If the progress
in institutional development exceeds 0.12, the e￿ect of IMF loan program
participation on output growth turns signi￿cantly positive at the 5% level.
Table 2.6 displays the average contribution of the various regressors to
a country’s real GDP per capita growth net of individual-speci￿c e￿ects, as
implied by the state-dependent panel model in Table 2.5.
Having analyzed the e￿ect of a country’s participation in IMF loan pro-
grams on its output growth, we next turn our focus to analyses of coun-
terfactuals and intertemporal e￿ects involving IMF loan programs. To get
87Independent Variables Coe￿cients
Loan-Quota Ratio 0:004
[1:024]
Loan-Quota Ratio * Institutional Development 0:049
[2:002]
**
Investment Share 0:070
[0:865]
In￿ation  0:003
[4:257]
***
Democracy 0:002
[1:059]
Mean Fertility Rate  0:038
[2:070]
**
Number of Observations: 773
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2.1), augmented with the Mundlak variables to capture
￿xed e￿ects. The F-test of joint signi￿cance of the correction terms, 1 and 2, is not signi￿cant. The conditioning
variable, institutional development, has also been considered as a control variable (not displayed) and is not signi￿cant.
The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. The adjusted R-squared for the regression equals 0.053.
t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the coe￿cient estimates. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10%
level, a ‘**’ indicates signi￿cance at the 5% level, and a ‘***’ indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The regression uses
annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2004, and the number of countries considered is 60. A description of all
variables used is provided in Appendix 2.B at the end of the chapter.
Table 2.5: Regression Results for the Participation E￿ects Equation with the
Progress in Institutional Quality as Conditioning Variable, FE Speci￿cation
an idea about the magnitude of the e￿ect of IMF program participation on
countries’ output growth, Tables 2.7 and 2.8 display counterfactual analyses
for the panel models reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.5.
Table 2.7 reports that during participation in IMF loan programs coun-
tries between 1975 and 2004 had on average a real GDP per capita growth
rate of 0:56%. The predicted value of this growth rate using the coe￿cients
from the sample estimated only with country years under participation equals
this 0:56%, while the ￿tted value using the same coe￿cients, but counterfac-
tually setting the loan-quota ratio to zero, amounts to 0:45%. The predicted
value using the coe￿cients from the sample estimated only with country
years not under participation amounts to 1:40%. Non-participating coun-
tries actually had on average a real per capita GDP growth of 1:63%. The
predicted value using the coe￿cients from the sample estimated only with
country years not under participation amounts to 1:63% while the ￿tted value
88Figure 2.3: E￿ect of Program Participation Conditional on a Country’s
Progress in Institutional Development, FE Speci￿cation
Variables Mean E￿ect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio 0.004 19.89
Loan-Quota Ratio * Instit. Dev. 0.001 2.33
Investment Share 0.007 35.11
In￿ation  0.001   6.06
Democracy 0.010 48.73
Sum 0.021 100.00
Table 2.6: Growth Accounting with the Progress in Institutional Quality as
Conditioning Variable, FE Speci￿cation
89Country years Actual a) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.56% 0.56% 0.45% 1.40%
Non-Particip. 1.63% ￿ 2.03% 1.63%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is always set to zero.
d) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years without participation in IMF loan programs.
Table 2.7: Counterfactual Analysis with the Degree of Program Implemen-
tation as Conditioning Variable, FE Speci￿cation
Country years Actual a) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.52% 0.52% 0.05% 1.43%
Non-Particip. 1.53% ￿ 2.08% 1.53%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is always set to zero.
d) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years without participation in IMF loan programs.
Table 2.8: Counterfactual Analysis with the Progress in Institutional Quality
as Conditioning Variable, FE Speci￿cation
90using the coe￿cients from the sample estimated only with countryyears un-
der participation, but counterfactually setting the loan-quota ratio always to
zero, amounts to 2:03%.
Three points are worth highlighting here. First, the second column of Ta-
ble 2.7 highlights the fact that country years under IMF loan participation
are times of (economic) crises. On average, countries had much lower output
growth during years of participation in IMF loan programs. For this rea-
son, it is imperative to properly capture the direction of causation in growth
regressions involving development aid. Second, countries in economic crisis
are, on average, better o￿ when turning to the IMF and participating in
IMF loan programs. The annual percentage gain amounts to 0:11% real per
capita GDP growth per year. Nevertheless, as our results make clear, it is
important for a country to comply with conditionality and improve upon
its institutional quality. Third, according to our counterfactuals, countries
that participated in IMF loan programs would have had an average growth
rate of 1:40% had they not participated. This number is almost three times
as high as their actual average growth rate and thus seems rather unreal-
istic. Our counterfactuals thus appear to provide evidence in favor of the
presumption underlying our estimation strategy that countries entering IMF
loan programs in times of crises have fundamentally di￿erent growth regimes
than those countries that do not.
To learn more about the dynamic e￿ects of IMF loan-program participa-
tion on a country’s output growth, we ￿nally turn to estimating the country’s
growth rates between t 1 and t 1+i, i = 1;2;:::;5, that can be attributed
to IMF loan participation in year t.28 Figures 2.4 and 2.5 display the in-
tertemporal e￿ects when taking the optimal speci￿cation of the ￿xed e￿ects
model with the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio or the progress in in-
stitutional development as conditioning state variable, respectively.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 display the corresponding coe￿cients and their sig-
ni￿cance levels for all time periods.
The output growth e￿ects of participation in IMF loan programs are sig-
28Note that it is not yet possible to use a dynamic model structure, in particular in the
growth equation, in our sample selection model.
91Figure 2.4: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspective
with the Actual Degree of Program Implementation as Conditioning Variable,
FE Speci￿cation
Figure 2.5: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspec-
tive with the Progress in Institutional Quality as Conditioning Variable, FE
Speci￿cation
92Dep. Variable Loan-Quota Ratio Loan-Quota Ratio*Drawn Ratio
yt yt 1
yt 1  0:005
[1:046]
0:012
[2:333]
**
yt+1 yt 1
yt 1  0:009
[0:863]
0:019
[1:923]
*
yt+2 yt 1
yt 1  0:017
[0:932]
0:026
[2:166]
**
yt+3 yt 1
yt 1  0:021
[0:868]
0:027
[1:809]
*
yt+4 yt 1
yt 1  0:025
[0:765]
0:027
[1:336]
yt+5 yt 1
yt 1  0:040
[0:832]
0:023
[0:809]
Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level and a ‘**’ indicates
signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Table 2.9: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspective
with the Degree of Program Implementation as Conditioning Variable, FE
Speci￿cation
Dep. Variable Loan-Quota Ratio Loan-Quota Ratio*Instit. Dev.
yt yt 1
yt 1 0:004
[1:024]
0:049
[2:002]
**
yt+1 yt 1
yt 1 0:008
[0:981]
0:060
[1:737]
*
yt+2 yt 1
yt 1 0:006
[0:401]
0:110
[0:265]
yt+3 yt 1
yt 1 0:008
[0:372]
0:023
[0:294]
yt+4 yt 1
yt 1 0:007
[0:265]
0:014
[0:165]
yt+5 yt 1
yt 1  0:001
[0:028]
0:026
[0:333]
Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level and a ‘**’ indicates
signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Table 2.10: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspec-
tive with the Progress in Institutional Quality as Conditioning Variable, FE
Speci￿cation
93ni￿cant for up to three years after participation in an IMF loan program. For
all time periods the output growth e￿ects of participation in IMF loan pro-
grams are more favorable if a country complies with conditionality / improves
on institutional development.
The following section concludes.
942.6 Conclusion
Through modelling conditionality of the output growth e￿ects of IMF pro-
gram participation, in this chapter we have shed light on what appears to be
a major reason as to why previous empirical studies have arrived at mixed
results, ranging from positive output growth e￿ects to no e￿ects to nega-
tive e￿ects from IMF program participation. Allowing the e￿ects of IMF
program participation to vary systematically with the degree of program im-
plementation or an index of institutional development, we ￿nd that there
are signi￿cant positive e￿ects of IMF program participation on a country’s
output growth only if the IMF programs are implemented to a su￿cient
degree or if the program participation is coupled with su￿cient progress in
institutional quality.
With regards to the magnitude of these output growth e￿ects, our growth
accounting calculations provide evidence that IMF loans have a sizeable im-
pact. Their output growth e￿ect, in absolute size, is larger than that of
in￿ation, for example, though much smaller than that of investment in phys-
ical capital.
Our counterfactual analysis provides evidence that countries participat-
ing in IMF loan programs would on average have had lower output growth,
had they not participated in IMF loan programs. The higher the degree
of program implementation and improvement in institutional quality, the
higher the potential gains from participating in IMF loan programs. We also
￿nd that output growth e￿ects of IMF program participation are signi￿cant
for up to three years after program participation, and are signi￿cantly pos-
itive if participating countries comply with conditionality. Countries that
decide to turn to the IMF for funding appear well advised to comply with
IMF conditionality and to make every e￿ort in improving their institutional
environment.
95Appendix 2.A: Computation of Conditional Expectations
and of Standard Errors
In this appendix we ￿rst discuss the computation of the conditional expecta-
tion in Equation (2.10) needed to correct the output growth equation, that
is Equation (2.1), under the random e￿ects speci￿cation for sample selection
bias, while also allowing for endogeneity of dit.29 The conditional expecta-
tion of vit given Z Z Zi;d d di, and i on the right hand side of Equation (2.2) is
calculated as follows:
E(vitjZ Z Zi;d d di;i) =[dit   (i +z z z
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where  and  denote the standard normal probability and cumulative den-
sity functions, respectively, and 1() denotes the indicator function.
Using this expression, the conditional expectation of uit given Z Z Zi and d d di,
Equation (2.10), can be obtained as:
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d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When obtaining standard errors for the estimates of the parameters of
the output growth equation under the two-step procedure of Section 2.2,
the sampling uncertainty that has entered the construction of the correc-
tion factors ^ uit and ^  ui needs to be observed. The following estimator of
29Note that the conditional expectation E(~ uitjZ Z Zi;d d di;g g gi) arising under the ￿xed e￿ects
speci￿cation can be computed in analogous fashion, and thus need not be considered
separately.
96the variance-covariance matrix of    = (   0 1 2)0 re￿ects this sampling
uncertainty:
^ V arN =
1
N
^ G G G
 1
N

^ V V V N + ^ D D DN ^ W W W N ^ D D D
0
N

^ G G G
 1
N ; (2.25)
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with
R R Ri =
 
d d di x x x
0
i ^ u u ui ^  ui  

; (2.29)
   = (1 2)
0 ; (2.30)
and    is again a vector of ones of size Ti. Note that if 2 = 0 is imposed in
the estimation, then it appears sensible to also impose that ^ e e ei^ e e e
0
i is a diagonal
matrix (re￿ecting that eit is restricted to be intertemporally uncorrelated).
Computation of the standard errors of the growth equation parameter es-
timates under the ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation can proceed in analogy to Equa-
tions (2.25) and (2.30).
97Appendix 2.B: Description of Variables
Variables Source
Amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio : The amount of all IMF loan pro-
gram funds a country actually draws expressed as a share of the original amount
agreed upon with the IMF.
International Financial
Statistics and own calcu-
lations
Bureaucracy quality: Assesses the institutional strength and quality of the
bureaucracy.
International Country
Risk Guide
Corruption: Assesses corruption within the political system. International Country
Risk Guide
Democracy index: Based of the Legal Index of Electoral Competitiveness
(LIEC); Codi￿ed with 1 if it has a value of 6 or larger which is the threshold for
democratic systems.
World Bank Political Insti-
tutions Dataset
Economic proximity to major Europe : Bilateral trade with major Europe
(France, Germany, United Kingdom), expressed as a ratio to GDP.
Barro and Lee (2005)
Educational attainment : Total population aged 15 and over, average years of
school.
Worldbank
Ethnic tensions: Assesses the degree of tension within a country attributable
to racial, nationality, or language divisions.
International Country
Risk Guide
Fertility rate: Number of children that are born to a woman if she lives to
the end of her childbearing years and bears children in accordance with current
age-speci￿c fertility rates.
World Development Indi-
cators 2006 CD-ROM
Freedom of the press: Assesses the degree of freedom of the press in a country. Freedom House
Freedom status: Assesses political rights and civil liberties in a country. Freedom House
Government share of real GDP : Percentage in 2000 constant prices. Penn World Tables 6.2
Government stability: Assesses the government’s ability to carry out its de-
clared program(s) and its ability to stay in o￿ce.
International Country
Risk Guide
In￿ation: Annual percentage change of the consumer price index. World Development Indi-
cators 2006 CD-ROM
Institutional index: Set up from the variables educational attainment, life ex-
pectancy, government stability, bureaucracy quality, corruption, law and order,
ethnic tensions, and internal con￿ict
International Country
Risk Guide and own
calculations
Internal con￿ict: Assesses the political violence in the country and its actual
or potential impact on governance.
International Country
Risk Guide
Investment share of real GDP : Percentage in 2000 constant prices. Penn World Tables 6.2
Law and order: Assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system as
well as the popular observance of the law.
International Country
Risk Guide
Life expectancy at birth: Expresses the number of years a newborn can be
expected to live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth are
the same throughout its life.
World Development Indi-
cators 2006 CD-ROM
Loan-quota ratio: Sum of all current IMF loans a country is eligible to as a
share of its quota at the IMF.
International Financial
Statistics and own calcu-
lation
Openness in constant prices : Percentage in 2000 constant prices. Penn World Tables 6.2
Political proximity to major Europe : Fraction of UN votes along with major
Europe (France, Germany, United Kingdom).
Barro and Lee (2005)
Quota: Countries’ quota in millions of standard drawing rights (SDR). International Financial
Statistics
Real GDP per capita: International Dollar in 2000 constant prices, thousand
dollars.
Penn World Tables 6.2
Total reserves in months of imports : Amount of reserves in terms of the
number of months of imports of goods and services which can be paid.
World Development Indi-
cators 2006 CD-ROM
98Appendix 2.C: Countries Contained in Data Set 30
Country Start :
end of
sample
Years with Program Partici-
pation
Country Start :
end of
sample
Years with Program Partici-
pation
Algeria 1977:1991 1989:1991 Liberia 1979:1987 1979:1985
Argentina 1976:2004 1976:1978; 1983:2004 Madagascar 1975:2003 1977:1978; 1980:1992; 1996:2003
Australia 1975:2004 % Malawi 1981:2002 1981:1986; 1988:2002
Austria 1975:2004 % Malaysia 1975:2003 %
Bangladesh 1987:2003 1987:1993; 2003:2003 Mali 1989:2003 1989:2003
Belgium 1975:2001 % Mexico 1979:2004 1979:1979; 1983:1993; 1995:1997;
1999:2000
Bolivia 1976:2003 1980:1980; 1986:2003 Morocco 1975:2003 1980:1993
Botswana 1976:2003 % Mozambique 1988:2003 1988:2003
Brazil 1981:2003 1983:1986; 1988:1990; 1992:1993;
1998:2003
Namibia 2003:2003 %
Burkina Faso 1975:2001 1991:2001 Netherlands 1975:2004 %
Cameroon 1977:1995 1988:1992; 1994:1995 New Zealand 1975:2004 %
Canada 1975:2004 % Nicaragua 1977:2004 1979:1979; 1991:2004
Chile 1975:2004 1975:1976; 1983:1990 Niger 1975:2003 1983:1991; 1994:2003
Colombia 1975:2003 1999:2003 Nigeria 1977:2004 1987:1987; 1989:1992; 2000:2001
Congo, Rep. 1986:2003 1986:1988;1990:1992; 1994:1999 Norway 1975:2004 %
Costa Rica 1977:2004 1977:1977; 1980:1983; 1985:1997 Pakistan 1976:2004 1977:1978; 1980:1983; 1988:1991;
1993:2004
Cote d’Ivoire 1975:2003 1981:1992; 1994:2003 Panama 1977:2003 1977:1987; 1992:2002
Cyprus 1976:2004 1980:1981 Papua New Guinea 1976:2001 1990:1992; 1995:1997; 2000:2001
Denmark 1975:2004 % Paraguay 1975:2003 2003:2003
Dominican Republic 1975:2003 1983:1986; 1991:1994; 2003:2003 Peru 1977:2003 1977:1980; 1982:1985; 1993:2003
Ecuador 1976:2004 1983:1992; 1994:1995; 2000:2001;
2003:2004
Philippines 1977:2004 1977:1981; 1983:2000
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977:2003 1977:1981; 1987:1988; 1991:1998 Portugal 1976:2004 1977:1979; 1983:1985
El Salvador 1976:2003 1980:1983; 1990:2000 Senegal 1975:2003 1979:1992; 1994:2003
Finland 1975:2004 1975:1976 Sierra Leone 1977:2003 1977:1982; 1984:1989; 1994:1998;
2001:2003
France 1975:2004 % Singapore 1975:2004 %
Gambia, The 1978:1997 1978:1980; 1982:1991 South Africa 1975:2004 1976:1977; 1982:1983
Germany 1992:2004 % Spain 1975:2004 1978:1979
Ghana 1975:2003 1979:1979; 1983:1992; 1995:2003 Sri Lanka 1975:2003 1975:1975; 1977:1981; 1983:1984;
1988:1995; 2001:2003
Greece 1976:2004 % Sudan 1977:2003 1979:1985
Guatemala 1977:2003 1981:1984; 1988:1990; 1992:1994;
2002:2003
Sweden 1975:2004 %
Guinea-Bissau 1988:2003 1988:1990; 1995:1998; 2000:2003 Syrian Arab Rep. 1977:1988 %
Haiti 1975:2000 1975:1990; 1995:1999 Thailand 1975:2003 1978:1979; 1981:1983; 1985:1986;
1997:2000
Honduras 1975:2004 1979:1983; 1990:1997; 1999:2002;
2004:2004
Togo 1975:2003 1979:1998
India 1975:2003 1981:1984; 1991:1993 Trinidad and To-
bago
1975:2003 1989:1991
Indonesia 1981:2004 1997:2003 Tunisia 1984:2004 1986:1992
Ireland 1975:2004 % Turkey 1975:2004 1978:1985; 1994:1996; 1999:2004
Israel 1975:2004 1975:1977 Uganda 1981:2003 1981:1984; 1987:2003
Italy 1975:2004 1975:1975; 1977:1978 United Kingdom 1975:2004 1975:1978
Jamaica 1976:2003 1977:1996 United States 1975:2004 %
Japan 1977:2004 % Uruguay 1978:2004 1978:1987; 1990:1993; 1996:2004
Jordan 1975:2003 1989:1990; 1992:2003 Venezuela, RB 1975:2004 1989:1993; 1996:1997
Kenya 1975:2003 1975:1986; 1988:1994; 1996:2003 Zambia 1986:2000 1986:1987,1995:2000
Korea, Rep. 1976:2004 1976:1977; 1980:1987; 1997:2000 Zimbabwe 1980:1994 1981:1984; 1992:1994
30Major oil exporting countries, centrally planned economies, and island economies
have been excluded.
99Appendix 2.D: Results for the Random E￿ects Panel
Model
Independent Variables Coe￿cients
Investment Share  1:174
[4:013]
***
In￿ation  0:016
[2:798]
**
Government Share 0:513
[2:359]
**
Number of Years under IMF Programs 0:021
[7:562]
***
Sta￿share at IMF  0:029
[1:630]
Political Proximity to Major Europe  0:123
[2:682]
**
Reserves  0:047
[0:692]
Current Account  0:173
[0:903]
Openness  0:123
[2:257]
**
Democracy  0:013
[1:967]
**
Number of Observations for the selection equation: 2439
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2.2). The dependent variable is the loan-quota ratio. The
McFadden pseudo R-squared for the regression equals 0.031. t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the
coe￿cient estimates. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level, a ‘**’ indicates signi￿cance at the 5% level, and a
‘***’ indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2004, and
the number of countries considered is 73. A description of all variables used is provided in Appendix 2.B at the end of
the chapter.
Table 2.12: Regression Results for the Participation Selection Equation, RE
Speci￿cation
100Figure 2.6: E￿ect of Program Participation Conditional on Actual Degree of
Program Implementation, RE Speci￿cation
Figure 2.7: E￿ect of Program Participation Conditional on a Country’s
Progress in Institutional Quality, RE Speci￿cation
101Figure 2.8: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspective
with the Actual Degree of Program Implementation as Conditioning Variable,
RE Speci￿cation
Figure 2.9: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspec-
tive with the Progress in Institutional Quality as Conditioning Variable, RE
Speci￿cation
102Independent Variables Coe￿cients
Loan-Quota Ratio  0:003
[0:682]
Loan-Quota Ratio * Drawn Ratio 0:010
[1:955]
*
Investment Share 0:138
[2:910]
**
In￿ation  0:003
[4:873]
***
Reserves 0:022
[1:882]
*
Number of Observations: 931
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2.1). The F-test of joint signi￿cance of the correction
terms, 1 and 2, is not signi￿cant, but 1 is individually signi￿cant at the 10% signi￿cance level, indicating correlation
between the idiosyncratic error terms. The conditioning variable, amount-drawn-to-agreed ratio, has been used as
control variable also (not displayed), and is not signi￿cant. The dependent variable is real growth per capita GDP. The
adjusted R-squared for the regression equals 0.051. t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the coe￿cient
estimates. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level, a ‘**’ indicates signi￿cance at the 5% level, and a ‘***’ indicates
signi￿cance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2004, and the number of
countries considered is 73. A description of all variables used is provided in Appendix 2.B at the end of the chapter.
Table 2.13: Regression Results for the Participation E￿ects Equation with
the Actual Degree of Program Implementation as Conditioning Variable, RE
Speci￿cation
Variables Mean E￿ect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio  0.003  14.29
Loan-Quota Ratio * Drawn Ratio 0.005 21.91
Investment Share 0.015 71.32
In￿ation  0.001   5.59
Democracy 0.006 26.64
Sum 0.021 100.00
Table 2.14: Growth Accounting with the Actual Degree of Program Imple-
mentation as Conditioning Variable, RE Speci￿cation
103Independent Variables Coe￿cients
Loan-Quota Ratio 0:004
[1:021]
Loan-Quota Ratio * Institutional Development 0:046
[1:955]
*
Investment Share 0:140
[1:953]
*
In￿ation  0:003
[4:011]
***
Democracy 0:002
[1:138]
Reserves 0:017
[1:404]
Number of Observations: 852
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2.1). The F-test of joint signi￿cance of the correction
terms, 1 and 2, is not signi￿cant. The conditioning variable, growth of the index of institutional quality, has been used
as control variable also (not displayed), and is not signi￿cant. The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth.
The adjusted R-squared for the regression equals 0.057. t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the
coe￿cient estimates. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level, a ‘**’ indicates signi￿cance at the 5% level, and a
‘***’ indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2004, and
the number of countries considered is 65. A description of all variables used is provided in Appendix B at the end of the
chapter.
Table 2.15: Regression Results for the Participation E￿ects Equation with
the Progress in Institutional Quality as Conditioning Variable, RE Speci￿-
cation
Variables Mean E￿ect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio 0.004 12.21
Loan-Quota Ratio * Instit. Dev. 0.001 1.43
Investment Share  0.001   4.04
In￿ation 0.009 28.55
Democracy 0.004 13.68
Sum 0.021 100.00
Table 2.16: Growth Accounting with the Progress in Institutional Quality as
the Conditioning Variable, RE Speci￿cation
104Country years Actuala) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.61% 0.61% 0.44% 2.91%
Non-Particip. 2.09% ￿ 2.18% 2.09%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is always set to zero.
d) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years without participation in IMF loan programs.
Table 2.17: Counterfactual Analysis with the Actual Degree of Program
Implementation as Conditioning Variable, RE Speci￿cation
Country years Actuala) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.57% 0.57% 0.13% 2.61%
Non-Particip. 2.06% ￿ 2.27% 2.06%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is always set to zero.
d) Coe￿cient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model speci￿cation involving only country
years without participation in IMF loan programs.
Table 2.18: Counterfactual Analysis with the Progress in Institutional Qual-
ity as Conditioning Variable, RE Speci￿cation
105Dep. Variable Loan-Quota Ratio Loan-Quota Ratio*Drawn Ratio
yt yt 1
yt 1  0:003
[0:682]
0:010
[1:955]
*
yt+1 yt 1
yt 1  0:008
[0:861]
0:017
[1:669]
yt+2 yt 1
yt 1  0:016
[1:226]
0:024
[2:060]
**
yt+3 yt 1
yt 1  0:024
[1:390]
0:028
[2:074]
**
yt+4 yt 1
yt 1  0:030
[1:265]
0:032
[1:751]
*
yt+5 yt 1
yt 1  0:027
[0:925]
0:030
[1:325]
Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level and a ‘**’ indicates
signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Table 2.19: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspective
with the Actual Degree of Program Implementation as Conditioning Variable,
RE Speci￿cation
Dep. Variable Loan-Quota Ratio Loan-Quota Ratio*Instit. Dev.
yt yt 1
yt 1 0:004
[1:021]
0:046
[1:955]
*
yt+1 yt 1
yt 1 0:006
[0:878]
0:049
[1:320]
yt+2 yt 1
yt 1 0:002
[0:173]
 0:120
[0:274]
yt+3 yt 1
yt 1  0:020
[0:144]
 0:004
[0:050]
yt+4 yt 1
yt 1  0:001
[0:036]
 0:013
[0:161]
yt+5 yt 1
yt 1 0:004
[0:181]
 0:003
[0:038]
Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A ‘*’ indicates signi￿cance at the 10% level and a ‘**’ indicates
signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Table 2.20: E￿ect of Program Participation in an Intertemporal Perspec-
tive with the Progress in Institutional Quality as Conditioning Variable, RE
Speci￿cation
106Chapter 3
Systemic Risk in an
Interconnected Banking System
with Endogeneous Asset Markets1
In a manner unexpected only a few years ago, the global ￿nancial crisis which
started in 2007 has demonstrated that a system of interconnected ￿nancial
institutions may be subject to a systemic breakdown, with large e￿ects on
the real economy. In this chapter a numerical model is used to analyze a
network of ￿nancial institutions subject to capital requirements. The model
allows to replicate important stylized facts of systemic risk which emerged
during the recent ￿nancial crisis. We then introduce the concept of a System
Value at Risk (SVaR) which allows to simultaneously determine both, a fair
risk charge as well as the optimal macroprudential capital endowment, for
￿nancial institutions in the system. Among other things we ￿nd that there is
not necessarily a correspondence between a bank’s 2 contribution to systemic
risk ￿ which determines its risk charge ￿ and the capital that is optimally
injected into it to make the ￿nancial system more resilient to systemic risk.
Depending on the sources of systemic risk assessed and the various po-
tential consequences on the ￿nancial system as well as on the real economy,
1This chapter is joint work with Jan Pieter Krahnen, Goethe-Universit￿t Frankfurt
am Main.
2In the following ‘banks’ and ‘￿nancial institutions’ will be used interchangeably.
107there is not a single de￿nition of systemic risk. 3 An early de￿nition of sys-
temic risk was given in Group of Ten: ￿Systemic ￿nancial risk is the risk that
an event will trigger a loss of economic value or con￿dence in, and attendant
increases is uncertainly about, a substantial portion of the ￿nancial system
that is serious enough to quite probably have signi￿cant adverse e￿ects on
the real economy. Systemic risk events can be sudden and unexpected, or the
likelihood of their occurrence can build up through time in the absence of ap-
propriate policy responses. The adverse real economic e￿ects from systemic
problems are generally seen arising from disruptions to the payment system,
to credit ￿ows, and from the destruction of asset values.￿ 4 Lo (2009) pro-
poses analyzing a set of risk measures to capture systemic risk in the entire
￿nancial system. These risk measures capture the six dimensions ‘leverage’,
‘liquidity’, ‘correlation’, ‘concentration’, ‘sensitivities’, and ‘connectedness’.
The IMF de￿nes systemic risk as ￿large losses to other ￿nancial institutions
induced by the failure of a particular institution due to its interconnected-
ness￿5 and the Financial Stability Board, International Monetary Fund, and
Bank for International Settlements describe systemic risk in a report to the
G-20 as ￿a risk of disruption to ￿nancial services that is (i) caused by an im-
pairment of all or parts of the ￿nancial system and (ii) has the potential to
have serious negative consequences for the real economy￿. 6 Following closely
the latter de￿nition, in this chapter we de￿ne systemic risk as the danger
that failures within the ￿nancial system will mean that an adequate supply
of credit and ￿nancial services to the economy is no longer guaranteed, so
that negative real e￿ects will follow.
A main driver of the recent ￿nancial crisis was the constitution of the
￿nancial system.7 Highly leveraged, to a large extent homogeneous (with
3See Chapter 2 of International Monetary Fund (2009) for a comprehensive discussion
of di￿erent de￿nitions of systemic risk.
4Group of Ten (2001), p. 126.
5Chapter 2 of International Monetary Fund (2010), p. 2.
6Financial Stability Board, International Monetary Fund, and Bank for International
Settlements (2009), p. 2.
7For a general overview on the causes and consequences of the recent ￿nancial crisis
see, inter alia, Issing, Asmussen, Krahnen, Regling, Weidmann, and White (2009), Borio
(2008), Brunnermeier (2009), and Gorton (2010a).
108respect to their portfolio structure) ￿nancial institutions, comprising the
banking as well as the shadow-banking system, 8 with interconnected, mostly
obscure balance sheets rendered the ￿nancial system fragile. In the course of
the crisis numerous institutions had to be bailed out because their insolvency
would have put the ￿nancial system at risk via triggering a cascade of other
￿nancial institutions’ defaults. Arising systemic risk was essentially driven
by three factors: (i) Size of ￿nancial institutions as well as the (ii) direct and
(iii) indirect interconnectedness between ￿nancial institutions.
First of all, the default of a ￿nancial institution which is relatively large
can put the ￿nancial system at risk. For example, in line with our de￿nition
of systemic risk, one can expect that the insolvency of the bank UBS would
constitute a serious threat to the ￿nancial system and the real economy
of Switzerland, the e￿ects of interconnectedness with other institutions not
even considered. Institutions of which a default would have threatened the
￿nancial system and the wider economy because of their mere size were called
‘too-big-to-fail’ in the recent ￿nancial crisis.
Second, banks that are highly interlinked with other ￿nancial institutions
can also threaten the ￿nancial system through counterparty exposure. If
such a bank defaults on its liabilities it can directly induce losses on its
creditor banks which on their part might spread the shock further in case they
also default. For example, during the recent ￿nancial crisis, the insurance
company American International Group (AIG) was bailed out because it was
highly interlinked with many ￿nancial institutions through Credit Default
Swaps (CDS). A default of AIG would thus have exposed a large part of the
￿nancial system to huge potential losses.
Third, indirect connections between ￿nancial institutions can also make
the ￿nancial system vulnerable. If banks invest in identical or correlated
￿nancial products their balance sheets can become correlated. Losses can
induce one or several banks to deleverage via liquidating large parts of assets
on the market, eventually resulting in a decline of prices for those assets.
8For an analysis of the role of the shadow banking system in the recent ￿nancial
crisis see Gorton (2010b) who compares the breakdown of the shadow banking system to
historical bank runs.
109Other banks that have invested into the same or to some extent correlated
assets then face a loss when marking their assets to market. Furthermore,
these banks might thus also be induced to sell assets on the market which
can further depress prices, eventually forcing other banks to also deleverage
etc. Ultimately this cascade creates ￿resales 9 and indirectly transmit shocks
between ￿nancial institutions with correlated balance sheets via markets.
Shocks can thus spread directly and indirectly through the ￿nancial system.
Institutions that threaten the ￿nancial system through a contagious casacade
of defaults because of their interconnectedness with the ￿nancial system were
labelled ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ during the recent ￿nancial crisis.
Figure 3.1 gives an outline of how balance sheets of ￿nancial institutions
are interconnected. Solid lines depict direct interconnections while dashed
lines depict indirect interconnections. The direction of the arrows indicates
exposure towards another bank. For example, the arrow from the interbank
lendings of bank 2 to the interbank borrowings of bank 1 represents counter-
party exposure of bank 2 towards bank 1.
On the stylized balance sheet from Figure 3.1 banks’ assets consist of
liquid and non-liquid assets as well as interbank lendings. Liquid assets are,
for example, cash and cash equivalents. Non-liquid assets are, for example,
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) and need to be marked to market if
they are held in a bank’s trading book. Interbank lendings are, for example,
credits given to other ￿nancial institutions. Distinguishing between liquid
and illiquid assets is important because one of the main drivers of systemic
risk during the recent ￿nancial crisis consisted of banks which were cut o￿
from liquidity on the interbank markets and thus had to sell illiquid assets,
resulting in self-energizing ￿resales. Banks’ liabilities consist of deposits, in-
terbank borrowings, and equity. Below the stylized balance sheets on Figure
3.1 in dashed lines are conditional assets and liabilities, for example CDS.
To mitigate the risk of future ￿nancial meltdowns it has become con-
sensus that, in addition to microprudential supervision, supervisors need
to set up an additional layer of macroprudential regulation and supervi-
9See Gorton and Metrick (2009) and Gorton (2009) for a detailed analysis of the
mechanism underlying ￿resales.
110Figure 3.1: Interconnections Between Financial Institutions
sion which shall allow to identify system-wide risk drivers, monitor systemic
risk, and react adequately to it. Systemic risk is a negative externality of
￿nancial institutions on the ￿nancial system. Without charging them for
this negative externality, ￿nancial institutions are perversely incentivized to
increase their contribution to systemic risk via becoming too-big-to-fail or
too-interconnected-to-fail because it allows them to take advantage from re-
sulting cheap re￿nancing opportunities.
To analyze systemic risk and banks’ contributions to it, we develop a
network of interrelated bank balance sheets with endogeneous asset markets.
Our model reproduces the main stylized facts with regards to systemic risk
that emerged during the recent ￿nancial crisis. We then introduce the con-
111cept of SVaR in which a Pigouvian tax is used to capitalize a systemic risk
fund. The capital from the systemic risk fund is re-injected into the ￿nan-
cial system to make it more resilient to systemic risk. The optimal amount
of capital for the systemic risk fund as well as the necessary proportions of
capital injected into ￿nancial institutions are determined with a parallelized
simulated annealing approach.
Our analysis provides evidence that there is not neccessarily a correspon-
dence between a bank’s contribution to systemic risk ￿ which determines its
risk charge ￿ and the capital that is injected into it to make the ￿nancial
system more resilient to systemic risk. In addition, the analysis provides
evidence that a systemic risk fund which is immediately re-injected into the
￿nancial system requires less capital than a systemic risk fund which stores
the capital in a central depository and is used to bail out banks ex-post.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 gives
an overview on the previous literature. Section 3.2 outlines our model, and
Section 3.3 shows how it can be used to analyze systemic risk as well as in-
dividual institutions’ contribution to systemic risk along various parameters.
Using the outlined model, Section 3.4 develops and analyzes a proposed sys-
temic risk charge and fund subject to our SVaR concept within a systemic
risk management approach. Section 3.5 concludes. Further details regarding
di￿erent model structures analyzed as well as the parallelized simulated an-
nealing algorithm employed for analysis are described in several appendices
at the end of the chapter.
1123.1 Review of Previous Literature
To get a general overview on systemic risk, Haldane (2009) considers the ￿-
nancial network as a complex and adaptive system and applies several lessons
from other disciplines such as ecology, epidemiology, biology, and engineering
to gain insights to systemic risk in the ￿nancial system. More speci￿cally and
regarding the various approaches to assessing systemic risk it is sensible to
distinguish between (i) ‘market-based’ and (ii) ‘network-based’ approaches. 10
While the former use correlations and default probabilities that can be ex-
tracted from market prices of ￿nancial instruments, the latter explicitely
model linkages between ￿nancial institutions, mostly using balance sheet in-
formation.
As regards the market-based literature, Lehar (2005) uses standard tools
which regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management
￿ however at the level of the entire bank system ￿ and shows that in a
sample of international banks over the period from 1988 to 2002 the North
American banking system increased its stability while the Japanese banking
sector has become more fragile. Bartram, Brown, and Hund (2007) develop
three distinct methods to quantify the risk of systemic failures in the global
banking system. Using a sample of 334 international banks during 6 ￿nan-
cial crises the authors come to the conclusion that the existing institutional
framework could be regarded as adequate to handle major macroeconomic
events. B￿rdsen, Lindquist, and Tsomocos (2006) evaluate the usefulness
of macroeconomic models for policy analysis from a ￿nancial stability per-
spective. They ￿nd that a suite of models is needed to evaluate risk factors
because ￿nancial stability depends on a wide range of factors.
To measure systemic risk, more recent research from the market-based
literature focuses mainly on detecting systemic risk in groups of ￿nancial
institutions, in particular using multivariate measures such as tail risk indi-
cators or multivariate distress dependences. 11 For example, Gray and Jobst
(2010) ￿nd that using equity option information to calculate (joint) tail risk
10See the background paper of Financial Stability Board, International Monetary Fund,
and Bank for International Settlements (2009) for a similar distinction.
11See Chapter Three of International Monetary Fund (2009) for a similar subsumption.
113indicators between institutions yields timely information about the extent
of systemic risk. Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) compute the multivariate
density of a portfolio of banks to capture linear and non-linear distress de-
pendences and apply their methodology to a number of country and regional
examples. Among other ￿ndings they show that U.S. banks are highly in-
terconnected, and that distress dependence rises in times of crises. Finally,
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) propose CoVaR, de￿ned as the value at risk
of ￿nancial institutions conditional on other institutions being in distress to
assess systemic risk in the ￿nancial system. Using this measure, the authors
quantify the extent to which ￿nancial key ￿gures such as the leverage ratio
and maturity mismatch can predict systemic risk.
As regards the network-based literature, Upper and Worms (2004) use
balance sheet information to analyze whether there is the risk of contagion
in the German interbank market and ￿nd that the failure of a single bank
can lead to a loss of up to 15% of the banking system’s assets. Cifuentes, Fer-
rucci, and Shin (2005) integrate a mechanism of marking to market assets in
a network model and show that liquidity requirements can serve as an e￿ec-
tive means to forestall contagious defaults in the ￿nancial system. Elsinger,
Lehar, and Summer (2006) use standard tools from risk management in com-
bination with a network model of interbank loans. Applying their methodol-
ogy to a dataset of all Austrian banks they provide evidence that correlations
in banks’ asset portfolios are a main source of systemic risk. Mueller (2006)
employs a data set of bilateral bank exposures and credit lines in a network
model and ￿nds a substantial potential for contagion in the Swiss interbank
market. Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne,
and Willison (2009) combine a network model of the ￿nancial system with
funding liquidity risk and incorporate this to a suite of models that allow to
model various aspects of systemic risk. The authors provide evidence that
large losses at some banks can be exacerbated by liquidity feedbacks and
thus can lead to system-wide instability.
Castaglionesi and Navarro (2007) study the endogeneous formation of
￿nancial networks and show that an e￿cient ￿nancial network and a decen-
tralized ￿nancial network both display a core-periphery structure in which
114core banks are all connected among themselves and choose to hold a safe
asset while periphery banks can eventually be connected to other banks and
choose to hold a risky asset. Gai and Kapadia (2010) develop a network
framework where asset prices are allowed to interact with balance sheets.
The authors ￿nd that greater connectivity in ￿nancial systems reduces the
likelihood of widespread default in case of relatively small shocks, while the
impact on the ￿nancial system in case of large shocks increases this likelihood.
Espinosa-Vega and SolØ (2010) show how a cross-border network analysis can
be used to e￿ciently monitor direct and indirect systemic linkages between
countries, in particular in the face of di￿erent credit and funding shocks. The
authors provide evidence that the inclusion of risk transfers can modify the
risk pro￿le of entire ￿nancial systems.
The recent ￿nancial crisis has revealed that individual ￿nancial institu-
tions impact di￿erently on systemic risk. There are particularly two reasons
why it is important to assess ￿nancial institutions’ individual contribution to
systemic risk. First of all, to prevent the insecurity surrounding potential de-
faults such as the Lehmann bankruptcy in 2008, a supervisor should be able
to assess the impact of individual institutions’ defaults on the stability of the
￿nancial system. Second, as already outlined in the previous section, individ-
ual ￿nancial institutions should be charged to incentivize them to internalize
the cost of their negative externality on the ￿nancial system. Tarashev, Bo-
rio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) use the Shapley value methodology to identify
the contribution of individual ￿nancial institutions to systemic risk. The
authors show that none of the drivers of contribution to systemic risk, such
as the institution’s size or its probability of default, in isolation provide a
fully satisfactory proxy for systemic importance. Following the authors, it is
thus important to carefully take into consideration the interactions between
the various risk factors when analyzing systemic risk and the individual in-
stitutions’ contribution to it. Gauthier, Lehar, and Souissi (2010) compare
alternative mechanisms for allocating the overall risk of a banking system to
its member banks. Using a data set of the Canadian banking system the au-
thors ￿nd that capital allocations that are optimal with respect to systemic
risk can di￿er by up to 50% from actually observed capital levels. Similarly
115to Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) these allocations are not trivially
related to di￿erent risk factors.
The following section outlines the network model that will be used for
our analysis.
1163.2 Model of an Interrelated Financial Network
The model which is set up in this section captures important features of the
￿nancial system and replicates several stylized facts in relation to systemic
risk that arose during the recent ￿nancial crisis. It consists of (i) a system
of three interconnected ￿nancial institutions that adjust their portfolio to
ful￿ll a capital requirement and (ii) the Rest of the World (ROW). Banks
have deposits, lend to each other, and hold liquid assets (LA) and non-
liquid assets (NLA) on their balance sheet. Non-liquid assets are marked
to market12 while liquid assets do not change their value on banks’ balance
sheets. The ￿nancial system is mapped with a matrix of assets and liabilities
as displayed on Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Matrix of the Financial System Model
On Figure 3.2 a bank’s assets are on the respective rows of the matrix. For
example, the row designated to bank 1 contains bank 1’s assets. Similarly,
a bank’s liabilities are captured on the respective columns of the matrix.
The ￿eld ‘W’ on Figure 3.2, that is, interbank lending from bank 2 to bank
1, designates an asset for bank 2 and a liability for bank 1, and the ￿eld
‘X’ which could, for example, be CDOs, captures bank 1’s investment in
12Note that there is no distinction between banking and trading book in the model, all
non-liquid assets are marked to market in the model.
117non-liquid asset products related to the rest of the world. The ￿eld ‘Y’,
for example cash and cash equivalents, captures bank 1’s holdings of liquid
assets, and the ￿eld ‘Z’ captures the depositors and bondholders of bank 1
from the rest of the world.
Banks have to ful￿ll a capital requirement ratio, 
, which is calculated
following Equation 3.1 for the i’th bank,

 =
P
j aj + p  bi + ci  
P
j lj   di P
j aj + p  bi
; (3.1)
where i;j 2 (1;2;3);i 6= j, are indices for the three banks in the system, bi
are non-liquid assets, ci are liquid assets, aj are interbank lendings, lj are
interbank borrowings, p is the market price of the non-liquid asset, and di
are deposits. Note that the liquid asset does not show up in the denominator
of Equation 3.1 because banks do not have to hold capital for their liquid
asset holdings.13 If a bank’s equity ratio is lower than the capital require-
ment, 
, it tries to net its interbank exposure and, if that is not su￿cient to
adequately recapitalize, sells non-liquid assets on the market. In both cases
the denominator in Equation 3.1 sinks relatively to the nominator. If a bank
cannot ful￿ll the capital requirement it defaults.
Equation 3.2 displays the new capital ratio if a bank engages in netting
its interbank lendings with other banks by  units.


 =
(
P
j aj   ) + p  bi + ci   (
P
j lj   )   di
(
P
j aj   ) + p  bi
(3.2)
Netting diminishes the denominator by  units while the nominator re-
mains unchanged. Note that in the model counterparties can net any amount
that exists as cross-exposure as long as their balance sheet net-value is non-
negative, that is
P
j aj + p  bi + ci  
P
j lj   di  0.14 Here and in the
following cross-exposure means that two banks have borrowed from and lent
to each other. Note that a bank which has cross-exposure with another
13See Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005) for a similar set up.
14If a bank’s liabilities exceed its assets the bank is taken into custody by the supervisor
for creditor protection. In that case no netting is possible anymore.
118bank can have net-exposure with the same bank. Here and in the following
net-exposure is de￿ned as one bank having lent more to another bank than
borrowed from the same bank.
Solving Equation 3.2 for the amount of bank i’s desired netting yields
Equation 3.3

d
i =  1 1 1[nvi0]
(1   
)(
P
j aj + p  bi + ci  
P
j lj   di)


; (3.3)
where 1 1 1 is an indicator function and nvi is bank i’s net-value de￿ned as
P
j aj +pbi+ci 
P
j lj  di. The amount of netting the j’th bank is willing
to accept with bank i is given by Equation 3.4

s
j = 1 1 1[nvj0]min(ai;li): (3.4)
Note that the minimum operator is used since only cross-exposures can be
netted. The resulting amount netted between bank i and bank j is given by
Equation 3.5
ji = min(
s
j;
d
i): (3.5)
Note that in the model banks never increase their lending to each other.
Similarly to recapitalizing via netting, Equation 3.6 displays the capital
ratio bank i expects to obtain if it engages in selling si units of its non-liquid
asset.


 =
P
j aj + p(bi   si) + ci + p  si  
P
j lj   di P
j aj + p(bi   si)
(3.6)
While netting has no further e￿ect except increasing the involved banks’
capitalization, recapitalization via selling non-liquid assets has further reper-
cussions on all banks’ balance sheets with non-liquid asset holdings. In the
model, the market price of the non-liquid asset, p, is a function of supply
and demand on the market. If banks decide to engage in liquidating (part
of) their non-liquid assets, there are several e￿ects on banks’ balance sheets:
selling banks obtain liquid assets and hence improve their capital ratio. How-
ever, at the same time an increased supply of non-liquid assets to the market
119decreases the market price of the non-liquid asset. This results in lowering
the market value of their remainder portfolio of non-liquid assets. Further-
more, this price e￿ect also puts pressure on other banks’ balance sheets since
the market value of their non-liquid assets decreases as well.
In the model the market price of the non-liquid asset is found via a t￿ton-
nement process between demand and o￿er. Similar to Cifuentes, Ferrucci,
and Shin (2005), the inverse demand function is assumed to follow Equation
3.7
p = exp( 
X
i
si); (3.7)
where  is a positive constant to scale the price responsiveness to non-
liquid assets sold on the market and si is the overall amount of non-liquid
assets sold by bank i on the market.
Solving Equation 3.6 for the amount of non-liquid assets sold by bank i
to ful￿ll the capital requirement and noting that a bank can only sell non-
liquid assets it owns15 yields Equation 3.8 which shows bank i’s supply of
non-liquid assets on the market as a function of the market price.
si = min

bi;
 (1   
)(p  bi +
P
ai)   ci +
P
li + di

p

(3.8)
Since each si is decreasing in p, the aggregate sales function, S(p), is also
decreasing in p. The t￿tonnement-process to ￿nd the equilibrium market
price is depicted on Figure 3.3.
Prior to any shock, the market price equals 1 which is the price when
all banks initially ful￿ll the capital requirement, and sales of the non-liquid
asset are zero. A shock to bank i, say a certain loss of cash, ci, shifts the
supply curve upwards, resulting in S(1) = si  0 because bank i starts selling
non-liquid assets to ful￿ll its capital ratio. However, for S(1) the bid price
equals only p(S(1))bid, while the o￿er price is one. The resulting market
price is p(S(1))mid, the midprice between bid and o￿er prices. Since the
15Note that banks do not engage in buying or short-selling non-liquid assets in the
model.
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market price thus decreases and banks have to mark their non-liquid assets
to market, additional non-liquid asset sales can result to ful￿ll the capital
requirement. The step adjustment continues until the intersection of the
demand and o￿er curves is reached at p. Note that the supply curve can
become horizontal from a certain amount of non-liquid assets sold on the
market onwards because there is only a limited amount of non-liquid assets
on banks’ balance sheets. Since a shock to one or several banks can only
result in an upward shift of the supply curve, with the maximum price of the
non-liquid asset equal to 1 in the initial equilibrium prior to the shock and
the minimum market price equal to zero, a market price p 2 (0;1) always
exists.
In the outlined framework the two main shock transmission channels are
121the direct connections between banks via interbank holdings (credit risk) and
indirect connections through marking to market the non-liquid assets on the
balance sheet (market risk).
The following sub-section outlines how speci￿c realizations of the ￿nancial
network are set up.
3.2.1 Generating Speci￿c Realizations of the Financial
System Matrix
A speci￿c set up of the ￿nancial system is a consistent matrix, that is, with all
banks ful￿lling the capital requirement ratio, of the ￿nancial system model
depicted on ￿gure 3.2, with concrete values for all assets and liabilities. Such
a set up is determined by (i) the structure of the system, that is, de￿ning
which banks have counterparty exposure through, for example, interbank
lending; (ii) banks’ ratio between interbank lendings and other assets (that
is, non-liquid and liquid assets), , with  the overall amount lent to other
banks and 1    the amount invested in other assets; (iii) the ratio between
investment in non-liquid and liquid assets, , with  the fraction invested
in non-liquid assets and 1    the fraction invested in liquid assets; (iv) the
capital requirement, 
; and (v) an initial endowment of capital, A, that is
allocated to banks’ assets according to  and . Note that 0    1 and
0    1.
To determine all rows except the last row of the ￿nancial system matrix
on Figure 3.2, one con￿gures a structure of interlinkages, that is, determines
which banks lend and/or borrow in the ￿nancial system, and assigns concrete
values for , , A, and 
. In the model banks invest all the capital borrowed
from other banks into liquid and non-liquid assets. The overall amounts bank
i then holds in non-liquid assets and liquid assets are ((1 )A+
P
j lj) and
((1 )A+
P
j lj)(1 ), respectively. The entry for the i’th bank in the last
row of the ￿nancial system matrix, that is, its deposits, is determined such
that it ful￿lls the capital requirement via combining the sum of its assets, its
interbank liabilities, and the equity ratio using Equation 3.9
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 +
 
(1   )  A +
X
j
lj
!
[p + 1   ]  
X
j
lj
  

"
A   + (1   )A    p +
X
j
lj    p
#
:
(3.9)
The symmetric case, for example, is displayed on Figure 3.4. All banks
are given the same amount of initial capital, A, borrow from and lend to each
other, and have the same investment proportions,  and .
Figure 3.4: Symmetric Case of the Financial System Matrix
In the example on Figure 3.4 each bank’s balance sheet then looks as
displayed on Table 3.1.
Assets Liabilities
LA: A(1   ) Deposits: A((p   1)   
( + p) + 1)
NLA: Ap Interbank borrowings: A
Interbank lendings: A Equity: A(
( + p)) P
= A( + (p   1) + 1)
P
= A( + (p   1) + 1)
Table 3.1: Banks’ Balance Sheets in the Symmetric Case
Note that with di￿erent interlinkage structures the relative size of banks
vis-￿-vis each other, measured by the sum of their assets, changes because
123borrowing money allows banks to leverage themselves, and increases the size
of their balance sheets.
The next sub-section outlines how shocks to the ￿nancial system matrix
are modeled.
3.2.2 Shocks in the Financial System Matrix and the
Measure for Systemic Risk
As outlined at the beginning, we de￿ne systemic risk as the danger that
failures within the ￿nancial system will mean that an adequate supply of
credit and ￿nancial services to the economy is no longer guaranteed, so that
negative real e￿ects will follow. In our model, systemic risk conditional on a
shock is de￿ned as the proportion of the ￿nancial system that breaks down
as measured by banks’ balance sheet size, that is, the sum of their assets.
When banks default, resulting liquidation costs but also the banks’ overall
importance with respect to ￿nancial services to the real economy will be
closely related to this ￿gure.
Shocks in the model always originate in a percentage loss of assets. Re-
sulting systemic risk caused by the shock is then calculated as the ratio of
assets from banks that default relative to system-wide assets, both prior to
the shock. For example, if consecutive on a shock only bank 1 defaults, with
the other banks in the ￿nancial system remaining solvent, systemic risk is
calculated as Sum of Bank 1’s Assets Prior to the Shock
Sum of all Banks’ Assets Prior to the Shock .
As it is likely to be unclear which shocks will actually emerge in the
￿nancial system, a range of possible extreme shock events is taken into con-
sideration. Note that these shocks shall in particular model strongly adverse
scenarios, that is, unexpectedly high loss events. The reason for this is that
systemic risk, involving defaults of parts of the ￿nancial system arises pri-
marily in high loss events. Resulting expected systemic risk consecutive on
a range of shocks is calculated as a weighted sum of the systemic risks under
the di￿erent shocks with each weight given by the probability of the asso-
ciated shock emerging. Equation (3.10) outlines this measure for expected
124systemic risk.

E =
X
j
Sum of Insolvent Bank’s Assets Prior to Shock j
Sum of all Banks’ Assets Prior to Shock j
 probj (3.10)
where E is expected systemic risk and probj is the probability assigned to
shock scenario j. This approach, with a range of di￿erent possible shocks to
each bank and a probability assigned to each shock, on the one hand allows
for a better identi￿cation of the di￿erent extents to which banks contribute
to expected systemic risk but also to investigate the three main risk-channels,
size, interconnectedness, and ￿resales, in a uni￿ed framework. While banks
contribute to systemic risk via the ￿resales channel already at relatively small
shocks, the interlinkage channel only comes into play from relatively large
shocks onwards. On the other hand, modeling a range of shocks and prob-
abilities o￿ers the possibility to later on transfer the Value at Risk (VaR)
concept,16 a well established risk management concept from microprudential
supervision, into a macroprudential framework with similar features, that is,
the System-VaR (SVaR). In the following, expected systemic risk is the key
measure which will be used to analyze systemic risk in the ￿nancial system.
Each possible shock to the banking system is modeled with a vector of
percentage losses to a bank’s (non-weighted) sum of assets over a discrete
grid, , ranging from 1% to &%, with & being the highest conceivable shock.
Taking all combinations of shocks for the three banks means there are 3
shock vectors, with each shock vector consisting of three entries, that is, the
loss associated with the shock for each bank in the model. The probability of
a shock realizing is captured by a multivariate normal distribution centered
at a value between 1 and &. The extent of correlation between the shocks
is modeled with the variance-covariance matrix of the multivariate normal
density function. The correlation between shocks in a given scenario, say
a shock to banks 1 and 2 in scenario 1, is then calculated as
cov1;2
12 , where
cov1;2 designates the covariance between shocks 1 and 2 and 1 and 2 the
standard deviations of shocks to banks 1 and 2, respectively. 17 Since shocks
16See Jorion (2006) for an outline of the VaR methodology.
17Besides the ￿resales channel of non-liquid assets, the correlation between direct shocks
125only range from 1 to &, the multivariate normal density is rescaled such that
the integral of the volume described by the discrete grid of shocks, ranging
from 1 to & in all three dimensions equals 1.
As previously outlined, if consecutive on a shock a bank cannot ful￿ll the
capital requirement it ￿rst tries to net its counterparty exposures and then
starts selling non-liquid assets, thus indirectly transmitting part of the shock
through downward pressure on the market prices of non-liquid assets to other
banks. If it cannot recapitalize to ful￿ll the capital requirement it defaults.
When a bank’s net-value, that is, its liabilities substracted from its assets,
turns negative it transmits this di￿erence to its liabilities. Respecting senior-
ity, this ￿rst diminishes the interbank liabilities and ultimately deposits.
The clearing algorithm for shock transmission is an iterative process in
which banks sequentially absorb the shock. Banks initially try to ful￿ll the
capital requirement via netting counterparty exposures, and, after that stage,
via selling non-liquid assets on the market. Banks with negative net-value
then transmit a shock to their creditors, and the iterative process restarts.
The process ends when shocks to solvent banks are absorbed. Figure 3.5
depicts the procedure of modeling the shock transmission.
Banks’ assets are contracted by the initial shock (step A on Figure 3.5).
Since netting has no negative repercussions on the balance sheet like the
negative price e￿ect from selling non-liquid assets, banks that do not ful￿ll
the capital requirement ￿rst try to improve their capital ratio through netting
interbank liabilities with other banks (step B on Figure 3.5). Next, banks
that do still not ful￿ll the capital requirement start selling non-liquid assets
on the market (step C on Figure 3.5).
Banks that are not able to ful￿ll the capital requirement default at this
point. If insolvent banks have negative net-value they will transmit shocks
to their creditors, that is, banks that have counterparty exposure to them or
ultimately to depositors. A bank with negative net-value transmits shocks to
its creditors, respecting seniority, until it has a net-value of zero. The overall
shock prepared for transmission to the insolvent banks’ creditors equals the
could be interpreted as an additional gauge of common exposure of banks in the ￿nancial
system.
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absolute value of their negative net-value and is assigned proportionally to a
bankrupt’s bank interbank liabilities as long as they are positive (step D on
Figure 3.5).
In case the interbank liability shock matrix contains nonzero entries it is
assigned (step E on Figure 3.5), and the iteration restarts (step A on Figure
3.5). If the interbank liability shock matrix is empty the shock has been
assigned, and the resulting systemic risk is computed (step F on Figure 3.5).
The following sub-section outlines how the model can be used to analyze
individual ￿nancial institutions’ contribution to expected systemic risk.
1273.2.3 Analyzing Banks’ Contribution to Expected Sys-
temic Risk
To ￿nd out an individual bank’s contribution to expected systemic risk the
Shapley value methodology can be employed. 18 In game theory this value
is used to ￿nd the fair allocation of gains obtained by cooperation among
players. For a game consisting of three players the Shapley value is de￿ned
as
i(v) =
1
3!
X
K3i;KN
v(K)   v(K   fig); (3.11)
where N is the set of all players, v(K) is the value obtained by coalition K
including player i and v(K   fig) is the value of coalition K without player
i. The Shapley value for player i is the average contribution to the gain of
the coalition over all permutations in which players can form a coalition.
The Shapley value has the following properties:
 Pareto e￿ciency: The total gain of a coalition is distributed;
 Symmetry: Players with equivalent marginal contributions obtain the
same Shapley value;
 Additivity: If one coalition can be split into two sub-coalitions then
the pay-o￿ of each player in the composite game is equal to the sum of
the sub-coalition games;
 Zero player: A player that has no marginal contribution to any coalition
has a Shapley value of zero.
Since expected systemic risk is a cost to the ￿nancial network, in the
model, the Shapley value is used to compute the marginal contribution of a
player to this cost.
18See Shapley (1953). See also Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) who use the
Shapley value to compute individual ￿nancial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk.
Note that in general also other measures for ￿nancial institutions’ contribution to sys-
temic risk could be employed, for example the CoVaR methodology from Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2009). However, given the model set up in this chapter, the Shapley value
methodology seems suited best.
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given a shock is calculated following Equation 3.11 as follows: As previously
outlined, systemic risk conditional on the realization of a shock is de￿ned as
the proportion of the assets of banks that become insolvent due to the shock
over system wide assets, both prior to the shock. v(K) is the coalition K
of ‘all banks that can default and transmit shocks’ and hence contribute to
the measure for expected systemic risk, and v(K   fig) is the coalition K
without the i’th bank. Intuitively the latter can be imagined as the situation
in which bank i cannot default and thus not transmit shocks to the ￿nancial
system. In the model this is done via temporarily adding a large amount of
liquid assets to a bank that shall not transmit shocks. Such a ‘safe’ bank
does not try to net counterparty exposure 19 or sell non-liquid assets on the
markets because it always ful￿lls the capital requirement. Following this
approach, one calculates for each permutation of banks the systemic risk if
only the ￿rst bank in the order can default, next the marginal contribution to
systemic risk if the following bank can also default, and ￿nally the marginal
contribution to systemic risk if all three banks in the actual order can default.
The Shapley value for a bank is then the average of its marginal contributions
over all possible permutations. Since systemic risk is de￿ned as a proportion
here, its value and the Shapley values are restricted between 0 and 1.
Similar to calculating expected systemic risk as a weighted sum of sys-
temic risk from a set of scenarios, Equation (3.12) outlines bank i’s contri-
bution to expected systemic risk from a weighted sum of its Shapley values.

E
i =
X
j
ij  probj (3.12)
where ij is bank i’s contribution to systemic risk in scenario j and probj is
the probability that scenario j realizes. Note that E =
P3
i E
i .
The following section outlines key results on expected systemic risk ob-
tained from the model.
19Though it accepts netting requests from other banks.
1293.3 Results from the Model
In the model banks’ contribution to expected systemic risk is driven in par-
ticular by three channels: (i) banks’ size in the ￿nancial system as well as
the extent of (ii) direct and (iii) indirect connections between banks. 20 First
of all, the size of an individual bank matters for its contribution to expected
systemic risk because our measure for systemic risk, the sum of assets of
banks that default relative to system-wide assets, both prior to the shock,
increases with the size of the insolvent banks’ balance sheets. Second, banks
that have borrowed from other banks are likely to contribute more to ex-
pected systemic risk than banks that have not borrowed. If banks that have
borrowed from other banks default on their liabilities they transmit shocks
to their creditor banks. Third, non-liquid assets can make the ￿nancial sys-
tem vulnerable to ￿resales. Large amounts of non-liquid assets on a bank’s
balance sheet on the one hand, make it vulnerable to market price decreases
of non-liquid assets. On the other hand, banks which have invested to a large
extent into non-liquid assets can themselves depress the market price if they
have to liquidate part of their non-liquid assets consecutive on a loss, thus
transmitting a shock via the market to other banks in the ￿nancial system.
The following analyses will be taken out with a view on these three main
risk-channels
Expected systemic risk will ￿rst be explored in a baseline speci￿cation
of the model. Subsequent analyses will then investigate the impact of the
main risk-channels outlined above. To shed some light on the role of banks’
capitalization and its role as a major shock bu￿er, the e￿ect of di￿erent
capital requirement ratios on expected systemic risk will also be investigated.
In the baseline speci￿cation parameters are set such that banks’ resulting
balance sheets feature roughly the same proportions that can actually be
found in the ￿nancial system. Regarding the relative amount of interbank
lending, Upper and Worms (2004) note that in their study on the German
interbank market banks lent on average 2.96 times the amount of their cap-
20Here and in the following expected systemic risk caused via direct and indirect expo-
sure will also be referred to as ‘interlinkage’ and ‘￿resales’ channels, respectively.
130ital to other banks. Scaling the parameter  to 0:3 approximately results in
this relative amount on banks’ balance sheets in case they engage in lending.
Furthermore, the proportion of non-liquid assets to cash and cash equivalents
in the Deutsche Bank’s total assets in 2009 was roughly 0:8.21 Setting  to
0:8 in the model hence roughly mimicks this proportion. As regards banks’
capitalization, following the Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision (2006),
the capital requirement ratio, parameter 
, is set to 8% of risk weighted as-
sets. The scaling parameter for the price responsiveness of non-liquid assets,
parameter , is set to 0:03 which results in a price decrease of approximately
7% of the market price if banks sell all their non-liquid assets on the market.
Banks in the system are initially equipped with one unit of capital, parameter
A. Since in the following exercises systemic risk is measured as a proportion,
A is a scaling parameter and impacts results only if it is changed such that
banks obtain di￿erent amounts of initial capital because this changes banks’
relative size vis-￿-vis each other.
Shocks that can impact individual banks are modeled as a loss of a bank’s
assets ranging from 1% to 9% of its balance sheet sum in discrete steps of 2%.
Note that a shock always manifests in the form of a loss in liquid assets. 22 The
multivariate normal shock distribution which determines the probability of a
shock scenario realizing is centered at a loss of 6% of banks’ assets. The main
diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix is set to 3, and the covariances
are set to yield a correlation coe￿cient of 1
6 between shocks to banks.23
Note that the distribution of shock scenarios can in￿uence the outcomes of
the following analyses to some extent. For example, choosing the parameters
21See Deutsche Bank AG (2010).
22A direct loss assigned to non-liquid assets might a￿ect the e￿ect of the ￿resales channel
in the model. A larger shock to an institution’s non-liquid assets can theoretically cause
lower risk in the ￿nancial system through a reduced extent of ￿resales. In the extreme
case, if a bank loses all its non-liquid assets consecutive on a shock its potential to transmit
the shock via the ￿resales channel has vanished.
23As regards the mean, and variance of the distribution of shocks, there is little guidance
as to how these parameters can be chosen. Moody’s Investor Service (2005) estimates the
asset correlations for major structural ￿nance sectors to range between 2% and 18%. Given
that the recent ￿nancial crisis has demonstrated that correlations in the ￿nancial sector
can be even higher than was previously assumed, a value slightly above the upper range
of the interval has been chosen.
131of the distribution such that small shocks receive a relatively high probability
generally lowers the expected contribution of banks through the interlinkage
channel. This feature comes up because banks only transmit shocks via this
channel if a shock is large enough to reduce the sum of their assets below the
sum of their liabilities, that is, their equity is entirely extinguished. Simi-
larly, if very large shocks have a high probability, the size channel dominates
the outcome as regards banks’ contribution to expected systemic risk. In the
extreme case when all banks lose all equity from an initial shock and cannot
recapitalize, the whole banking system defaults and no contagion via ￿re-
sales or interlinkages takes place. In this respect the variance and covariance
between shocks matter as well. For example, to identify banks which con-
tribute to expected systemic risk via the interlinkage channel it is necessary
to model shock scenarios in which creditor banks are subject to a relatively
small shock which does not cause their insolvency while at the same time
their debtor banks are subject to a relatively big shock which makes them
default on their liabilities, thus ultimately causing the default of the creditor
banks. The distribution parameters hence in￿uence expected systemic risk
as well as banks’ contribution via di￿erent channels to it.
Our choice of parameters governing the distribution of shock scenarios has
been taken mainly with a view on generating shock scenarios which, on the
one hand, allow for the emergence of systemic risk through all risk-channels,
and, on the other hand, to identify through which of the channels banks
primarily contribute to expected systemic risk. It is important to note that
while the analyses are in some cases a￿ected by distributional assumptions
and interactions between the risk-channels themselves, the insights obtained
from the outcomes of the experiments are qualitatively robust to changes in
these underlying parameters because they are always corroborated with a
view on the model’s underlying mechanics. Furthermore, in case the distri-
butional assumptions particularly matter, it will be pointed out in how far
the results which are refered to are impacted.
Given that a bank can borrow to and lend from another bank at the same
time there are 26 possible banking structures. Appendix 3.A at the end of the
chapter gives an overview of all di￿erent structures of the ￿nancial network
132matrix that can emerge for analysis.
All following analyses consist of investigating expected systemic risk and
bank 1’s contribution to it. Omitting the other banks’ contributions to ex-
pected systemic risk is without loss of generality because the interlinkage
structures are redundant from the perspectives of di￿erent banks. For ex-
ample, as can be seen in Appendix 3.A, structure 19 from the perspective of
bank 1 is the same as structure 25 from the perspective of bank 3.
Finally note that all following analyses will frequently refer to speci￿c
structures of the ￿nancial system as well as to banks’ size, counterparty
exposure, and amount of non-liquid asset investment. Besides the general
structural overview given in Appendix 3.A, the information refered to can be
found in Appendix 3.B at the end of the chapter displaying speci￿c set ups
of structures and banks’ relative sizes.
The following sub-section analyzes expected systemic risk in the baseline
speci￿cation.
3.3.1 Expected Systemic Risk in the Baseline Speci￿ca-
tion
Figure 3.6 displays expected systemic risk in the baseline speci￿cation of
the model. The upper panel shows the contribution of bank 1 to expected
systemic risk (y-axis). The possible interlinkage structures outlined in Ap-
pendix 3.A have been ordered from lowest to highest contribution to expected
systemic risk (x-axis).
In the baseline speci￿cation bank 1 contributes least to expected systemic
risk in structure 31 (Table 3.13 in Appendix 3.B). Investigating the three
main risk-channels, size, interlinkages, and ￿resales, indicates as to why this
is the case. First of all, in this structure bank 1 is relatively small, it only
constitutes 28% of the ￿nancial system. Second, it has no direct connections
to other banks. This prevents it from being involved in shock emissions
or transmissions through interbank lendings. Third, in this structure, bank
1 holds the same amount of non-liquid assets as the other two banks and
thus is not particularly involved in the ￿resales channel. Bank 1 contributes
133most to expected systemic risk in structures 12 and 64 (Tables 3.7 and 3.16,
respectively). In these structures bank 1 constitutes 36% of the ￿nancial
system. It thus strongly contributes to expected systemic risk via the size
channel. Furthermore, due to its interlinkages with other banks it can directly
emit a shock but also transmit shocks from the bank it has exposure to, itself,
both to its creditor bank. Finally, it has the second largest amount of non-
liquid assets on its balance sheet thus giving it some potential to be involved
in ￿resales.
As outlined at the beginning of this section, expected systemic risk and
bank 1’s contribution to it can depend on the distributional assumptions of
the shock scenarios. Note, for example, that in structure 16 (Table 3.8),
though bank 1 is the largest bank in the ￿nancial system (44%), two banks
have net-exposure to it, and it has the largest holdings of non-liquid assets,
it contributes slightly less to expected systemic risk than in structures 12 or
64. This result comes up because large shocks that are su￿cient to make
all banks default in structure 16 via a shock to bank 1 that is transmitted
to banks 2 and 3 are at the extreme end of the shock distribution and thus
receive relatively little weight in the calculation of expected systemic risk
(Equation (3.10)) and bank 1’s contribution to it (Equation (3.12)). By con-
trast, in structures 12 or 64 an eventual loss from bank 1 is transmitted more
concentrated to its single creditor, thus making a sizeable shock transmis-
sion more likely at relatively smaller shocks which have a higher probability
weight in the shock distribution.
The lower panel of Figure 3.6 displays expected systemic risk (y-axis)
in the ￿nancial system over the di￿erent possible interlinkage structures (x-
axis). The structures have been ordered according to their expected systemic
risk value. In the baseline speci￿cation expected systemic risk is lowest in
interlinkage structure 32 (Table 3.14), where banks are not connected by
interbank lendings and are otherwise equal as regards size and non-liquid
asset holdings. Expected systemic risk is highest in interlinkage structures
with unidirectional links, as for example in structures 10 and 61 (Tables
3.6 and 3.15, respectively). Note that in these structures the arrows are
‘pointing’ into the same direction, that is, from bank 1 via bank 2 to bank 3,
134and from bank 3 back to bank 1, or vice versa, such that each bank can emit
shocks via interbank linkages to all other banks in the ￿nancial system. In
these two riskiest structures banks are equal as regards size and non-liquid
asset holdings.
Figure 3.6: Expected Systemic Risk in the Financial System Model’s Baseline
Speci￿cation
To investigate the e￿ects of the main risk-channels on expected systemic
risk and banks’ contribution to it they will be individually analyzed in the
following, (partially) shutting down the other channels. Note that the size
channel can only be in￿uenced to some extent by varying the initial amounts
of capital, parameter A, banks are endowed with. Some variations in banks’
size depend on the ￿nancial system structure. For example, if banks borrow
from each other they increase their size, measured by the sum of their assets
relative to system-wide assets.
The next sub-section analyzes the e￿ect of ￿resales on expected systemic
135risk.
3.3.2 The E￿ect of Firesales on Expected Systemic Risk
The e￿ect of the ‘￿resales’ channel on expected systemic risk can be analyzed
if the ‘interlinkage’ channel is shut down and all banks start with the same
amount of initial assets. This can be done using structure 32 (Table 3.14),
where all banks have the same size with respect to the ￿nancial system and
do not lend to each other. The price responsiveness of the non-liquid asset,
parameter , is increased from 0 to 0.05. If all non-liquid assets are sold on
the market, the percentage loss of the price of the non-liquid asset then ranges
from 0% to 11%, respectively. Figure 3.7 displays the e￿ect of an increase in
the price responsiveness of the non-liquid asset (x-axis) on expected systemic
risk (y-axis) on the lower panel and bank 1’s contribution to it (y-axis) on
the upper panel, both in structure 32. With higher responsiveness of the
Figure 3.7: E￿ect of Firesales on Expected Systemic Risk in Financial System
Structure 32
136price the e￿ect of marking to market gets more severe, increasing the impact
of ￿resales. This leads to higher expected systemic risk as well as bank 1’s
contribution to it. From a parameter value of 0.05 onwards, even tiny shocks
in the model lead to a default of the whole system because relatively small
amounts of non-liquid assets sold to recapitalize lead to massive price e￿ects,
triggering ￿resale spirals.
Note that the functions displayed on Figure 3.7 do not follow a smooth
pattern because of the coarseness of the grid of shocks which features a
stepsize of 2% over a range of losses. For example, say, that with a given
price responsiveness, a bank that loses 5% or more of its assets has no chance
to recapitalize and thus always sells all its non-liquid assets on the market
and defaults. If the price responsiveness is then ceteris paribus increased
a bit, this bank would maybe already liquidate all its non-liquid assets at
a loss of 4% or larger of its assets and default. However, since the next
smaller shock considered is 3%, the price responsiveness needs to be raised
sizeably to increase expected systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it over
some ranges of the grid. The result is that in some regions of the analyzed
parameter space of  only a sizeable change in the price responsiveness may
cause an increase of expected systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it.
Overall, the analysis of the impact of ￿resales on expected systemic risk
provides evidence that a stronger responsiveness of the price of non-liquid
assets increases the risk of ￿resales. This leads to higher expected systemic
risk as well as banks contribution to it.
The next sub-section analyzes the e￿ect of interlinkages on expected sys-
temic risk.
3.3.3 The E￿ect of Interlinkages on Expected Systemic
Risk
As a ￿rst inspection of the e￿ect of interlinkages on expected systemic risk,
Figure 3.8 displays a boxplot of expected systemic risk (lower panel) as well
as bank 1’s contribution to it (upper panel) for each number of connections
possible in the 64 possible ￿nancial system structures analyzed. Note that
137two banks are considered as being connected as soon as one of the banks
lends to or borrows from the other. To get the e￿ect of interbank connections
without the e￿ect of ￿resales and size, the parameter for price responsiveness
has been set to zero, and all banks start with the same amount of initial
assets. When investigating the medians (red lines), the ￿gure displays that
Figure 3.8: E￿ect of Number of Interlinks on Expected Systemic Risk
expected systemic risk as well as bank 1’s contribution to it tend to increase
with a growing number of interlinks. However, focusing on the upper and
lower quartiles (designated by the blue boxes), the whiskers which extend
to the most extreme data points not considered outliers (black lines), and
an outlier (red plus symbol), one can see that more interconnections do not
strictly result in higher expected systemic risk or contribution to it.
In the network literature this property is called ’robust yet fragile’, mean-
ing that with a growing number of interlinks the network can get more robust
to small shocks and at the same time more vulnerable to large shocks. Since
in this case the shock vectors are the same, the ‘robust yet fragile’ property
138Figure 3.9: E￿ect of Financial System Structures on Expected Systemic Risk
comes up through another dimension, namely the speci￿c set up of the in-
terlinks, in particular depending on whether there is cross-exposure between
two banks which is akin to an insurance between banks, or whether one of the
banks has net-exposure to the other and can likely receive a shock through
that exposure.
Overall, Figure 3.8 provides evidence that in tendency both expected sys-
temic risk as well as a bank’s contribution to it increase with more interlinks
in the ￿nancial system.
As a second inspection of the e￿ect of the interlinkage channel on expected
systemic risk, Figure 3.9 displays a similar visualization as on Figure 3.6 for
the baseline speci￿cation, but with the ￿resales channel shut down, that is,
the parameter for price responsiveness, , set to zero, and all banks still
starting with the same amount of initial assets, parameter A.
Qualitatively the results remain broadly the same. However, two points
139deserve mentioning. First, expected systemic risk (lower panel) as well as
bank 1’s contribution to it (upper panel) are lower on Figure 3.9. For some
structures, such as structure 32 which is at the low end of expected systemic
risk, the decrease of expected systemic risk (from 0:87 on Figure 3.6 to 0:49
on Figure 3.9) and bank 1’s contribution to it (from 0:29 on Figure 3.6 to
0:17 on Figure 3.9) are sizeable. For other structures, such as for example
structure 61 which is at the high end of expected systemic risk, the e￿ect is
relatively small (expected systemic risk decreases from 0:99 on Figure 3.6 to
0:94 on Figure 3.9 and bank 1’s contribution to it from 0:33 on Figure 3.6 to
0:31 on Figure 3.9.).
Second, the ordering of structures along the x-axis can be a￿ected, provid-
ing further evidence that the ￿resales channel impacts expected systemic risk
arising through di￿erent interlinkage structures to di￿erent extents. Shock
transmission via direct interlinkages takes only place if a debtor bank is hit
by a shock which is strong enough to turn the bank’s net-value negative
because the direct interlinkage channel only gets contagious once the debtor
bank’s equity has been completely extinguished. The analysis of Sub-Section
3.3.2 has already provided evidence that the ￿resales channel increases the
impact of shocks, as, for example, a high value for the parameter for price
responsiveness, , causes the whole ￿nancial system to default at even tiny
shocks. This feature indirectly also impacts the e￿ect of interlinkages and
can thus a￿ect expected systemic risk as well as banks’ contribution to it in
some structures.
Consider, for example, expected systemic risk and bank 1’s contribution
to it in structures 19 and 25 (Tables 3.9 and 3.10, respectively) on Figures
3.6 and 3.9. Both structures yield the same expected systemic risk on the
same ￿gure (0:96 on Figure 3.6 and 0:79 on Figure 3.9.). However, comparing
bank 1’s contributions to expected systemic risk (upper panel) on Figure 3.6
with the ￿resales channel being active, bank 1 contributes less to expected
systemic risk in structure 25 (0.32) than in structure 19 (0.33). By contrast,
with the ￿resales channel shut down, on Figure 3.9 bank 1 contributes rela-
tively more to expected systemic risk in structure 25 (0.30) than in structure
19 (0.25).
140This change of order comes up because of the interaction between the
interlinkage and ￿resales channels as well as the mean shock size banks are
subject to. The underlying mechanism can best be clari￿ed via ￿rst of all
investigating the risk-channels through which bank 1 contributes to expected
systemic risk. Taking into perspective only the interlinkage channel, bank
1 can contribute more to expected systemic risk in structure 25 than in
structure 19.24 Furthermore, in structure 25 bank 1 constitutes a larger
proportion of the ￿nancial system (0.37) and has more non-liquid assets
(0.92) than in structure 19 (0.33 and 0.8, respectively). Depending on the
shock scenario, bank 1 can contribute more to systemic risk in structure 25
than in structure 19 in all three channels.
This is re￿ected on Figure 3.9 where bank 1 contributes more to expected
systemic risk in structure 25 than in structure 19. Note that when the ￿re-
sales channel is shut down, the interconnection channel is generally weak in
the baseline speci￿cation and only plays a minor role in banks’ contribution
to expected systemic risk.25 The result that bank 1 contributes more to ex-
pected systemic risk in structure 25 than in structure 19 on Figure 3.9 thus
seems to be primarily driven by the larger size of bank 1 in structure 25.
However, as outlined, on Figure 3.6 bank 1 contributes slightly more to
expected systemic risk in structure 19 than in structure 25. The change
of order between the two structures when the ￿resales channel is active ￿
rendering shocks more severe ￿ comes up because in the former structure
shocks which are close to the mean of the shock distribution cause bank 1
to contribute more to expected systemic risk than they do in structure 25. 26
24As can be seen on Tables 3.9 and 3.10, in structure 25 bank 3 has net-exposure to
bank 1 and bank 2 has net exposure to bank 3 while in structure 19 bank 2 has net-
exposure to bank 1 and bank 1 has net exposure to bank 3. This means that in structure
19 bank 1 can directly emit a shock to bank 2 and/or transmit a shock from bank 3 to
bank 2. In structure 25, however, bank 1 can directly emit a shock to bank 3 which can
then transmit the shock even further to bank 2. Ceteris paribus, in the model a bank X
that emits a shock to another bank Y which can transmit the shock further to a third
bank Z contributes more to systemic risk than a bank X which can directly emit a shock
to another bank Y but also transmit a shock from another bank Z to bank Y.
25Banks that have borrowed from other banks to invest into non-liquid assets are rel-
atively safe with the ￿resales channel shut down because non-liquid assets are equivalent
to liquid assets.
26With the ￿resales channel intact shocks to banks in the ￿nancial system generally
141Since shocks close to the mean receive a higher probability weight in the
computation of the contribution to expected systemic risk than shocks on
the upper range of the interval of shocks analyzed, bank 1 contributes more
to expected systemic risk via the interlinkage channel ￿ which in this case
outweighs its relatively smaller contribution from the other two channels ￿
in structure 19 than in structure 25 on Figure 3.6. 27
Shutting down the ￿resales channel also impacts di￿erently on structures
of the ￿nancial system as regards expected systemic risk (lower panels on
Figures 3.6 and 3.9). For example, the second lowest expected systemic risk
is found in structure 8 (0.88; Table 3.5) on Figure 3.6. This structure is
relatively safe because only banks 1 and 3 which have cross-exposure but no
net-exposure to each other are interlinked. This o￿ers them the potential
to self-insure against shocks via netting. However, with the ￿resales channel
shut down (Figure 3.9), the second lowest level of expected systemic risk can
be found in structure 29 (0.62; Table 3.12). This change of order comes up
because the ￿resales channel impacts the interlinkage channel to di￿erent ex-
tents in di￿erent structures: In structure 29 bank 2 has net exposure to bank
3 which is leveraged and holds more non-liquid assets than the other banks.
However, with the ￿resales channel shut down, bank 3 gets extremely safe
because the non-liquid assets are equivalent to liquid assets, so it rarely trans-
mits a shock to bank 2 via the interlinkage channel. This shock bu￿er lowers
systemic risk more than the self-insurance provided by the cross-exposure
get more impact, increasing also the in￿uence of the interconnection channel. Taking into
account the mean size of shocks to the system, a further aspect comes into play: in case
of a big shock, that is, a shock on the upper range of the shocks considered, to bank 1, its
net-value turns immediately negative and so it cannot recover via netting its counterparty
exposure. In case of a medium shock, that is, a shock close to the mean of the shock
distribution, to bank 1, however, it eventually improves its capital ratio via netting its
counterparty exposure because the shock has not su￿cient impact to turn bank 1’s net-
value negative. Since bank 1 can net more counterparty exposure in structure 25 (0.3)
than in structure 19 (0.15) it has less chances to recover via netting in the latter structure
and is thus more likely to emit a shock to a bank that has exposure to it.
27Note that this interpretation is corroborated by the fact that summing up all con-
tributions to expected systemic risk by bank 1 with equal weights, that is, relaxing the
assumption that shocks near the mean have a higher probability and all other parameters
set as in the baseline speci￿cation, results, as expected, in bank 1 contributing more to
expected systemic risk in structure 25 than in structure 19.
142between banks 1 and 3 in structure 8. In addition, in the latter structure all
banks hold the same amount of non-liquid assets, so banks that theoretically
can emit shocks via interbank lendings have not a particularly large shock
bu￿er from non-liquid assets when the ￿resales channel is shut down.
In summary, given the settings in the baseline speci￿cation with the ￿re-
sales and size channels (partially) shut down, this sub-section yields four in-
sights as regards the interlinkage channel. First, expected systemic risk and
a bank’s contribution to it tend to increase with the amount of interlinkages
in the ￿nancial system. Second, cross-exposure gives banks the possibility
to self-insure (via netting on the interbank market to increase the capital
ratio) and thus can lower expected systemic risk and banks’ contribution to
it. Third, net-exposure increases expected systemic risk as well as the con-
tribution to it from banks which are net borrowers. Fourth, the e￿ect of the
interlinkage channel on expected systemic risk and bank 1 ’s contribution to
it depends on the magnitude of the shock to the ￿nancial system which is
also impacted by the ￿resales channel. Since the interlinkage channel only
becomes contagious at relatively large shocks, that is, those shocks which
turn the net-value of banks negative, and the ￿resales channel ampli￿es the
e￿ect of shocks to the ￿nancial system, the e￿ect of the interlinkage channel
on expected systemic risk as well as banks’ contribution to it increase with
the extent of ￿resales in the ￿nancial system.
The next sub-section analyzes the e￿ect of a bank’s size on expected
systemic risk.
3.3.4 The E￿ect of Banks’ Size on Expected Systemic
Risk
The e￿ect of banks’ size on expected systemic risk is isolated via shutting
down the interlinkage and ￿resales channels. Using structure 32 (Table 3.14)
in which no banks borrow from or lend to each other and the price respon-
siveness of the liquid asset, parameter , set to zero, the amount of initial
assets of bank 1 is increased over a range from 1 to 3, while the amount of
initial assets of banks 2 and 3 remains set to 1 as in the baseline speci￿cation.
143Figure 3.10 displays the e￿ect of varying bank 1’s initial assets on ex-
pected systemic risk (lower panel) as well as its contribution to it (upper
panel) in structure 32. Controlling for the e￿ect of the ￿resales and interlink-
Figure 3.10: E￿ect of an Increase of Size on Expected Systemic Risk in
Financial System Structure 32
age channels and increasing bank 1’s size results in increasing its contribution
to expected systemic risk (from 0:16 to 0:29). However, given the de￿nition
of systemic risk as well as the symmetry of the shock vectors and assigned
probabilities which are used in the computation of expected systemic risk,
the expected amount of systemic risk does not change (constantly at 0:49).
This outcome is driven by the fact that in the weighted sum of systemic risk
over all shock scenarios the changes in systemic risk resulting from increas-
ing bank 1’s size relatively to the other banks in the ￿nancial system exactly
o￿set each other.
Increasing bank 1’s size does not change its probability of default in any
shock scenario but only increases its proportion in the ￿nancial system as
144measured by the sum of its assets and reduces the proportion of the remainder
two banks by the same amount. When increasing bank 1’s size, systemic risk
thus increases in scenarios in which only bank 1 or bank 1 and one other bank
default, decreases in scenarios in which only bank 2 or 3 or both default, and
remains unchanged in scenarios where all banks or none of the banks default.
For example, say in scenario A only bank 1 defaults while in scenario B banks
2 and 3 default with both scenarios having the same probabilities. Increasing
the relative size of bank 1 in the ￿nancial system results in increasing systemic
risk in scenario 1 and lowering it by the same amount in scenario 2. Expected
systemic risk computed according to Equation (3.10) including both scenarios
does not change. Note that the level of expected systemic risk can be a￿ected
of course if the distribution of shocks is not symmetric.
In summary, controlling for the e￿ect of the interlinkage and ￿resales
channels, increasing a bank’s size with respect to the ￿nancial system in-
creases the contribution to expected systemic risk from that bank and lowers
the contribution of the remainder two banks by the same amount such that
expected systemic risk remains una￿ected.
The next sub-section investigates the e￿ect of the capital requirement
ratio on expected systemic risk.
3.3.5 The E￿ect of Capital Requirements on Expected
Systemic Risk
In order to lower systemic risk in the ￿nancial system, several calls have
been voiced to increase banks’ capitalization. Since capital held in excess of
liabilities is the main shock bu￿er before a bank starts emitting shocks via
its interbank liabilities it is regarded to be one of the most e￿ective tools in
macro- and micro-prudential regulation. For example, under the proposed
Basel III framework an essential strengthening of banks’ capitalization is
envisaged to make the ￿nancial system more resilient. 28
In the following analysis the implications of di￿erent levels of banks’ cap-
ital ratios on expected systemic risk will be analyzed with all remainder
28Bank for International Settlements (2010).
145parameters set as in the baseline speci￿cation. Figure 3.11 displays expected
systemic risk (lower panel) as well as bank 1’s contribution to expected sys-
temic risk (upper panel) when the required equity ratio in the ￿nancial system
is varied over a range from 1% to 25%.
Expected systemic risk and bank 1 ’s contribution to it are displayed
along the y-axis, the varying levels of required capital are displayed along
the x-axis, and the interlinkage structures have been ordered along the z-axis
according to their highest sum of expected systemic risk or contribution to
it, that is, the integral over the x-axis for a given structure. For example,
adding up all contributions to expected systemic risk from bank 1 over the
range of analyzed required capital ratios, structures 12 and 64 (Tables 3.7
and 3.16, respectively) yield the highest values, which is the reason for these
structures being farthest right on the upper panel.
As regards the ordering of ￿nancial system structures along the z-axis,
results remain broadly the same with respect to ￿gure 3.6. In the model
increasing the parameter for the required capital ratio results in lowering
expected systemic risk as well as bank 1’s contribution to it. The lowest
sum of contribution to expected systemic risk from bank 1 is achieved in
structure 31 (Table 3.13). The highest expected systemic risk over all capital
requirements analyzed is achieved in structures 10 and 61 (Tables 3.6 and
3.15, respectively). The lowest sum of expected systemic risk is obtained
in structure 27 (Table 3.11), where at high levels of bank capitalization the
self-insurance mechanism via cross-exposures becomes very e￿ective, making
it thus less risky than structure 32 (Table 3.14) which yields the lowest level
of expected systemic risk on Figure 3.6.
The analysis in this sub-section provides evidence that increasing the
capital requirement is an e￿ective means to lower expected systemic risk and
banks’ contribution to it.
Overall, the results in this section show that our model reproduces the
stylized facts which could be observed during the recent ￿nancial crisis. The
main risk-channels which cause the emergence of systemic risk are interlink-
ages, ￿resales and the size of a bank with respect to the ￿nancial system. It
has been shown that banks’ capital requirements are an e￿ective shock bu￿er
146Figure 3.11: E￿ect of the Capital Requirement on Expected Systemic Risk
and can make the ￿nancial system more resilient to expected systemic risk
as well as banks’ contribution to it.
In the following section the model will be used to explore a systemic
risk charge and fund which address systemic risk from a macroprudential
perspective.
1473.4 Developing a Systemic Risk Charge and Fund
A supervisor’s approach to manage systemic risk should feature in particular
three characteristics. First of all, it should address extreme shock scenarios,
that is, shock events with an unusually high impact on the ￿nancial system.
Systemic risk arises primarily through unexpectedly high losses which gen-
erally lead to ￿resales, contagion, and the default of individual institutions.
To properly identify risk-channels and banks’ contribution to expected sys-
temic risk, these scenarios should cover a su￿cient range of di￿erent shocks.
Second, addressing systemic risk should not give wrong incentives, that is, it
should not cause moral hazard29 but, akin to a Pigouvian tax, incentivize ￿-
nancial institutions to lower their negative externality on the ￿nancial system
which arises through their contribution to systemic risk. Third, the approach
should envisage to preserve with a high probability even in strongly adverse
scenarios a fraction of the ￿nancial system which is deemed necessary to
prevent a ￿nancial shock from severely a￿ecting the real economy.
It has been shown in the previous section that banks’ contribution to
systemic risk is driven by three risk-channels, (i) the extent of direct shock
transmission through interbank liabilities which itself depends on the in-
terlinkage structure and the amounts lent and borrowed, (ii) the extent of
￿resales which themselves depend on the amount of non-liquid asset holdings
and the price responsiveness of the non-liquid asset, and (iii) banks’ size rel-
ative to the ￿nancial system. If the supervisor wants to lower systemic risk,
it is unlikely that he starts regulating all these dimensions involved in banks’
contribution to expected systemic risk. However, it makes sense to use in
particular one instrument, additional capital, to make the ￿nancial system
more resilient to expected systemic risk. On the one hand, as has become
clear in the previous section, this instrument has a high impact as shock
bu￿er to lower expected systemic risk and, on the other hand, remaining
administrative regulatory approaches such as, for example, forcing a bank
to change its portfolio composition or counterparties, would be unfeasible in
29See Poole (2008) for a discussion of ￿nancial institutions, ￿nancial stability, and moral
hazard.
148reality.
Our model will be used to investigate a systemic risk management ap-
proach in which a systemic risk charge and systemic risk fund are determined
within an SVaR concept.30 As will become clear, the SVaR concept combines
the previously outlined characteristics in a uni￿ed framework. The general
idea is to charge banks according to their contribution to expected systemic
risk. Banks which contribute more to expected systemic risk have to pay
a higher risk charge than banks which contribute less. These payments are
used to capitalize a systemic risk fund which is re-injected into the ￿nancial
system in an optimal way to make it more resilient to systemic risk.
In the following, the approach to determine (i) the optimal amount of
capital for the risk fund and (ii) the individual ￿nancial institution’s contri-
bution to it, as well as (iii) the optimal (macroprudential) capital amounts
individual ￿nancial institutions are injected from the systemic risk fund to
make the ￿nancial system more resilient to systemic risk will be outlined.
To set up the systemic risk charge and fund, the supervisor ￿rst of all
de￿nes a distribution of extreme shock scenarios deemed possible. Given our
model, the supervisor will be able to compute the expected systemic risk as
well as individual institutions’ contribution to it associated with the stress
scenarios. Next, the supervisor chooses an SVaR. The SVaR is de￿ned as the
proportion of the ￿nancial system which the supervisor is willing to accept to
become insolvent in a given quantile of the shock distribution. For example,
an SVaR could be de￿ned as ‘In 95% of all shock-scenarios systemic risk shall
not exceed 0.37’. Given all shock scenarios the supervisor then computes the
minimum (macroprudential) capital amounts which banks in the ￿nancial
system need to be injected to ful￿ll this SVaR. The sum of these additional
capital injections (which need not be the same across banks) constitutes the
overall necessary amount of capital in the systemic risk fund.
The fund is capitalized via charging ￿nancial institutions according to
their contribution to systemic risk. Equation (3.13) displays the systemic
30The following SVaR approach features some of the characteristics of the VaR concept
which is a well established measure in risk management used on the level of individual
banks. The VaR indicates for a given portfolio the loss it will not exceed in a speci￿ed
time horizon with a given probability. See, for example, Jorion (2006).
149risk charge, H, for the i’th bank.
Hi = 	 
E
i P3
j E
j
: (3.13)
where i 2 j, 	 is the amount of capital to be collected for the entire
systemic risk fund, and E
i designates the contribution to expected systemic
risk by bank i as measured by the Shapley value. After collecting all individ-
ual charges in the fund,31 the money is re-injected into ‘neuralgic’ ￿nancial
institutions, that is, those institutions which increase the ￿nancial system’s
resilience most, as additional capital which they are required to hold as liquid
assets. The additional capital can be injected on top of the required capital
from microprudential regulation in the form of preferred stock such that its
function as an additional shock-bu￿er only emerges after other shareholders’
equity has been extinguished.
As will become clear in the following, requiring banks to hold this macro-
prudential capital in addition to the microprudential capital requirement, the
risk fund primarily addresses systemic risk arising through the interlinkage
channel. The other two risk channels are only indirectly a￿ected. The size
channel is not directly a￿ected because the additional capital is not included
in computing banks’ proportion of the ￿nancial system. Furthermore, banks
default if they cannot ful￿ll both the macro- and microprudential capital
requirement, that is, a default does not get more unlikely through addi-
tional capital. The ￿resales channel is also not directly a￿ected because of
a same argument. Since banks have to maintain the higher capitalization
their market behaviour as regards sales of non-liquid assets does not change.
However, both channels are indirectly a￿ected as, for example, a reduced
impact from the interlinkage channel because of a higher capitalization can
prevent a shock from being spread further via that channel to a bank with
a sizeable amount of non-liquid assets on the balance sheet. The ￿resales
channel is thus indirectly dampened via less shock transmission through the
interlinkage channel.32
31Note that at this point it is assumed that banks can pay these charges from pro￿ts,
for example, by deferring dividend payments.
32The ￿resales and size channels could be addressed via ‘triggering’ in case a systemic
150An important feature of the SVaR concept is that individually all banks
can default. If none of the banks’ sizes exceeds the proportion of the ￿nancial
system that is accepted to break down under the SVaR, then, depending on
which scenario realizes, all three banks are threatened with insolvency. This
reduces the risk of moral hazard from the systemic risk fund.
In the following, the outlined systemic risk charge and fund will be com-
puted for the baseline speci￿cation of the ￿nancial system developed in the
previous section. The structure of the ￿nancial system analyzed is structure
19 (see Appendix 3.A as well as Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.B at the end of this
chapter). The shocks are modeled as outlined in Section 3.2.
The supervisor’s SVaR is de￿ned as ‘In at least 95% of possible shock
scenarios, not more than 37% of the ￿nancial system shall default’. The
following exercise consists of ￿nding the minimum additional capital amounts
that need to be injected into ￿nancial institutions to ful￿ll this SVaR. Since
in structure 19 the biggest bank constitutes 37% of the ￿nancial system
(measured by the size of their balance sheets, banks 1 to 3 constitute, in
rounded values, 33%, 29%, and 37% of the ￿nancial system, respectively),
theoretically each bank can default with the SVaR still being ful￿lled if the
other two banks remain solvent in a given shock scenario.
The loss function, , which is minimized to compute the optimal amount
of additional capital that needs to be injected to full￿ll the SVaR is given by
Equation 3.14.
 =
3 X
i
i +
L X
w
ow(); (3.14)
where i is the additional amount of capital injected into ￿nancial institu-
shock emerges either (i) reduced required capital ratios, if the additional (macroprudential)
capital had been injected as preferred stock, or, (ii) the conversion of debt into equity, in
case the additional (macroprudential) capital had been injected in the form of Contingent
Convertible Bonds (CoCos). (For a review on the advantages and disadvantages of contin-
gent capital see Pazarbasioglu, Zhou, LeslØ, and Moore (2011).) However, any threshold
value, be it triggered by a market based measure or by a supervisory authority, can lead
to perverse incentives and cause moral hazard. Investigating the e￿ect of such triggers in
our model would be interesting to pursue but is beyond the scope of this chapter and thus
not addressed.
151tion i. ow is the systemic risk in scenario w, with L the number of scenarios
that exceed the accepted proportion of systemic risk after exclusion of the
percentage amount of scenarios the supervisor allows to attain or exceed the
maximum systemic risk. For example, consider the supervisor sets up 100
scenarios, with each scenario assigned a di￿erent probability. According to
the SVaR, in 95% of all scenarios the proportion of insolvent banks with re-
spect to the ￿nancial system shall not exceed 0:37. Say, in case the supervisor
injects no additional capital at all, that is
P3
i i = 0, the sum of probabilities
of scenarios resulting in excess of a systemic risk of 0.37 is 25%. Inspect-
ing Equation (3.14),  then consists of the sum of systemic risk resulting in
all scenarios exceeding the SVaR, excluding those scenarios in excess of the
SVaR which add up to the highest expected systemic risk based on 5% of
the shock scenarios.33
Note that minimizing Equation (3.14) to ￿nd out the necessary addi-
tional capital and the ￿nancial institutions in which additional capital needs
to be injected requires a non-standard optimization technique because the
objective function can have multiple local minima. The simulated anneal-
ing approach,34 a probabilistic metaheuristic optimization procedure, is used
to ￿nd the optimal solution for Equation (3.14). A parallelized variant of
the optimization algorithm is outlined in Appendix 3.C at the end of this
chapter.
Table 3.2 displays the optimal results from the systemic risk fund exercise.
The ￿rst three rows display the banks’ weighted Shapley values, that is, their
contribution to expected systemic risk, resulting from the set of all shocks.
Note that these Shapley values are calculated following Equation (3.12) on
the basis of the ￿nancial system without any capital injections from the
systemic risk fund. Rows four to six display the resulting optimal capital risk
33In Equation (3.14) probabilities are not used to weight the scenarios. However, ex-
cluding the 5% of scenarios in excess of the SVaR which result in the highest expected
value yields the lowest value of the loss function. In any case, in the exercise, all shock
scenarios included in the second term of equation (3.14) consist of at least the systemic
risk value arising through the insolvency of two banks which exceeds the ￿rst term of
Equation (3.14). The supervisor has thus a strong incentive to make sure the SVaR is not
exceeded in any of the scenarios representing 95% of the shock distribution.
34See Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi (1983).
152Contribution to Expected Systemic Risk of Bank 1 0.3289
Contribution to Expected Systemic Risk of Bank 2 0.3017
Contribution to Expected Systemic Risk of Bank 3 0.3246
Contribution of Bank 1 to Systemic Risk Fund 0.0472
Contribution of Bank 2 to Systemic Risk Fund 0.0433
Contribution of Bank 3 to Systemic Risk Fund 0.0465
Amount of Capital Injected to Bank 1 from Systemic Risk Fund 0.0494
Amount of Capital Injected to Bank 2 from Systemic Risk Fund 0.0350
Amount of Capital Injected to Bank 3 from Systemic Risk Fund 0.0526
Table 3.2: Results of the Systemic Risk Fund Exercise in Financial System
Structure 19
charge ￿ which depends on the necessary size of the systemic risk fund as well
as banks’ individual contributions to expected systemic risk ￿ for each bank.
These values are computed following Equation (3.13) where 	 is obtained by
minimizing Equation (3.14) and summing up the optimal individual capital
injections. Rows seven to nine which are also obtained from the minimization
of Equation (3.14) display the optimal amount of capital injected from the
systemic risk fund into the respective banks to ful￿ll the SVaR.
Three points are worth mentioning. First of all, banks’ contribution to
expected systemic risk is driven by the three risk-channels outlined before,
size, ￿resales, and interlinkages. In particular note that the higher contri-
bution to expected systemic risk of bank 1 with respect to bank 3 in this
structure has already been analyzed in Sub-Section 3.3.3 in the context of
investigating the e￿ect of interlinkages on expected systemic risk. 35 Bank
2 contributes least to expected systemic risk because the other banks have
no net-exposure to it, it holds the smallest amount of non-liquid assets, and
constitutes the smallest proportion of the ￿nancial system. This is re￿ected
in the contributions to expected systemic risk and the banks’ contribution
to the systemic risk fund on Table 3.2. Bank 1 contributes slightly more to
35Given the symmetry of all structures, the contribution of bank 1 to expected systemic
risk in structure 25 is the same as the contribution of bank 3 to expected systemic risk
in structure 19. Sub-Section 3.3.3 clari￿ed why in the baseline speci￿cation displayed on
Figure 3.6 the contribution to systemic risk by bank 1 (upper panel) is larger in structure
19 than in structure 25.
153expected systemic risk and thus has to pay the highest charge, followed by
banks 3 and 2, respectively.
Second, the optimal size of the systemic risk fund (0.14), obtained when
summing up rows 7 to 9 on Table 3.2 represents 3.5% of system-wide as-
sets. Calculating for each shock the di￿erence between the net-value of the
￿nancial system, that is, the sum of all banks’ net-values, with and with-
out pre-injecting the capital from the systemic risk fund into the banks, and
summing up these di￿erences weighted with the shock probabilities shows
that in expectation the ￿nancial system would have to be injected ex-post
an additional capital of about 4.1% in relation to system wide assets if the
same outcome as with pre-injecting the capital amounts was desired. This
expected size of an ex-post bail-out exceeds the size of the fund that is imme-
diately re-injected into the ￿nancial system to ful￿ll the supervisor’s SVaR. 36
This second result is driven by pre-emptively nipping the contagious e￿ects
of ￿nancial shocks in the bud, in particular knock-on defaults via the inter-
linkage channel and resulting ￿resales of non-liquid assets when the systemic
risk fund is immediately injected into the ￿nancial system.
Third, the optimal amounts of additional capital injected from the sys-
temic risk fund do not fully re￿ect the ranking which emerges in banks con-
tribution to expected systemic risk. Although bank 1 contributes more to
expected systemic risk than bank 3, it is optimal to inject more capital into
bank 3 to ful￿ll the SVaR.37 Taking a systemic perspective, the optimal
macroprudential capitalizations thus need not necesarily re￿ect banks’ con-
tribution to systemic risk in a proportional way. This result is mainly driven
by using di￿erent probability weights when computing banks’ contribution
36Note that the size of an ex-post bail-out fund gets even larger if one does not take the
expected di￿erence over all scenarios, but the largest di￿erence that results in the 95% of
scenarios in which the SVaR must be ful￿lled.
37Note that this result is robust to controlling for scenarios in which more than 37%
of the ￿nancial system default, that is, the 5% of scenarios which are accepted under
the outlined SVaR to exceed the highest proportion the supervisor is willing to accept as
insolvent in the system. Calculating the contribution to expected systemic risk without
additional capital injections only for the 95% of scenarios in which 62% (due to rounding,
the three banks’ proportions add up to 0.99) or more of the banking system remains
solvent with the optimal injections from the systemic risk fund, results in the same order
of contribution to expected systemic risk as displayed on Table 3.2.
154to expected systemic risk, however, following the de￿nition of the SVaR,
equally weighting 95% of the shock scenarios for computing banks’ optimal
additional capital injections.38
Note that qualitatively, the same result emerges, however more robust
to distributional assumptions about the shock scenarios, when taking into
consideration that additional capital injections a￿ect the channels of con-
tribution to expected systemic risk to di￿erent extents. As outlined before,
increasing a bank’s capitalization does not directly a￿ect its contribution to
expected systemic risk via the size and ￿resales channels. The main impact
of additional capital is lowering expected systemic risk emerging via the in-
terlinkage channel. To make this point clear consider, for example, a slight
modi￿cation of the baseline speci￿cation which consists of strongly increasing
the size of one of the ￿nancial institutions while making the remainder two
￿nancial institutions highly interlinked in the ￿nancial system. Increasing
bank 1’s initial assets, parameter A, to 2, leaving all remainder parameter
values as in the baseline speci￿cation, and taking ￿nancial system structure
60 results in the desired setting. Table 3.3 displays the ￿nancial system as
well as the banks’ proportions in the outlined set up.
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0.30 0.30 1.12 0.28 0.44
Bank 2 0 0 1.04 0.26 0.28
Bank 3 0 0 1.04 0.26 0.28
ROW 1.86 0.92 0.92
Table 3.3: Financial System Structure 60 with Parameter A increased to 2
for bank 1
As can be seen, bank 1 constitutes the largest proportion of the ￿nancial
system (44%) while banks 2 and 3 both constitute a relatively little propor-
38The probability weights play no role in the 95% of scenarios in which the supervisor
insures that 62% or more of the ￿nancial system remain solvent. In these scenarios the
supervisor only tries to ￿nd the minimum amount of capital which ensures that at most one
bank defaults. As has been outlined in Sub-Section 3.3.3, without giving di￿erent weights
to the shock scenarios, bank 1 contributes more to expected systemic risk in structure
25 than in structure 19. Given the symmetry of all structures, the contribution of bank
1 to expected systemic risk in structure 25 is the same as the contribution of bank 3 in
structure 19.
155Contribution to Expected Systemic Risk of Bank 1 0.4693
Contribution to Expected Systemic Risk of Bank 2 0.2610
Contribution to Expected Systemic Risk of Bank 3 0.2610
Contribution of Bank 1 to Systemic Risk Fund 0.0731
Contribution of Bank 2 to Systemic Risk Fund 0.0407
Contribution of Bank 3 to Systemic Risk Fund 0.0407
Amount of Capital Injected to Bank 1 from Systemic Risk Fund 0.0000
Amount of Capital Injected to Bank 2 from Systemic Risk Fund 0.0772
Amount of Capital Injected to Bank 3 from Systemic Risk Fund 0.0772
Table 3.4: Results of the Systemic Risk Fund Exercise in Financial System
Structure 60
tion (28%, each). Furthermore, bank 1 holds the largest amount of non-liquid
assets (1.12) while banks 2 and 3 hold a relatively small amount (1.04, each).
With regards to interlinkages, bank 1 has net-exposure both to banks 2 and
3. In this setting bank 1 contributes most to expected systemic risk via the
size and ￿resales channels and banks 2 and 3 contribute most to expected
systemic risk via the interlinkage channel.
De￿ning the SVaR as ‘In 95% of all shock-scenarios systemic risk shall not
exceed 0.44’ and repeating the systemic risk fund exercise, Table 3.4 displays
the optimal results for the ￿nancial system outlined on Table 3.3.
Again, there is no correspondence between a bank’s systemic risk charge
and the capital that is optimally injected into it. Though bank 1 contributes
most to expected systemic risk and thus pays the highest charge for the
systemic risk fund, from a ￿nancial stability perspective it is optimal to
inject this capital into banks 2 and 3, only. As outlined before, this outcome
results from the fact that the contribution to expected systemic risk is driven
by three di￿erent risk-channels which are a￿ected to a di￿erent extent by the
supervisor’s instrument to lower expected systemic risk, additional capital
injections. Since the contribution of bank 1 is only driven by the ￿resales
and size channels which are not directly addressed in the model by additional
capital, the SVaR is optimally attained via injecting all additional capital
into banks 2 and 3 which contribute most to expected systemic risk via the
156interlinkage channel.39
Overall, the SVaR analysis shows that linking a bank’s macroprudential
capital requirements directly to its contribution to systemic risk, as, for ex-
ample, suggested in Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2009), 40
is not necessarily an optimal and consistent policy approach when taking a
systemic risk management perspective. Following the results in our frame-
work, linking banks’ macroprudential capital requirements directly to their
contribution to expected systemic risk can be inconsistent or ine￿cient if, as
is likely the case, the drivers of expected systemic risk are di￿erently a￿ected
by additional macroprudential capital requirements. This result becomes
more intuitive when pointing out that a variant of the Tinbergen rule applies
in our setting. The Tinbergen rule implies that consistent economic policy
requires the number of policy instruments to at least equal the number of
policy targets.41 In our systemic risk management approach a consistent
and e￿cient economic policy calls for the same requirement because there
are two policy targets which the supervisor tries to achieve. First of all, a
numerical value with respect to expected systemic risk, the SVaR, and, sec-
ond, to incentivize banks to lower their contribution to expected systemic
risk via an appropriate risk charge. Though ultimately related, both targets
can become distinct when the risk-channels through which banks contribute
to expected systemic risk are a￿ected by the instrument to achieve systemic
stability, additional capital, to a di￿erent extent.
The solution to the dilemma in the SVaR concept is to use two instru-
39Note that the result is robust to relaxing the distributional assumptions such that
all scenarios emerge with the same probabilities. Furthermore, it is robust to controlling
for scenarios in which more than 44% of the ￿nancial system default, that is the 5% of
scenarios which are accepted under the outlined SVaR to exceed the highest proportion the
supervisor is willing to accept as insolvent in the system. Calculating the contribution to
expected systemic risk without additional capital injections only for the 95% of scenarios
in which 56% or more of the banking system remain solvent with the optimal injections
from the systemic risk fund, results in the same order of contribution to expected systemic
risk as displayed on Table 3.4.
40The authors propose, inter alia, that ￿[c]apital requirements could be set as a function
of a ￿nancial ￿rm’s marginal expected shortfall￿ (p. 8) which is their measure for a bank’s
contribution to systemic risk. See also V. Acharya and M. Richardson (2009).
41See J. Tinbergen (1952).
157ments, a levy to ful￿ll the incentive requirement 42 and a capital injection to
guarantee systemic stability. Though a proper incentive requirement should
foster the target of ￿nancial stability, it is possible that both targets cannot
be achieved by only one instrument in an e￿cient or in a consistent way if
the risk-channels are unequally a￿ected by the single instrument. Merging
the two instruments in case the risk-channels are indeed a￿ected di￿erently
by additional capital injections can result in not properly incentivizing ￿nan-
cial institutions to lower their contribution to expected systemic risk 43 or in
requiring a systemic risk fund with a larger amount than the one implied
by the optimal SVaR approach44 which then results in a sub-optimal capital
allocation.
The next section concludes.
42Note that the incentive requirement implied by the SVaR is only ful￿lled if ￿nancial
institutions are aware of how they can lower their contribution to systemic risk. This how-
ever potentially depends in part on the decisions taken by other banks. In the model and
SVaR approach the incentive requirement is only ful￿lled to the extent that banks which
contribute more to systemic risk face a higher risk charge. It still needs to be investigated,
desireably in richer framework where banks do not only try to ful￿ll a capital requirement
but also maximize their pro￿t, whether a trade-o￿ between maximizing pro￿t and paying
an adequate risk charge for the resulting contribution to systemic risk is feasible.
43This is the case if each bank is only charged the optimal amount of capital it will be
required to hold as additional (macroprudential) capital. In the example on Table 3.4 this
would be achieved via setting the contributions of banks to the systemic risk fund, rows
4 to 6, to the respective values displayed in rows 7 to 9. The SVaR would be optimally
ful￿lled, however, the incentive requirement not. Hence the policy approach would be
inconsistent.
44This is the case if the incentive requirement is ful￿lled, that is, banks are charged
according to their contribution to systemic risk while ful￿lling the SVaR, however, not in
an optimal way. With respect to the example on Table 3.4 this is achieved via including the
additional restriction in the optimization procedure that the amount injected into a bank
must be equal to the amount charged from that bank. In the example, this restriction
leads to a higher sum of necessary capital injections, that is, in a sub-optimal capital
allocation with respect to not including the restriction.
1583.5 Conclusion
In this chapter a model that allows to replicate the main stylized facts of
systemic risk which came up during the recent ￿nancial crisis has been de-
veloped. In our model, the three main risk-channels through which systemic
risk arises are banks’ size, their interlinkages, and ￿resales of non-liquid as-
sets. Furthermore, a proposed systemic risk charge and fund are designed
within an SVaR approach which allows to make the ￿nancial system more
resilient to systemic risk and charges banks according to their contribution
to expected systemic risk. This systemic risk management concept allows
to simultaneously determine the necessary capital of a systemic risk fund,
banks optimal (macroprudential) capitalization, and risk charge in a uni￿ed
framework which is consistent and e￿cient.
Among numerous insights into the complex processes arising in an interde-
pendent ￿nancial network two key results are of particular importance. First
of all, keeping additional (macroprudential) capital obtained from charging
banks according to their contribution to expected systemic risk in the ￿nan-
cial system to make it more resilient to extremely adverse shock scenarios
is likely to come at a lower cost than bailing out banks ex-post. The rea-
son for this outcome is that re-injecting capital into ‘neuralgic’ points of the
￿nancial system helps nipping crisis developments and contagion e￿ects in
the bud before they can unfold their mischief. Besides the argument that a
systemic risk fund which is not injected into the ￿nancial system but kept
centralized in a ‘government chest’ sparks political interest to divert its in-
tended use after a longer period with no systemic events, the result of our
systemic risk fund analysis provides further evidence as to why it is better to
keep macroprudential capital which is levied via a risk charge in the ￿nancial
system.
Second, using the model to analyze the proposed systemic risk charge and
fund provides evidence that there is not necessarily a correspondence between
a bank’s contribution to systemic risk ￿ which determines its risk charge ￿
and the capital that is optimally injected into it to make the ￿nancial system
more resilient to systemic risk. If the drivers of systemic risk are a￿ected by
159additional (macroprudential) capital to di￿erent extents one is well advised
to carefully distinguish between a bank’s contribution to systemic risk as
a determinant of its risk charge and the amount of capital injected into
it to make the ￿nancial system more resilient. Increasing a bank’s capital
is an e￿cient administrative instrument to lower systemic risk and banks’
contribution to it. However, not distinguishing between a bank’s risk charge
and its macroprudential capitalization can result in inconsistent or ine￿cient
economic policy.
160Appendix 3.A: Structures of the Financial Network Ma-
trix45
45An arrow from a bank to another bank symbolizes that this bank has exposure to the
other bank through interbank lending.
161Appendix 3.B: Structures Referred to in the Analysis
The structures of the ￿nancial system outlined in the following tables have
been referred to in the analysis of Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The entries in the
tables are generated along the parameter settings in the baseline speci￿cation.
The left part of each table is built up as outlined on Figure 3.2, and the
right side outlines the respective bank’s proportion in the ￿nancial system
as measured by the amounts of its assets relative to system-wide assets.
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0.3 0.80 0.20 0.36
Bank 2 0 0 0.80 0.20 0.28
Bank 3 0.3 0 0.80 0.20 0.36
ROW 0.912 0.936 0.912
Table 3.5: Financial System Structure 8
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0.3 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 2 0.3 0 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 3 0 0.3 0.80 0.20 0.33
ROW 0.912 0.912 0.912
Table 3.6: Financial System Structure 10
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.36
Bank 2 0.3 0 0.56 0.14 0.28
Bank 3 0 0 1.04 0.26 0.36
ROW 0.912 0.9312 0.9168
Table 3.7: Financial System Structure 12
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0 1.28 0.32 0.44
Bank 2 0.3 0 0.56 0.14 0.28
Bank 3 0.3 0 0.56 0.14 0.28
ROW 0.8976 0.9312 0.9312
Table 3.8: Financial System Structure 16
162Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.33
Bank 2 0.15 0.15 0.68 0.17 0.29
Bank 3 0.15 0.15 0.92 0.23 0.37
ROW 0.912 0.9216 0.9024
Table 3.9: Financial System Structure 19
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0.15 0.15 0.92 0.23 0.37
Bank 2 0.15 0.15 0.68 0.17 0.29
Bank 3 0.3 0 0.8 0.2 0.33
ROW 0.9024 0.9216 0.912
Table 3.10: Financial System Structure 25
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0.15 0.15 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 2 0.15 0.15 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 3 0.15 0.15 0.80 0.20 0.33
ROW 0.912 0.912 0.912
Table 3.11: Financial System Structure 27
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0 0.8 0.2 0.30
Bank 2 0 0.3 0.56 0.14 0.30
Bank 3 0 0 1.04 0.26 0.39
ROW 0.936 0.9312 0.9168
Table 3.12: Financial System Structure 29
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0 0.80 0.20 0.28
Bank 2 0 0.3 0.80 0.20 0.36
Bank 3 0 0.3 0.80 0.20 0.36
ROW 0.936 0.912 0.912
Table 3.13: Financial System Structure 31
163Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0 0 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 2 0 0 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 3 0 0 0.80 0.20 0.33
ROW 0.936 0.936 0.936
Table 3.14: Financial System Structure 32
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0.3 0 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 2 0 0.3 0.80 0.20 0.33
Bank 3 0.3 0 0.80 0.20 0.33
ROW 0.912 0.912 0.912
Table 3.15: Financial System Structure 61
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 NLA LA Proportion
Bank 1 0.3 0 0.8 0.20 0.36
Bank 2 0 0 1.04 0.26 0.36
Bank 3 0.3 0 0.56 0.14 0.28
ROW 0.912 0.9168 0.9312
Table 3.16: Financial System Structure 64
164Appendix 3.C: A Parallelized Simulating Annealing Al-
gorithm
To minimize the loss-function outlined in Section 3.4 (Equation (3.14)) the
simulated annealing algorithm is used. The algorithm has been developed
by Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi (1983) and is a heuristic optimization
procedure to approximate the global minimum of a complex function that
has multiple local minima.46 It has been inspired from the annealing process
in metallurgy where a slow cooling down of metal insures that atoms have
enough time to form stable crystals without defects.
To minimize a function with the simulated annealing algorithm, new func-
tion values are generated along random changes to the control parameters in
a Markov chain. New solutions that lead to improvements, that is, decreas-
ing values, in the function are always accepted as new element in the Markov
chain, whereas new solutions that lead to an increase in the function value are
only accepted with a certain probability. This acceptance probability is in-
￿uenced by a temperature used in the algorithm. At high temperature values
the acceptance probability is high, and at low temperatures this probability is
small. The optimization procedure consists of numerous sub-optimizations
along Markov chains. After each Markov chain the temperature is gradu-
ally lowered which decreases the initially high probability of ‘uphill-moves’
￿ thus preventing the optimization routine to get ‘trapped’ in local minima.
The ￿nal solution is found when the system has ‘frozen’, that is, when for
the length of one Markov chain no new solutions are accepted. Figure 3.12
displays the simulated annealing algorithm.
In the following, a variant of simulated annealing developed for our ap-
plication is outlined. It uses parallel Markov chains as well as an automatic
adjustment of the stepsize and temperature to increase accuracy and the
chance that the global minimum is found.
Following Parks (1990) new solutions are generated following Equation
3.15
  i+1 =   i +D D D u u u; (3.15)
46The following outline also draws strongly upon Parks (2010).
165Figure 3.12: Simulated Annealing Algorithm
where    is the vector of control variables, D D D is a diagonal matrix scaling the
stepsize of changes to the control variables, and u u u is a vector of uniformly
distributed numbers on the interval (-1,1). D D D is updated after a successful
draw as D D D = (1   )D D D + !R R R, where 0 <  < 1 is a parameter that
controls how fast D D D is updated, ! is a scaling parameter, and R R R is a diagonal
matrix containing the absolute value of successfully implemented steps, that
is R R R = jD D Du u uj. Following Parks (2010), the values of  and ! are set to 0:1
and 2:1, respectively.
Since the stepsize is ￿exibly adjusting to the functions’ topography, the
acceptance probability for uphill movements, that is increasing function val-
ues, needs to take this into account and is calculated following Equation
3.16
166prob = exp

 
f+
T  d

; (3.16)
where  d is the average step size, that is,  d =
P
k jDkkukj, and f+ is the
increase in the loss function at the updated vector of control variables.
Following Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi (1983) the initial temperature
is set such that the average probability of a function increase equals 0:8. The
initial temperature, T0, can be found via an initial search with the initial
stepsize set to 1, with all function changes being accepted, and then applying
Equation 3.17
T0 =  
  f+
ln(0:8)
; (3.17)
where   f+ is the average positive change in the loss function during the initial
search’s Markov chain.
The maximum length of one Markov chain is set such that the search,
given the initial step size theoretically can pace several times through the
whole search space deemed realistical for the problem at hand, which in this
application is set to be a cube with side length 2A, with A the inital assets of
banks in the model.47 In this application, with the initial maximum stepsize
set to 1, the length of the Markov chain is set to ￿fty times the searchspace’s
volume divided by the initial maximum stepsize, that is (2  A)3  50 = 400.
Clearly, the length of the Markov chain is a relatively arbitrary parameter.
Setting its length too short can result in the system freezing prematurely,
that is, getting stuck in a local optimum. Setting it too long can result in
unnecessarily long computation time. In practice, the adequacy of the length
of the Markov chain for the function to be minimized can be evaluated via
taking out several optimizations with di￿erent starting values to cross-check
whether they lead to the same optimal solution, also when taking random
starting values.48
47Note that the algorithm theoretically can explore far beyond this limit since the
stepsize is adjusting freely to the necessary length. As robustness check totally unrealistic
starting values of up to 1000  A have been chosen, always resulting in the same optimal
solution, though eventually taking a long time to compute.
48Note that no matter which length the Markov chain is assigned, it is very unlikely
to end up at exactly the same solution in each optimization given the heuristic nature of
167After a Markov chain of new random solutions has been completed the
temperature is adjusted following an adaptive approach from Huang, Romeo,
and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli (1986) where the temperature is decremented
following Equation 3.18
Tk+1 = k  Tk; (3.18)
and k is given by Equation 3.19
k = max

0:5;exp

 
0:7  Tk
k

; (3.19)
where k is the standard deviation of the loss function values that have
been accepted during the Markov chain at temperature Tk. Note that the
Markov chain is interrupted before its maximal length has been reached if
the number of accepted random draws along the Markov chain equals 60%
of the length of the Markov chain.
After the temperature has been decreased or at the beginning of the opti-
mization procedure, the actual optimal value as well as stepsize and temper-
ature are given to q parallel Markovian processes, where q is the number of
CPUs used for parallel computing. Each process then optimizes the Markov
chain along the lines outlined above until it is completed or interrupted be-
cause the number of accepted draws attained 60%. Next, the best solution
as well as the according temperature and stepsize of these sub-optimizations
from the parallel Markov chains are taken as new best value for the parallel
optimization and given again as input to q parallel Markovian processes.
The algorithm terminates when the number of accepted changes in the
entire optimal Markov chain is zero.
the algorithm. However, same solutions can be characterized as being in the same close
neighborhood.
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